From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD05BECDFB8 for ; Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:25:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ACCD20854 for ; Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:25:46 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8ACCD20854 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=ucw.cz Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728029AbeGTLNT (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jul 2018 07:13:19 -0400 Received: from atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz ([195.113.26.193]:49622 "EHLO atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727303AbeGTLNT (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jul 2018 07:13:19 -0400 Received: by atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz (Postfix, from userid 512) id E32FC804DE; Fri, 20 Jul 2018 12:25:40 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 12:25:32 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: Yu Chen Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Message-ID: <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="0F1p//8PRICkK4MW" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --0F1p//8PRICkK4MW Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi! > > > > > As security becomes more and more important, we add the in-kernel > > > > > encryption support for hibernation. > > > >=20 > > > > Sorry, this does not really explain what security benefit it is > > > > supposed have to against what attack scenarios. > > > >=20 > > > > Which unfortunately means it can not reviewed. > > > >=20 > > > > Note that uswsusp already provides encryption. If this is supposed = to > > > > have advantages over it, please say so. > > > >=20 > > > The advantages are described in detail in=20 > > > [PATCH 1/4]'s log, please refer to that. > >=20 > > Are you refering to this? > > > Not this one. I've sent v2 of this patch set which > explain more on this: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10532935/ Aha, sorry about that. > Let me paste the log here: >=20 > 1. (This is not to compare with uswsusp but other > tools) One advantage is: Users do not have to > encrypt the whole swap partition as other tools. Well.. encrypting the partition seems like good idea anyway.=20 > 2. Ideally kernel memory should be encrypted by the > kernel itself. We have uswsusp to support user > space hibernation, however doing the encryption > in kernel space has more advantages: > 2.1 Not having to transfer plain text kernel memory to > user space. Per Lee, Chun-Yi, uswsusp is disabled > when the kernel is locked down: > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/ > linux-fs.git/commit/?h=3Dlockdown-20180410& > id=3D8732c1663d7c0305ae01ba5a1ee4d2299b7b4612 > due to: > "There have some functions be locked-down because > there have no appropriate mechanisms to check the > integrity of writing data." > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10476751/ So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation can be enabled with kernel lockdown? > 2.2 Not having to copy each page to user space > one by one not in parallel, which might introduce > significant amount of copy_to_user() and it might > not be efficient on servers having large amount of DRAM. So how big speedup can be attributed by not doing copy_to_user? > 2.3 Distribution has requirement to do snapshot > signature for verification, which can be built > by leveraging this patch set. Signatures can be done by uswsusp, too, right? > 2.4 The encryption is in the kernel, so it doesn't > have to worry too much about bugs in user space > utilities and similar, for example. Answer to bugs in userspace is _not_ to move code from userspace to kernel. > > Also note that joeyli has patch series which encrypts > > both in-kernel and uswsusp hibernation methods. His motivation is > > secure boot. How does this compare to his work? > > > Joey Lee and I had a discussion on his previous work at > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10476751 > We collaborate on this task and his snapshot signature > feature can be based on this patch set. Well, his work can also work without your patchset, right? Pavel --=20 (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blo= g.html --0F1p//8PRICkK4MW Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAltRuJwACgkQMOfwapXb+vKoLwCeNp7X2wxMaONvzvgt9uMDavdt k+0An2rCHACwENvM76lCmYBRfo+H+9h2 =giC4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --0F1p//8PRICkK4MW--