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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted()
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 17:58:06 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180306145806.ejg5kzaqqmncgqi7@black.fi.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <91d27559-3f28-d53c-9fd9-d16e015a3f59@intel.com>

On Tue, Mar 06, 2018 at 02:56:08PM +0000, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 03/06/2018 12:57 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 09:08:53AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >> On 03/05/2018 08:26 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >>> +static inline bool page_encrypted(struct page *page)
> >>> +{
> >>> +	/* All pages with non-zero KeyID are encrypted */
> >>> +	return page_keyid(page) != 0;
> >>> +}
> >>
> >> Is this true?  I thought there was a KEYID_NO_ENCRYPT "Do not encrypt
> >> memory when this KeyID is in use."  Is that really only limited to key 0.
> > 
> > Well, it depends on what we mean by "encrypted". For memory management
> > pruposes we care if the page is encrypted with KeyID different from
> > default one. All pages with non-default KeyID threated the same by memory
> > management.
> 
> Doesn't it really mean "am I able to use the direct map to get this
> page's contents?"

Yes.

Any proposal for better helper name?

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-06 14:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-05 16:25 [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 01/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-12 12:20   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 02/22] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-12 12:21   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-13  2:12     ` Kai Huang
2018-03-13 12:49       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-13 15:09         ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-13 22:07         ` Kai Huang
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 03/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-12 12:21   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 04/22] x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-12 12:22   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 05/22] x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-12 12:23   ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 06/22] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 07/22] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 15:55   ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 08/22] mm: Introduce __GFP_ENCRYPT Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 16:02   ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 09/22] mm, rmap: Add arch-specific field into anon_vma Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 10/22] mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 11/22] mm: Use __GFP_ENCRYPT for pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 12/22] mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 13/22] mm, rmap: Free encrypted pages once mapcount drops to zero Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:12   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:18     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:13   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:59       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 15:00         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 14/22] mm, khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 15/22] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 16/22] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:09   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:30     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 17/22] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 18/22] x86/mm: Handle allocation of encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:03   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:34     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:36     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 19/22] x86/mm: Implement free_encrypt_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:00   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:38     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:54     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 13:52       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:09         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-20 12:50     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-27 14:44       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 20/22] x86/mm: Implement anon_vma_encrypted() and anon_vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 17:08   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:57     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:56       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:58         ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-03-06 15:04           ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 22/22] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 18:30 ` [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Christoph Hellwig
2018-03-05 19:05   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-06  8:58     ` Kirill A. Shutemov

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