From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752695AbeFAPAH (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jun 2018 11:00:07 -0400 Received: from userp2130.oracle.com ([156.151.31.86]:54506 "EHLO userp2130.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752468AbeFAPAC (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jun 2018 11:00:02 -0400 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Paolo Bonzini , =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= , Joerg Roedel , Borislav Petkov , David Woodhouse , Tom Lendacky , Janakarajan Natarajan , Kees Cook , KarimAllah Ahmed , Andy Lutomirski Subject: [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage Date: Fri, 1 Jun 2018 10:59:20 -0400 Message-Id: <20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.4 In-Reply-To: <20180601145921.9500-1-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> References: <20180601145921.9500-1-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=8911 signatures=668702 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1805220000 definitions=main-1806010174 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by mail.home.local id w51F0XUI011390 The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) for speculative store bypass disable. This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR. See the document titled: 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf A copy of this document is available at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889 Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: "Radim Krčmář" Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan Cc: Kees Cook Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed Cc: Andy Lutomirski --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 8 +++++--- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b6d7ce32927a..5701f5cecd31 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 7416fc206b4a..6bea81855cdd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -529,18 +529,20 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE); /* - * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses - * a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family. + * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may + * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family. */ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) { case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: + case X86_VENDOR_AMD: + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { + x86_amd_ssb_disable(); + break; + } x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); break; - case X86_VENDOR_AMD: - x86_amd_ssb_disable(); - break; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 494735cf63f5..d08a29bd0385 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -783,6 +783,12 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL); } + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD); + } } void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 132f8a58692e..f4f30d0c25c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -379,7 +379,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features = - F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(VIRT_SSBD) | F(AMD_SSB_NO); + F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) | + F(AMD_SSB_NO); /* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */ const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features = @@ -664,7 +665,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD); entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features; cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX); - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) + /* + * The preference is to use SPEC CTRL MSR instead of the + * VIRT_SPEC MSR. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 26110c202b19..950ec50f77c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -4115,7 +4115,8 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) break; case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && - !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) return 1; msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl; @@ -4217,11 +4218,12 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) break; case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: if (!msr->host_initiated && - !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) return 1; /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ - if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)) return 1; svm->spec_ctrl = data; -- 2.13.4