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From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, christoffer.dall@arm.com,
	drjones@redhat.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	awallis@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 00/10] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 17:12:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180704161212.GS4828@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180503132031.25705-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

HI Mark,

On Thu, May 03, 2018 at 02:20:21PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This series adds support for the ARMv8.3 pointer authentication extension,
> enabling userspace return address protection with recent versions of GCC.

As discussed off-list, I'd really like to get a feel for how we might use
this to protect the kernel before we commit to a userspace ABI, especially
given that there is some level of resource sharing with the keys.

So ideally, we'd merge this along with the support for the kernel side.
In the meantime, is it worth taking any of the ID register sanity checks
now?

Will

      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-04 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-03 13:20 [PATCHv4 00/10] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 01/10] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 02/10] arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 03/10] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 04/10] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 05/10] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2018-05-23  8:48   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-25 10:01     ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-04 16:09       ` Will Deacon
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 06/10] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 19:08   ` Adam Wallis
2018-05-23  8:42   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-25 10:18     ` Mark Rutland
2018-06-08 13:11   ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 07/10] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 08/10] arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 09/10] arm64: enable pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 13:20 ` [PATCHv4 10/10] arm64: docs: document " Mark Rutland
2018-07-04 16:12 ` Will Deacon [this message]

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