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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 034/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:16:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171522.845433060@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180814171520.883143803@linuxfoundation.org>

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

commit 42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921 upstream

For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.

Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.

To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.

Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.

It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.

For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().

For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.

[dwmw2: Backport to 4.9]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |    9 +++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c             |   21 +++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h  |   12 ++++++++++
 mm/memory.c                    |   29 ++++++++++++++++++------
 mm/mprotect.c                  |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1026,6 +1026,15 @@ static inline u16 pte_flags_pkey(unsigne
 #endif
 }
 
+
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED 1
+extern bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot);
+
+static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
 #include <asm-generic/pgtable.h>
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -121,3 +121,24 @@ const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area
 		return "[mpx]";
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Only allow root to set high MMIO mappings to PROT_NONE.
+ * This prevents an unpriv. user to set them to PROT_NONE and invert
+ * them, then pointing to valid memory for L1TF speculation.
+ *
+ * Note: for locked down kernels may want to disable the root override.
+ */
+bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return true;
+	if (!__pte_needs_invert(pgprot_val(prot)))
+		return true;
+	/* If it's real memory always allow */
+	if (pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return true;
+	if (pfn > l1tf_pfn_limit() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -842,4 +842,16 @@ int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED
+static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -1641,6 +1641,9 @@ int vm_insert_pfn_prot(struct vm_area_st
 	if (track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, __pfn_to_pfn_t(pfn, PFN_DEV)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn, pgprot))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	ret = insert_pfn(vma, addr, __pfn_to_pfn_t(pfn, PFN_DEV), pgprot);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1659,6 +1662,9 @@ int vm_insert_mixed(struct vm_area_struc
 	if (track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, pfn))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn_t_to_pfn(pfn), pgprot))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/*
 	 * If we don't have pte special, then we have to use the pfn_valid()
 	 * based VM_MIXEDMAP scheme (see vm_normal_page), and thus we *must*
@@ -1692,6 +1698,7 @@ static int remap_pte_range(struct mm_str
 {
 	pte_t *pte;
 	spinlock_t *ptl;
+	int err = 0;
 
 	pte = pte_alloc_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
 	if (!pte)
@@ -1699,12 +1706,16 @@ static int remap_pte_range(struct mm_str
 	arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
 	do {
 		BUG_ON(!pte_none(*pte));
+		if (!pfn_modify_allowed(pfn, prot)) {
+			err = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
 		set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(pfn, prot)));
 		pfn++;
 	} while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
 	arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
 	pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
-	return 0;
+	return err;
 }
 
 static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud,
@@ -1713,6 +1724,7 @@ static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct
 {
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 	unsigned long next;
+	int err;
 
 	pfn -= addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pud, addr);
@@ -1721,9 +1733,10 @@ static inline int remap_pmd_range(struct
 	VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
 	do {
 		next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
-		if (remap_pte_range(mm, pmd, addr, next,
-				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		err = remap_pte_range(mm, pmd, addr, next,
+				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1734,6 +1747,7 @@ static inline int remap_pud_range(struct
 {
 	pud_t *pud;
 	unsigned long next;
+	int err;
 
 	pfn -= addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, addr);
@@ -1741,9 +1755,10 @@ static inline int remap_pud_range(struct
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	do {
 		next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
-		if (remap_pmd_range(mm, pud, addr, next,
-				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		err = remap_pmd_range(mm, pud, addr, next,
+				pfn + (addr >> PAGE_SHIFT), prot);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -260,6 +260,42 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct v
 	return pages;
 }
 
+static int prot_none_pte_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
+			       unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return pfn_modify_allowed(pte_pfn(*pte), *(pgprot_t *)(walk->private)) ?
+		0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_hugetlb_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask,
+				   unsigned long addr, unsigned long next,
+				   struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return pfn_modify_allowed(pte_pfn(*pte), *(pgprot_t *)(walk->private)) ?
+		0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_test(unsigned long addr, unsigned long next,
+			  struct mm_walk *walk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int prot_none_walk(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+			   unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
+{
+	pgprot_t new_pgprot = vm_get_page_prot(newflags);
+	struct mm_walk prot_none_walk = {
+		.pte_entry = prot_none_pte_entry,
+		.hugetlb_entry = prot_none_hugetlb_entry,
+		.test_walk = prot_none_test,
+		.mm = current->mm,
+		.private = &new_pgprot,
+	};
+
+	return walk_page_range(start, end, &prot_none_walk);
+}
+
 int
 mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
 	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
@@ -278,6 +314,19 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Do PROT_NONE PFN permission checks here when we can still
+	 * bail out without undoing a lot of state. This is a rather
+	 * uncommon case, so doesn't need to be very optimized.
+	 */
+	if (arch_has_pfn_modify_check() &&
+	    (vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) &&
+	    (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC)) == 0) {
+		error = prot_none_walk(vma, start, end, newflags);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit;
 	 * but (without finer accounting) cannot reduce our commit if we
 	 * make it unwritable again. hugetlb mapping were accounted for



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-14 17:16 [PATCH 4.9 000/107] 4.9.120-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/107] ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/107] tpm: fix race condition in tpm_common_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/107] parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/107] kasan: add no_sanitize attribute for clang builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/107] Mark HI and TASKLET softirq synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/107] xen/netfront: dont cache skb_shinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/107] ACPI / LPSS: Add missing prv_offset setting for byt/cht PWM devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/107] scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/107] init: rename and re-order boot_cpu_state_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/107] root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/107] make sure that __dentry_kill() always invalidates d_seq, unhashed or not Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/107] fix mntput/mntput race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/107] fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/107] proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/107] proc/sysctl: Dont grab i_lock under sysctl_lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/107] proc: Fix proc_sys_prune_dcache to hold a sb reference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/107] IB/core: Make testing MR flags for writability a static inline function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/107] IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/107] mtd: nand: qcom: Add a NULL check for devm_kasprintf() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/107] IB/ocrdma: fix out of bounds access to local buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/107] ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/107] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/107] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/107] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/107] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/107] mm: x86: move _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY from bit 7 to bit 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/107] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/107] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/107] x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/107] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/107] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/107] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/107] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/107] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/107] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/107] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/107] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/107] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/107] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/107] x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 054/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/107] Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/107] cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/107] x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/107] cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/107] x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/107] x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/107] x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/107] x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/107] x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/107] x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/107] x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/107] cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/107] cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/107] x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/107] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/107] Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/107] cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Replace vmx_l1d_flush_always with vmx_l1d_flush_cond Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/107] x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/107] x86: Dont include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/107] x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/107] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/107] Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/107] KVM: VMX: support MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES as a feature MSR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/107] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/107] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/107] KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/107] cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 102/107] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 103/107] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 104/107] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 105/107] tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 106/107] x86/microcode: Do not upload microcode if CPUs are offline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 107/107] x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 18:58 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/107] 4.9.120-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-08-15  5:51   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  0:36 ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15  1:00   ` Nathan Chancellor
2018-08-15  1:01   ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15  5:55   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  6:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 12:20   ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 13:14     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:12 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 17:01 ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 17:52   ` Sven Joachim
2018-08-15 18:22     ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 18:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-15 18:33         ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 19:10           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 18:27     ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 18:55       ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 19:08         ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 19:26           ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 19:42             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-15 20:33               ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 20:42                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-16  7:03                   ` Sebastian Gottschall
2018-08-15 20:40               ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 19:14       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 19:11   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 20:43 ` Dan Rue

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