* Re: Linux 3.18.119
2018-08-18 8:42 Linux 3.18.119 Greg KH
@ 2018-08-18 8:43 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2018-08-18 8:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, Andrew Morton, torvalds, stable; +Cc: lwn, Jiri Slaby
diff --git a/Documentation/Changes b/Documentation/Changes
index 1de131bb49fb..9ad68f1819d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/Changes
+++ b/Documentation/Changes
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ o Gnu C 3.2 # gcc --version
o Gnu make 3.80 # make --version
o binutils 2.12 # ld -v
o util-linux 2.10o # fdformat --version
-o module-init-tools 0.9.10 # depmod -V
+o kmod 13 # depmod -V
o e2fsprogs 1.41.4 # e2fsck -V
o jfsutils 1.1.3 # fsck.jfs -V
o reiserfsprogs 3.6.3 # reiserfsck -V
@@ -119,12 +119,6 @@ is not build with CONFIG_KALLSYMS and you have no way to rebuild and
reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops
with ksymoops.
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires module-init-tools
-to use. It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels.
-
Mkinitrd
--------
@@ -302,14 +296,15 @@ Util-linux
----------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>
+Kmod
+----
+o <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kmod/>
+o <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git>
+
Ksymoops
--------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/ksymoops/v2.4/>
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/rusty/modules/>
-
Mkinitrd
--------
o <https://code.launchpad.net/initrd-tools/main>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 5c3464b5bb1e..6f85cc732008 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 3
PATCHLEVEL = 18
-SUBLEVEL = 118
+SUBLEVEL = 119
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Diseased Newt
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
index f3e88c03b1e4..a7c011f1edde 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@
/* non-prefetchable memory */
0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
num-lanes = <1>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 51947348fcb9..323d122267b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src)
newdisp = (u8 *) src + (s64) insn.displacement.value - (u8 *) dest;
if ((s64) (s32) newdisp != newdisp) {
pr_err("Kprobes error: new displacement does not fit into s32 (%llx)\n", newdisp);
- pr_err("\tSrc: %p, Dest: %p, old disp: %x\n", src, dest, insn.displacement.value);
return 0;
}
disp = (u8 *) dest + insn_offset_displacement(&insn);
@@ -568,8 +567,7 @@ static int reenter_kprobe(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs,
* Raise a BUG or we'll continue in an endless reentering loop
* and eventually a stack overflow.
*/
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecoverable kprobe detected at %p.\n",
- p->addr);
+ pr_err("Unrecoverable kprobe detected.\n");
dump_kprobe(p);
BUG();
default:
diff --git a/crypto/ablkcipher.c b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
index 520729d898fe..5061d7ad33e4 100644
--- a/crypto/ablkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
@@ -72,11 +72,9 @@ static inline u8 *ablkcipher_get_spot(u8 *start, unsigned int len)
return max(start, end_page);
}
-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
- unsigned int bsize)
+static inline void ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
+ unsigned int n)
{
- unsigned int n = bsize;
-
for (;;) {
unsigned int len_this_page = scatterwalk_pagelen(&walk->out);
@@ -88,17 +86,13 @@ static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
n -= len_this_page;
scatterwalk_start(&walk->out, scatterwalk_sg_next(walk->out.sg));
}
-
- return bsize;
}
-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
- unsigned int n)
+static inline void ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
+ unsigned int n)
{
scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n);
scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n);
-
- return n;
}
static int ablkcipher_walk_next(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
@@ -108,39 +102,40 @@ int ablkcipher_walk_done(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, int err)
{
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = req->base.tfm;
- unsigned int nbytes = 0;
+ unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */
+ bool more;
- if (likely(err >= 0)) {
- unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err;
+ if (unlikely(err < 0))
+ goto finish;
- if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW)))
- n = ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
- else if (WARN_ON(err)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
- } else
- n = ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
+ n = walk->nbytes - err;
+ walk->total -= n;
+ more = (walk->total != 0);
- nbytes = walk->total - n;
- err = 0;
+ if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) {
+ ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
+ } else {
+ if (WARN_ON(err)) {
+ /* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
}
- scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
- scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);
-
-err:
- walk->total = nbytes;
- walk->nbytes = nbytes;
+ scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more);
+ scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more);
- if (nbytes) {
+ if (more) {
crypto_yield(req->base.flags);
return ablkcipher_walk_next(req, walk);
}
-
+ err = 0;
+finish:
+ walk->nbytes = 0;
if (walk->iv != req->info)
memcpy(req->info, walk->iv, tfm->crt_ablkcipher.ivsize);
kfree(walk->iv_buffer);
-
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ablkcipher_walk_done);
diff --git a/crypto/blkcipher.c b/crypto/blkcipher.c
index f25799f351f7..5ebfdd0d4543 100644
--- a/crypto/blkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/blkcipher.c
@@ -70,19 +70,18 @@ static inline u8 *blkcipher_get_spot(u8 *start, unsigned int len)
return max(start, end_page);
}
-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
- unsigned int bsize)
+static inline void blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
+ unsigned int bsize)
{
u8 *addr;
addr = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)walk->buffer, walk->alignmask + 1);
addr = blkcipher_get_spot(addr, bsize);
scatterwalk_copychunks(addr, &walk->out, bsize, 1);
- return bsize;
}
-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
- unsigned int n)
+static inline void blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
+ unsigned int n)
{
if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY) {
blkcipher_map_dst(walk);
@@ -96,49 +95,48 @@ static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n);
scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n);
-
- return n;
}
int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk, int err)
{
- unsigned int nbytes = 0;
+ unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */
+ bool more;
- if (likely(err >= 0)) {
- unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err;
+ if (unlikely(err < 0))
+ goto finish;
- if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW)))
- n = blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
- else if (WARN_ON(err)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
- } else
- n = blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
+ n = walk->nbytes - err;
+ walk->total -= n;
+ more = (walk->total != 0);
- nbytes = walk->total - n;
- err = 0;
+ if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) {
+ blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
+ } else {
+ if (WARN_ON(err)) {
+ /* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
}
- scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
- scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);
-
-err:
- walk->total = nbytes;
- walk->nbytes = nbytes;
+ scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more);
+ scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more);
- if (nbytes) {
+ if (more) {
crypto_yield(desc->flags);
return blkcipher_walk_next(desc, walk);
}
-
+ err = 0;
+finish:
+ walk->nbytes = 0;
if (walk->iv != desc->info)
memcpy(desc->info, walk->iv, walk->ivsize);
if (walk->buffer != walk->page)
kfree(walk->buffer);
if (walk->page)
free_page((unsigned long)walk->page);
-
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blkcipher_walk_done);
diff --git a/crypto/vmac.c b/crypto/vmac.c
index df76a816cfb2..bb2fc787d615 100644
--- a/crypto/vmac.c
+++ b/crypto/vmac.c
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
/*
- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
+ * VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing
+ *
+ * Reference: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krovetz-vmac-01
+ *
* Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
@@ -16,14 +20,15 @@
* Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
*/
-/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai.
- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
- * Please send bug reports to the authors.
- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*
+ * Derived from:
+ * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai.
+ * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
+ * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
+ * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
+ */
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -31,9 +36,35 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/vmac.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+/*
+ * User definable settings.
+ */
+#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64
+#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */
+#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
+#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
+
+/* per-transform (per-key) context */
+struct vmac_tfm_ctx {
+ struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
+ u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
+ u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
+ u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
+};
+
+/* per-request context */
+struct vmac_desc_ctx {
+ union {
+ u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */
+ __le64 partial_words[VMAC_NHBYTES / 8];
+ };
+ unsigned int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */
+ bool first_block_processed;
+ u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; /* running total of L2-hash */
+};
+
/*
* Constants and masks
*/
@@ -318,13 +349,6 @@ static void poly_step_func(u64 *ahi, u64 *alo,
} while (0)
#endif
-static void vhash_abort(struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
-{
- ctx->polytmp[0] = ctx->polykey[0] ;
- ctx->polytmp[1] = ctx->polykey[1] ;
- ctx->first_block_processed = 0;
-}
-
static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
{
u64 rh, rl, t, z = 0;
@@ -364,280 +388,209 @@ static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
return rl;
}
-static void vhash_update(const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int mbytes, /* Pos multiple of VMAC_NHBYTES */
- struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
+/* L1 and L2-hash one or more VMAC_NHBYTES-byte blocks */
+static void vhash_blocks(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx,
+ const __le64 *mptr, unsigned int blocks)
{
- u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
- const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
- int i;
- u64 ch, cl;
- u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
- u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
-
- if (!mbytes)
- return;
-
- BUG_ON(mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES);
-
- mptr = (u64 *)m;
- i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES; /* Must be non-zero */
-
- ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
- cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
-
- if (!ctx->first_block_processed) {
- ctx->first_block_processed = 1;
+ const u64 *kptr = tctx->nhkey;
+ const u64 pkh = tctx->polykey[0];
+ const u64 pkl = tctx->polykey[1];
+ u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
+ u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
+ u64 rh, rl;
+
+ if (!dctx->first_block_processed) {
+ dctx->first_block_processed = true;
nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
rh &= m62;
ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
- i--;
+ blocks--;
}
- while (i--) {
+ while (blocks--) {
nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
rh &= m62;
poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
}
- ctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
- ctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
+ dctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
+ dctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
}
-static u64 vhash(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
- u64 *tagl, struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
+static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
- u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
- const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
- int i, remaining;
- u64 ch, cl;
- u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
- u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
-
- mptr = (u64 *)m;
- i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES;
- remaining = mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES;
-
- if (ctx->first_block_processed) {
- ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
- cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
- } else if (i) {
- nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, ch, cl);
- ch &= m62;
- ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
- i--;
- } else if (remaining) {
- nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), ch, cl);
- ch &= m62;
- ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
- goto do_l3;
- } else {/* Empty String */
- ch = pkh; cl = pkl;
- goto do_l3;
- }
-
- while (i--) {
- nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
- rh &= m62;
- poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
- }
- if (remaining) {
- nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), rh, rl);
- rh &= m62;
- poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
- }
-
-do_l3:
- vhash_abort(ctx);
- remaining *= 8;
- return l3hash(ch, cl, ctx->l3key[0], ctx->l3key[1], remaining);
-}
+ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+ __be64 out[2];
+ u8 in[16] = { 0 };
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
-static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
- const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl,
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- u64 *in_n, *out_p;
- u64 p, h;
- int i;
-
- in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce;
- out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes;
-
- i = n[15] & 1;
- if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) {
- in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n);
- in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8);
- ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE;
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
- (unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n);
-
- ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i);
+ if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i);
- h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
- return le64_to_cpu(p + h);
-}
-static int vmac_set_key(unsigned char user_key[], struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
- u64 in[2] = {0}, out[2];
- unsigned i;
- int err = 0;
-
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, user_key, VMAC_KEY_LEN);
+ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->cipher, key, keylen);
if (err)
return err;
/* Fill nh key */
- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0x80;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey)/8; i += 2) {
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
+ in[0] = 0x80;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->nhkey); i += 2) {
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+ tctx->nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
+ tctx->nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
+ in[15]++;
}
/* Fill poly key */
- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xC0;
- in[1] = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey)/8; i += 2) {
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i] =
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i] =
- be64_to_cpup(out) & mpoly;
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i+1] =
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i+1] =
- be64_to_cpup(out+1) & mpoly;
- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
+ in[0] = 0xC0;
+ in[15] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->polykey); i += 2) {
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+ tctx->polykey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]) & mpoly;
+ tctx->polykey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]) & mpoly;
+ in[15]++;
}
/* Fill ip key */
- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xE0;
- in[1] = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key)/8; i += 2) {
+ in[0] = 0xE0;
+ in[15] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->l3key); i += 2) {
do {
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
- } while (ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] >= p64
- || ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] >= p64);
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+ tctx->l3key[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
+ tctx->l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
+ in[15]++;
+ } while (tctx->l3key[i] >= p64 || tctx->l3key[i+1] >= p64);
}
- /* Invalidate nonce/aes cache and reset other elements */
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[0] = (u64)-1; /* Ensure illegal nonce */
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[1] = (u64)0; /* Ensure illegal nonce */
- ctx->__vmac_ctx.first_block_processed = 0;
-
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
-static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
- const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
+ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
- crypto_shash_set_flags(parent, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return vmac_set_key((u8 *)key, ctx);
-}
-
-static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc)
-{
+ dctx->partial_size = 0;
+ dctx->first_block_processed = false;
+ memcpy(dctx->polytmp, tctx->polykey, sizeof(dctx->polytmp));
return 0;
}
-static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
- unsigned int len)
+static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, unsigned int len)
{
- struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
- int expand;
- int min;
-
- expand = VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size > 0 ?
- VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size : 0;
-
- min = len < expand ? len : expand;
-
- memcpy(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, p, min);
- ctx->partial_size += min;
-
- if (len < expand)
- return 0;
-
- vhash_update(ctx->partial, VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
- ctx->partial_size = 0;
-
- len -= expand;
- p += expand;
+ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ unsigned int n;
+
+ if (dctx->partial_size) {
+ n = min(len, VMAC_NHBYTES - dctx->partial_size);
+ memcpy(&dctx->partial[dctx->partial_size], p, n);
+ dctx->partial_size += n;
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
+ if (dctx->partial_size == VMAC_NHBYTES) {
+ vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, dctx->partial_words, 1);
+ dctx->partial_size = 0;
+ }
+ }
- if (len % VMAC_NHBYTES) {
- memcpy(ctx->partial, p + len - (len % VMAC_NHBYTES),
- len % VMAC_NHBYTES);
- ctx->partial_size = len % VMAC_NHBYTES;
+ if (len >= VMAC_NHBYTES) {
+ n = round_down(len, VMAC_NHBYTES);
+ /* TODO: 'p' may be misaligned here */
+ vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, (const __le64 *)p, n / VMAC_NHBYTES);
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
}
- vhash_update(p, len - len % VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
+ if (len) {
+ memcpy(dctx->partial, p, len);
+ dctx->partial_size = len;
+ }
return 0;
}
-static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *pdesc, u8 *out)
+static u64 vhash_final(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx)
{
- struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
- vmac_t mac;
- u8 nonce[16] = {};
-
- /* vmac() ends up accessing outside the array bounds that
- * we specify. In appears to access up to the next 2-word
- * boundary. We'll just be uber cautious and zero the
- * unwritten bytes in the buffer.
- */
- if (ctx->partial_size) {
- memset(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, 0,
- VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size);
+ unsigned int partial = dctx->partial_size;
+ u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
+ u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
+
+ /* L1 and L2-hash the final block if needed */
+ if (partial) {
+ /* Zero-pad to next 128-bit boundary */
+ unsigned int n = round_up(partial, 16);
+ u64 rh, rl;
+
+ memset(&dctx->partial[partial], 0, n - partial);
+ nh_16(dctx->partial_words, tctx->nhkey, n / 8, rh, rl);
+ rh &= m62;
+ if (dctx->first_block_processed)
+ poly_step(ch, cl, tctx->polykey[0], tctx->polykey[1],
+ rh, rl);
+ else
+ ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
}
- mac = vmac(ctx->partial, ctx->partial_size, nonce, NULL, ctx);
- memcpy(out, &mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
- memzero_explicit(&mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
- memset(&ctx->__vmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct vmac_ctx));
- ctx->partial_size = 0;
+
+ /* L3-hash the 128-bit output of L2-hash */
+ return l3hash(ch, cl, tctx->l3key[0], tctx->l3key[1], partial * 8);
+}
+
+static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ static const u8 nonce[16] = {}; /* TODO: this is insecure */
+ union {
+ u8 bytes[16];
+ __be64 pads[2];
+ } block;
+ int index;
+ u64 hash, pad;
+
+ /* Finish calculating the VHASH of the message */
+ hash = vhash_final(tctx, dctx);
+
+ /* Generate pseudorandom pad by encrypting the nonce */
+ memcpy(&block, nonce, 16);
+ index = block.bytes[15] & 1;
+ block.bytes[15] &= ~1;
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, block.bytes, block.bytes);
+ pad = be64_to_cpu(block.pads[index]);
+
+ /* The VMAC is the sum of VHASH and the pseudorandom pad */
+ put_unaligned_le64(hash + pad, out);
return 0;
}
static int vmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
- struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
+ struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(cipher))
return PTR_ERR(cipher);
- ctx->child = cipher;
+ tctx->cipher = cipher;
return 0;
}
static void vmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
+ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_cipher(tctx->cipher);
}
static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
@@ -655,6 +608,10 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (alg->cra_blocksize != 16)
+ goto out_put_alg;
+
inst = shash_alloc_instance("vmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
@@ -670,11 +627,12 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
- inst->alg.digestsize = sizeof(vmac_t);
- inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_ctx_t);
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_tfm_ctx);
inst->alg.base.cra_init = vmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = vmac_exit_tfm;
+ inst->alg.descsize = sizeof(struct vmac_desc_ctx);
+ inst->alg.digestsize = VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8;
inst->alg.init = vmac_init;
inst->alg.update = vmac_update;
inst->alg.final = vmac_final;
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
index f771c6afbab5..beab499d182c 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr,
/* unmap the data buffer */
if (dma_size != 0)
- dma_unmap_single(&adap->dev, dma_addr, dma_size, dma_direction);
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr, dma_size, dma_direction);
if (unlikely(!ret)) {
dev_err(dev, "completion wait timed out\n");
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 584d035ec0dd..b780c059cc03 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -903,7 +903,6 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
- struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
struct sk_buff *nskb;
@@ -912,15 +911,16 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
skb_frag_t *nfrag = &skb_shinfo(nskb)->frags[0];
- if (shinfo->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to;
BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb));
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb));
}
- BUG_ON(shinfo->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+ BUG_ON(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
- skb_add_rx_frag(skb, shinfo->nr_frags, skb_frag_page(nfrag),
+ skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
+ skb_frag_page(nfrag),
rx->offset, rx->status, PAGE_SIZE);
skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags = 0;
diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index a34d4019f465..5977fc3f4705 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -1848,10 +1848,12 @@ struct dentry *d_make_root(struct inode *root_inode)
static const struct qstr name = QSTR_INIT("/", 1);
res = __d_alloc(root_inode->i_sb, &name);
- if (res)
+ if (res) {
+ res->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
d_instantiate(res, root_inode);
- else
+ } else {
iput(root_inode);
+ }
}
return res;
}
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ded3f1edd7f7..df76ec5f22cb 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -590,12 +590,21 @@ bool legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
return true;
mnt = real_mount(bastard);
mnt_add_count(mnt, 1);
+ smp_mb(); // see mntput_no_expire()
if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
return true;
if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
return false;
}
+ lock_mount_hash();
+ if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
+ mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+ return true;
+ }
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+
rcu_read_unlock();
mntput(bastard);
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1049,12 +1058,27 @@ static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(delayed_mntput_work, delayed_mntput);
static void mntput_no_expire(struct mount *mnt)
{
rcu_read_lock();
- mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
- if (likely(mnt->mnt_ns)) { /* shouldn't be the last one */
+ if (likely(READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt_ns))) {
+ /*
+ * Since we don't do lock_mount_hash() here,
+ * ->mnt_ns can change under us. However, if it's
+ * non-NULL, then there's a reference that won't
+ * be dropped until after an RCU delay done after
+ * turning ->mnt_ns NULL. So if we observe it
+ * non-NULL under rcu_read_lock(), the reference
+ * we are dropping is not the final one.
+ */
+ mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
lock_mount_hash();
+ /*
+ * make sure that if __legitimize_mnt() has not seen us grab
+ * mount_lock, we'll see their refcount increment here.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+ mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
if (mnt_get_count(mnt)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
unlock_mount_hash();
diff --git a/include/crypto/vmac.h b/include/crypto/vmac.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b700c7b2fe1..000000000000
--- a/include/crypto/vmac.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
- * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
- * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
- * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
- * more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
- * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
- * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
- */
-
-#ifndef __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
-#define __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
-
-/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai.
- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
- * Please send bug reports to the authors.
- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/*
- * User definable settings.
- */
-#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64
-#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */
-#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
-#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
-
-/*
- * This implementation uses u32 and u64 as names for unsigned 32-
- * and 64-bit integer types. These are defined in C99 stdint.h. The
- * following may need adaptation if you are not running a C99 or
- * Microsoft C environment.
- */
-struct vmac_ctx {
- u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
- u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
- u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
- u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
- u64 cached_nonce[2];
- u64 cached_aes[2];
- int first_block_processed;
-};
-
-typedef u64 vmac_t;
-
-struct vmac_ctx_t {
- struct crypto_cipher *child;
- struct vmac_ctx __vmac_ctx;
- u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */
- int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */
-};
-
-#endif /* __CRYPTO_VMAC_H */
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 70a9f027f963..b3e3c8f339a0 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -849,12 +849,12 @@ static int check_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
maxobj = order_objects(compound_order(page), s->size, s->reserved);
if (page->objects > maxobj) {
slab_err(s, page, "objects %u > max %u",
- s->name, page->objects, maxobj);
+ page->objects, maxobj);
return 0;
}
if (page->inuse > page->objects) {
slab_err(s, page, "inuse %u > max %u",
- s->name, page->inuse, page->objects);
+ page->inuse, page->objects);
return 0;
}
/* Slab_pad_check fixes things up after itself */
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static int on_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *search)
int nr = 0;
void *fp;
void *object = NULL;
- unsigned long max_objects;
+ int max_objects;
fp = page->freelist;
while (fp && nr <= page->objects) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
index 9f5273a0be7a..4f41b245ce5b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
@@ -416,8 +416,8 @@ static void hidp_del_timer(struct hidp_session *session)
del_timer(&session->timer);
}
-static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session,
- int type, const u8 *data, int len, int intr)
+static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session, int type,
+ const u8 *data, unsigned int len, int intr)
{
if (len > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
len = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE;
diff --git a/scripts/depmod.sh b/scripts/depmod.sh
index 122599b1c13b..ea1e96921e3b 100755
--- a/scripts/depmod.sh
+++ b/scripts/depmod.sh
@@ -10,10 +10,16 @@ DEPMOD=$1
KERNELRELEASE=$2
SYMBOL_PREFIX=$3
-if ! test -r System.map -a -x "$DEPMOD"; then
+if ! test -r System.map ; then
exit 0
fi
+if [ -z $(command -v $DEPMOD) ]; then
+ echo "'make modules_install' requires $DEPMOD. Please install it." >&2
+ echo "This is probably in the kmod package." >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
# older versions of depmod don't support -P <symbol-prefix>
# support was added in module-init-tools 3.13
if test -n "$SYMBOL_PREFIX"; then
diff --git a/sound/core/info.c b/sound/core/info.c
index 9f404e965ea2..08832c973a53 100644
--- a/sound/core/info.c
+++ b/sound/core/info.c
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_info_entry_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer
struct snd_info_buffer *buf;
ssize_t size = 0;
loff_t pos;
+ unsigned long realloc_size;
data = file->private_data;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!data))
@@ -261,7 +262,8 @@ static ssize_t snd_info_entry_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer
pos = *offset;
if (pos < 0 || (long) pos != pos || (ssize_t) count < 0)
return -EIO;
- if ((unsigned long) pos + (unsigned long) count < (unsigned long) pos)
+ realloc_size = (unsigned long) pos + (unsigned long) count;
+ if (realloc_size < (unsigned long) pos || realloc_size > UINT_MAX)
return -EIO;
switch (entry->content) {
case SNDRV_INFO_CONTENT_TEXT:
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread