From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] idr: fix invalid ptr dereference on item delete
Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 07:14:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180519141445.GA9526@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180519062635.GA6352@rkaganip.lan>
On Sat, May 19, 2018 at 09:26:36AM +0300, Roman Kagan wrote:
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 03:31:38PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Fri, 18 May 2018 10:50:25 -0700 Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> > > If the radix tree underlying the IDR happens to be full and we attempt
> > > to remove an id which is larger than any id in the IDR, we will call
> > > __radix_tree_delete() with an uninitialised 'slot' pointer, at which
> > > point anything could happen. This was easiest to hit with a single entry
> > > at id 0 and attempting to remove a non-0 id, but it could have happened
> > > with 64 entries and attempting to remove an id >= 64.
> > >
> > > Fixes: 0a835c4f090a ("Reimplement IDR and IDA using the radix tree")
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+35666cba7f0a337e2e79@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > > Debugged-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
> >
> > Neither of the changelogs I'm seeing attempt to describe the end-user
> > impact of the bug. People like to know that so they can decide which
> > kernel version(s) need patching, so please always remember it.
>
> That's my fault, Matthew may not have seen the original discussion among
> the KVM folks.
>
> > Looknig at the sysbot report, the impact is at least "privileged user
> > can trigger a WARN", but I assume there could be worse,
>
> Unfortunately it is worse: the syzcaller test boils down to opening
> /dev/kvm, creating an eventfd, and calling a couple of KVM ioctls. None
> of this requires superuser. And the result is dereferencing an
> uninitialized pointer which is likely a crash.
>
> > as-yet-undiscovered impacts. So I'm thinking a cc:stable is needed,
> > yes?
>
> Well the specific path caught by syzbot is via KVM_HYPERV_EVENTD ioctl
> which is new in 4.17. But I guess there are other user-triggerable
> paths, so cc:stable is probably justified.
We have around 250 calls to idr_remove() in the kernel today. Many of
them pass an ID which is embedded in the object they're removing, so
they're safe. Picking a few likely candidates:
drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c looks unsafe; the ID comes from an ioctl.
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ctx.c is similar
drivers/atm/nicstar.c could be taken down by a handcrafted packet
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-19 14:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-18 17:50 [PATCH] idr: fix invalid ptr dereference on item delete Matthew Wilcox
2018-05-18 20:23 ` Roman Kagan
2018-05-19 0:31 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-05-18 22:31 ` Andrew Morton
2018-05-19 0:28 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-05-19 6:26 ` Roman Kagan
2018-05-19 14:14 ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2018-05-21 19:13 ` Andrew Morton
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-05-10 19:16 Roman Kagan
2018-05-10 23:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-05-11 5:40 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-05-11 5:57 ` Roman Kagan
2018-05-11 9:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-05-18 20:29 ` Roman Kagan
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