From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZqzpQCquMq+fCFxCrP2tQQtlmzNtGLMIxNJbt3IrnI6DtNUedtkYhtVtvgBK5MY1lcO5czE ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1526937392; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=P9RX6VBnjvaCdC+pkfQyYiCaAlNbQ9o2/ggUlQ3I5zgfIJmUpGFjRJEj7sUvTkipbl 3V7dQbBlz/So9uRx/aDV3rWQYgnddaQ3Kts50fsSl1e5s+ESFYg1jjWeQNGZ2S7D+b3P t6SI3432piZgmEA3MbPEb0oiNWDWzeyHEKhgzEXMmKY93DdeuJ66lY12kFtxrAg5hfQt JiSDo0O0phl3vASQ4zuKxMI34eLchp86ROPoCJRjKEexjeA39ufr9vCBlPDLMCDrFIl/ oG8OF2zRb2H/2zrD14whyxMxyoIQBQ+73UzSqUrPpenCdZtMhJPjvHo5lROswBxH91xf wyhw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date :subject:cc:to:from:dkim-signature:arc-authentication-results; bh=+j5wz+GnvjdhZhqLto514K/4oKIpoOr8Akv2iyRn+cI=; b=vjY5w8cEH1HPgb5dcTyAbp5d3mL0yaKN7dyr6SiMOAhvxanuRGWnTVFr4jY54/sb3o gkn6TEvz79fUdIWF59GSERlkKAcU1zecGG/IpDXWlc+sjhIavmJhFay4rXv9cUEDTn9w wqgWZmWazUlaCVvlUAiqbr1Gns/Hl0+PJAYiNmha73YEmKt8i+2Y0rlNWTpVLkJtSBlc EQ8BCO49dOrXO+ensrJ7d5ZkNz3MNYItYbtCtDHYWKUbDzPg+Ilkf2XbiraC64btUNBs xYl5bHgUc+/72pgjDOaUgkCRoYPQ45csZvld5bsFMgkayMSRmdgdo2MZozPKSWyGmJ8T N4xg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=P8WJC6yg; spf=pass (google.com: domain of srs0=nia/=ii=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org designates 198.145.29.99 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=SRS0=nia/=II=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=P8WJC6yg; spf=pass (google.com: domain of srs0=nia/=ii=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org designates 198.145.29.99 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=SRS0=nia/=II=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Thomas Gleixner , David Woodhouse Subject: [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:11:42 +0200 Message-Id: <20180521210425.937595360@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180521210420.222671977@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180521210420.222671977@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-LABELS: =?utf-8?b?IlxcU2VudCI=?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1601109903251925648?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1601109903251925648?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Borislav Petkov commit dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc upstream Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt +++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ Speculation Control =================== -Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact -vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege -domains. +Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in +fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across +privilege domains. The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various -forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on -the kernel command line. +forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some +can be supplied on the kernel command line. There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled @@ -32,18 +32,18 @@ the following meaning: Bit Define Description ==== ===================== =================================================== 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by - PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL. 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is - disabled + disabled. 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is - enabled + enabled. 3 PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail. ==== ===================== =================================================== If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. -If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is +If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ Common error codes Value Meaning ======= ================================================================= EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused - prctl(2) arguments are not 0 + prctl(2) arguments are not 0. -ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature +ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature. ======= ================================================================= PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Value Meaning 0 Success ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor - PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE + PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE. ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.