linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.17 89/97] KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:17:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171436.569237492@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180814171433.160434170@linuxfoundation.org>

4.17-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

commit 5b76a3cff011df2dcb6186c965a2e4d809a05ad4 upstream

When nested virtualization is in use, VMENTER operations from the nested
hypervisor into the nested guest will always be processed by the bare metal
hypervisor, and KVM's "conditional cache flushes" mode in particular does a
flush on nested vmentry.  Therefore, include the "skip L1D flush on
vmentry" bit in KVM's suggested ARCH_CAPABILITIES setting.

Add the relevant Documentation.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                 |    3 +--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
@@ -546,6 +546,27 @@ available:
     EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
     parameter.
 
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
 
 .. _default_mitigations:
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1415,6 +1415,7 @@ int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcp
 void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
 void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void);
 void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
 int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -6232,8 +6232,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_v
 		++vmx->nmsrs;
 	}
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities);
+	vmx->arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
 
 	vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1098,11 +1098,35 @@ static u32 msr_based_features[] = {
 
 static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
 
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 data;
+
+	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond")
+	 * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume.
+	 * If an outer hypervisor is doing the cache flush for us
+	 * (VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NESTED_VM), we can safely pass that
+	 * capability to the guest too, and if EPT is disabled we're not
+	 * vulnerable.  Overall, only VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER will
+	 * require a nested hypervisor to do a flush of its own.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
+
+	return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
+
 static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
 {
 	switch (msr->index) {
-	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 		rdmsrl_safe(msr->index, &msr->data);
 		break;
 	default:



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-14 17:16 [PATCH 4.17 00/97] 4.17.15-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 01/97] parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 03/97] Mark HI and TASKLET softirq synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 04/97] stop_machine: Disable preemption after queueing stopper threads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 05/97] sched/deadline: Update rq_clock of later_rq when pushing a task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 06/97] zram: remove BD_CAP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO with writeback feature Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 07/97] xen/netfront: dont cache skb_shinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 08/97] bpf, sockmap: fix leak in bpf_tcp_sendmsg wait for mem path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 09/97] bpf, sockmap: fix bpf_tcp_sendmsg sock error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 10/97] scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 11/97] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix memory leak for allocating abort IOCB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 12/97] init: rename and re-order boot_cpu_state_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 13/97] root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 14/97] make sure that __dentry_kill() always invalidates d_seq, unhashed or not Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 15/97] fix mntput/mntput race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 16/97] fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 17/97] ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 18/97] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 19/97] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 20/97] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 21/97] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 22/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 23/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 24/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 25/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 26/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 27/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 28/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 29/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 30/97] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 31/97] sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 32/97] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 33/97] x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 34/97] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 35/97] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 36/97] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 37/97] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 38/97] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 39/97] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 40/97] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 41/97] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 42/97] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 43/97] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 45/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 46/97] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.17 47/97] x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 48/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 49/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 50/97] Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 51/97] cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 52/97] x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 53/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 54/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 55/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 56/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 57/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 58/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 59/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 60/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 61/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 62/97] cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 63/97] x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 64/97] x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 65/97] x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 66/97] x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 67/97] x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 68/97] x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 69/97] x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 70/97] cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 71/97] cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 72/97] x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 73/97] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 74/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 75/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 76/97] Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 77/97] cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 78/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 79/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Replace vmx_l1d_flush_always with vmx_l1d_flush_cond Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 80/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 81/97] x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 82/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 83/97] x86: Dont include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 84/97] x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 85/97] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 86/97] Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 87/97] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 88/97] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 90/97] cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 91/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 92/97] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 93/97] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 94/97] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 95/97] tools headers: Synchronize prctl.h ABI header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 96/97] tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.17 97/97] x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  6:14 ` [PATCH 4.17 00/97] 4.17.15-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:15 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 20:31 ` Dan Rue
2018-08-16 10:08   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180814171436.569237492@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).