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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 33/61] powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
Date: Tue,  5 Jun 2018 19:01:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180605170119.820466474@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180605170117.643936916@linuxfoundation.org>

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

commit 9a868f634349e62922c226834aa23e3d1329ae7f upstream.

This commit adds security feature flags to reflect the settings we
receive from firmware regarding Spectre/Meltdown mitigations.

The feature names reflect the names we are given by firmware on bare
metal machines. See the hostboot source for details.

Arguably these could be firmware features, but that then requires them
to be read early in boot so they're available prior to asm feature
patching, but we don't actually want to use them for patching. We may
also want to dynamically update them in future, which would be
incompatible with the way firmware features work (at the moment at
least). So for now just make them separate flags.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h |   65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                 |    2 
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c               |   15 ++++++
 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c

--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Security related feature bit definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
+#define _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
+
+
+extern unsigned long powerpc_security_features;
+
+static inline void security_ftr_set(unsigned long feature)
+{
+	powerpc_security_features |= feature;
+}
+
+static inline void security_ftr_clear(unsigned long feature)
+{
+	powerpc_security_features &= ~feature;
+}
+
+static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
+{
+	return !!(powerpc_security_features & feature);
+}
+
+
+// Features indicating support for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
+
+// The L1-D cache can be flushed with ori r30,r30,0
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30		0x0000000000000001ull
+
+// The L1-D cache can be flushed with mtspr 882,r0 (aka SPRN_TRIG2)
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2		0x0000000000000002ull
+
+// ori r31,r31,0 acts as a speculation barrier
+#define SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31		0x0000000000000004ull
+
+// Speculation past bctr is disabled
+#define SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED	0x0000000000000008ull
+
+// Entries in L1-D are private to a SMT thread
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV		0x0000000000000010ull
+
+// Indirect branch prediction cache disabled
+#define SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED	0x0000000000000020ull
+
+
+// Features indicating need for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
+
+// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[HV] 1->0 transition (hypervisor to guest)
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV		0x0000000000000040ull
+
+// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[PR] 0->1 transition (kernel to userspace)
+#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR		0x0000000000000080ull
+
+// A speculation barrier should be used for bounds checks (Spectre variant 1)
+#define SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR	0x0000000000000100ull
+
+// Firmware configuration indicates user favours security over performance
+#define SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY		0x0000000000000200ull
+
+#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64)		+= setup_64.o sys_p
 obj-$(CONFIG_VDSO32)		+= vdso32/
 obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT)	+= hw_breakpoint.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)	+= cpu_setup_ppc970.o cpu_setup_pa6t.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)	+= cpu_setup_power.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)	+= cpu_setup_power.o security.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)	+= mce.o mce_power.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64)	+= exceptions-64e.o idle_book3e.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64)		+= vdso64/
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+//
+// Security related flags and so on.
+//
+// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <asm/security_features.h>
+
+
+unsigned long powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = \
+	SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \
+	SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
+	SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
+	SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-06-05 17:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-05 17:01 [PATCH 4.9 00/61] 4.9.107-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/61] arm64: lse: Add early clobbers to some input/output asm operands Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/61] powerpc/64s: Clear PCR on boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/61] USB: serial: cp210x: use tcflag_t to fix incompatible pointer type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/61] Revert "pinctrl: msm: Use dynamic GPIO numbering" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/61] xfs: detect agfl count corruption and reset agfl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/61] Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/61] Input: elan_i2c_smbus - fix corrupted stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/61] tracing: Fix crash when freeing instances with event triggers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/61] selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/61] cfg80211: further limit wiphy names to 64 bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/61] dma-buf: remove redundant initialization of sg_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/61] rtlwifi: rtl8192cu: Remove variable self-assignment in rf.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/61] ASoC: Intel: sst: remove redundant variable dma_dev_name Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/61] platform/chrome: cros_ec_lpc: remove redundant pointer request Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/61] x86/amd: revert commit 944e0fc51a89c9827b9 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/61] xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/61] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/61] tcp: avoid integer overflows in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/61] scsi: ufs: fix failure to read the string descriptor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/61] scsi: ufs: refactor device descriptor reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/61] scsi: ufs: Factor out ufshcd_read_desc_param Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/61] arm64: Add hypervisor safe helper for checking constant capabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/61] arm64/cpufeature: dont use mutex in bringup path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Move out of HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR #ifdef Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/61] powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/61] powerpc/powernv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/61] powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/61] powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/61] powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/61] powerpc/powernv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/61] powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/61] powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/61] powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/61] powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/61] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/61] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/61] powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/61] powerpc: Move default " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/61] powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/61] powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/61] net/mlx4_en: fix potential use-after-free with dma_unmap_page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/61] iio:kfifo_buf: check for uint overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/61] MIPS: ptrace: Fix PTRACE_PEEKUSR requests for 64-bit FGRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/61] MIPS: prctl: Disallow FRE without FR with PR_SET_FP_MODE requests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/61] scsi: scsi_transport_srp: Fix shost to rport translation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/61] stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/61] hwtracing: stm: fix build error on some arches Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/61] IB/core: Fix error code for invalid GID entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/61] fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/61] mm: fix the NULL mapping case in __isolate_lru_page() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/61] sparc64: Dont clibber fixed registers in __multi4 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 17:02 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/61] serial: pl011: add console matching function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-05 22:01 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/61] 4.9.107-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-06-06  8:06   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-06 11:24 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-06-06 13:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-06-06 13:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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