From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-fs@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 18:23:52 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180314102352.GG19718@linux-l9pv.suse> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu_1+8AOy4Fj_yD6iEJQvjw3hA4KW11agU+ozujxMNQHVA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Ard,
First! Thanks for your review!
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 05:25:30PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 13 March 2018 at 10:37, Lee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:
> > The mok can not be trusted when the secure boot is disabled. Which
> > means that the kernel embedded certificate is the only trusted key.
> >
> > Due to db/dbx are authenticated variables, they needs manufacturer's
> > KEK for update. So db/dbx are secure when secureboot disabled.
> >
>
> Did you consider the case where secure boot is not implemented? I
> don't think db/dbx are secure in that case, although perhaps it may
> not matter (a bit more information on the purpose of these patches and
> all the shim lingo etc would be appreciated)
>
The patch 5 in this series checks that the db/dbx must have
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute. But I agree
with you that kernel should checks the SecureBoot variable must
exist in system. I will add patch to detect it.
> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> > Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > certs/load_uefi.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
> > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
> > index 3d88459..d6de4d0 100644
> > --- a/certs/load_uefi.c
> > +++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
> > @@ -164,17 +164,6 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
>
> Which tree does this apply to? My tree doesn't have get_cert_list()
>
This patch set is base on the efi-lock-down and keys-uefi branchs in
David Howells's linux-fs git tree.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-uefi
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-14 10:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-13 10:37 [PATCH 0/5 v2] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 10:37 ` [PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 17:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-14 10:23 ` joeyli [this message]
2018-03-13 10:38 ` [PATCH 2/5] MODSIGN: print appropriate status message when getting UEFI certificates list Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 10:38 ` [PATCH 3/5] MODSIGN: load blacklist from MOKx Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 10:38 ` [PATCH 4/5] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 17:18 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-14 6:08 ` joeyli
2018-03-14 14:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-15 6:16 ` joeyli
2018-03-15 14:30 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-16 7:32 ` joeyli
2018-03-13 10:38 ` [PATCH 5/5] MODSIGN: check the attributes of db and mok Lee, Chun-Yi
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-03-13 10:35 [PATCH 0/5 v2] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module Lee, Chun-Yi
2018-03-13 10:35 ` [PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled Lee, Chun-Yi
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