From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 10:00:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180920080053.GM24124@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0c55c162a077aadbfd57878e2694e35292c1a29c.1537392876.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 02:35:30PM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> This patch provides an application property based spectre_v2
> protection with STIBP against attack from another app from
> a sibling hyper-thread. For security sensitive non-dumpable
> app, STIBP will be turned on before switching to it for Intel
> processors vulnerable to spectre_v2.
Why does that non dumpable thing make sense? Why not use the same
prctl() we already use for SSBD?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 8:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-19 21:35 [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-09-19 21:35 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2 Tim Chen
2018-09-19 21:35 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection Tim Chen
2018-09-20 7:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-20 17:17 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-20 8:00 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-09-20 17:32 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-02 15:41 ` Jon Masters
2018-10-02 15:43 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-10-02 15:44 ` Jon Masters
2018-09-20 21:38 ` [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-21 15:44 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-21 17:14 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-21 17:44 ` Lendacky, Thomas
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