[PATCH] fs: fix possible Spectre V1 indexing in __close_fd()

From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@android.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Omer Tripp <trippo@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] fs: fix possible Spectre V1 indexing in __close_fd()
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 11:15:00 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180924181500.125257-1-ghackmann@google.com> (raw)

__close_fd() is reachable via the close() syscall with a
userspace-controlled fd.  Ensure that it can't be used to speculatively
access past the end of current->fdt.

Reported-by: Omer Tripp <trippo@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
---
 fs/file.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index 7ffd6e9d103d..a80cf82be96b 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 unsigned int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024;
 unsigned int sysctl_nr_open_min = BITS_PER_LONG;
@@ -626,6 +627,7 @@ int __close_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned fd)
 	fdt = files_fdtable(files);
 	if (fd >= fdt->max_fds)
 		goto out_unlock;
+	fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
 	file = fdt->fd[fd];
 	if (!file)
 		goto out_unlock;
-- 
2.19.0.397.gdd90340f6a-goog

