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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] perf/core: fix possible spectre-v1 write
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 19:06:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180710180607.56624-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)

It's possible for userspace to control event_id. Sanitize event_id when
using it as an array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write
gadget.

This class of issue is also known as CVE-2018-3693, or "bounds check bypass
store".

Found by smatch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

For Arm CPUs, more details can be found in the Arm Cache Speculation
Side-channels whitepaper, available from the Arm security updates site [1].

Mark.

[1] https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 8f0434a9951a..eece719bd18e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -8155,6 +8155,7 @@ struct static_key perf_swevent_enabled[PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX];
 static void sw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
+	event_id = array_index_nospec(event_id, PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX);
 
 	WARN_ON(event->parent);
 
@@ -8186,6 +8187,7 @@ static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
 
 	if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
 		return -ENOENT;
+	event_id = array_index_nospec(event_id, PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX);
 
 	if (!event->parent) {
 		int err;
-- 
2.11.0


             reply	other threads:[~2018-07-10 18:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-10 18:06 Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-07-10 19:01 ` [PATCH] perf/core: fix possible spectre-v1 write kbuild test robot
2018-07-10 21:02 ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-11  5:53 ` Mark Rutland

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