From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/dumpstack: don't dump kernel memory based on usermode RIP
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 18:25:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180828162551.GA4950@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180828154901.112726-1-jannh@google.com>
On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 05:49:01PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> show_opcodes() is used both for dumping kernel instructions and for dumping
> user instructions. If userspace causes #PF by jumping to a kernel address,
> show_opcodes() can be reached with regs->ip controlled by the user,
> pointing to kernel code.
Yap, and people keep asking how to dump the running kernel, after
patching and jump labels and stuff... Here's how!
:-))))
> Make sure that userspace can't trick us into
> dumping kernel memory into dmesg.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: 7cccf0725cf7 ("x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function")
I think this one is more likely:
ba54d856a9d8 ("x86/fault: Dump user opcode bytes on fatal faults")
as it added the dumping of user opcode bytes.
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> ---
> v2: Andy pointed out that I probably shouldn't be doing wrapping
> arithmetic on pointers.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> index b6dc698f992a..f335aad404a4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> @@ -111,6 +111,6 @@ static inline unsigned long caller_frame_pointer(void)
> return (unsigned long)frame;
> }
>
> -void show_opcodes(u8 *rip, const char *loglvl);
> +void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl);
> void show_ip(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl);
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_STACKTRACE_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> index 9c8652974f8e..14b337582b6f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> @@ -89,14 +89,21 @@ static void printk_stack_address(unsigned long address, int reliable,
> * Thus, the 2/3rds prologue and 64 byte OPCODE_BUFSIZE is just a random
> * guesstimate in attempt to achieve all of the above.
> */
> -void show_opcodes(u8 *rip, const char *loglvl)
> +void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl)
> {
> #define PROLOGUE_SIZE 42
> #define EPILOGUE_SIZE 21
> #define OPCODE_BUFSIZE (PROLOGUE_SIZE + 1 + EPILOGUE_SIZE)
> u8 opcodes[OPCODE_BUFSIZE];
> + u8 *prologue = (u8 *)(regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE);
> + /*
> + * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel
> + * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it.
> + */
> + bool bad_ip = user_mode(regs) &&
> + __range_not_ok(prologue, OPCODE_BUFSIZE, TASK_SIZE_MAX);
>
Ok, can we pls move the sole dumping of opcodes in a helper called,
__show_opcodes(), for example, which the checking wrapper show_opcodes()
- without the "__" prefix - calls?
So that show_signal_msg() can call the checking variant - show_opcodes()
- as userspace might be doing monkey business there and we definitely
wanna check first but __show_regs() can call the non-checking variant
__show_opcodes() because there we wanna dump whatever rIP points to
because we wanna know if the machine has gone off into the weeds etc,
when staring at splats.
Or am I missing a security aspect here?
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-28 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-28 15:49 [PATCH v2] x86/dumpstack: don't dump kernel memory based on usermode RIP Jann Horn
2018-08-28 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2018-08-28 16:29 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-29 7:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-08-29 7:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-08-29 13:55 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-29 14:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-08-30 11:13 ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86/dumpstack: Don't " tip-bot for Jann Horn
2018-08-31 15:12 ` tip-bot for Jann Horn
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