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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 11:40:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180905094012.GT24082@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809051001360.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm>

On Wed, Sep 05, 2018 at 10:02:41AM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> Yeah, I did more or less that earlier today; my series currently has

Excellent, maybe add a wee comment like so?

> +static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
> +{
	/*
	 * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
	 * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to
	 * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks.
	 *
	 * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO.
	 */
> +       return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
> +                       __ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB));
> +}

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-05  9:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-31 20:56 [PATCH] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Jiri Kosina
2018-09-03  8:51 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-03 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 14:23 ` [PATCH v3 " Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 14:40   ` [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 16:13     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-04 16:21       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-04 17:26     ` Tim Chen
2018-09-04 17:35       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 18:10         ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-04 18:48           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 23:26             ` Tim Chen
2018-09-05  6:22               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-05 15:58                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-05 18:04                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-09-05 18:29                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-05 18:40                       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-09-05 18:42                         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-05 19:03                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-05 19:27                           ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-05 20:02                         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-05 18:26                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-05 18:35                   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 23:37           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-09-05  1:00             ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-05  2:38               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-09-05  8:00         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-05 15:37           ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-05  7:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-04 14:42   ` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 16:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-05  7:59       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-05  8:02         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-05  9:40           ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-09-05  7:52     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-05  7:55       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 14:42   ` [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Jiri Kosina
2018-09-04 14:24 [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Jiri Kosina

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