From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753473AbeDMBbC (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Apr 2018 21:31:02 -0400 Received: from imap.thunk.org ([74.207.234.97]:37194 "EHLO imap.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752037AbeDMBa6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Apr 2018 21:30:58 -0400 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Linux Kernel Developers List , "Theodore Ts'o" , stable@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/5] random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 21:30:45 -0400 Message-Id: <20180413013046.404-4-tytso@mit.edu> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.1.72.g5be1f00a9a In-Reply-To: <20180413013046.404-1-tytso@mit.edu> References: <20180413013046.404-1-tytso@mit.edu> X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: tytso@thunk.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on imap.thunk.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jann Horn Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.8+ Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Jann Horn --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 681ee0c0de24..6e7fa13b1a89 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); } - spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { unsigned long rv; if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && @@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); crng->init_time = jiffies; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); numa_crng_init(); -- 2.16.1.72.g5be1f00a9a