[PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.159 release.
There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat Sep 29 09:06:27 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.159-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.4.159-rc1

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: only allow 1 flush on user qps

Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>
    HID: sony: Support DS4 dongle

Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>
    HID: sony: Update device ids

Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
    arm64: Add trace_hardirqs_off annotation in ret_to_user

Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com>
    ext4: don't mark mmp buffer head dirty

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    ext4: fix online resizing for bigalloc file systems with a 1k block size

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    ext4: fix online resize's handling of a too-small final block group

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories

Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
    tty: vt_ioctl: fix potential Spectre v1

Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
    drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Use pm_runtime_get_noresume() in connector_detect()

Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
    ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic

Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
    scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation

Vasily Khoruzhick <vasilykh@arista.com>
    neighbour: confirm neigh entries when ARP packet is received

Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
    net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state

Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
    net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: fix possible use-after-free in ip6_xmit()

Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
    gso_segment: Reset skb->mac_len after modifying network header

Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
    mm: shmem.c: Correctly annotate new inodes for lockdep

Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
    ring-buffer: Allow for rescheduling when removing pages

Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
    xen/x86/vpmu: Zero struct pt_regs before calling into sample handling code

Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
    xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags

Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
    platform/x86: alienware-wmi: Correct a memory leak

Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
    ALSA: emu10k1: fix possible info leak to userspace on SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO

Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
    ALSA: bebob: use address returned by kmalloc() instead of kernel stack for streaming DMA mapping

Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
    ASoC: cs4265: fix MMTLR Data switch control

Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
    NFC: Fix the number of pipes

Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
    NFC: Fix possible memory corruption when handling SHDLC I-Frame commands


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                    |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                   |  3 +++
 arch/x86/xen/pmu.c                          |  2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c | 20 ++++++++++---------
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c                      |  3 +++
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h                       |  2 ++
 drivers/hid/hid-sony.c                      |  6 ++++++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c            |  6 ++++++
 drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c               |  8 ++++++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c             |  2 +-
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c                  |  8 +++++++-
 drivers/platform/x86/alienware-wmi.c        |  1 +
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c    | 30 ++++++++++++++---------------
 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c                   |  4 ++++
 fs/ext4/dir.c                               | 20 +++++++++----------
 fs/ext4/inline.c                            |  4 +++-
 fs/ext4/mmp.c                               |  1 -
 fs/ext4/resize.c                            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/ext4/super.c                             |  2 ++
 fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c                   |  1 +
 include/net/nfc/hci.h                       |  2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                  |  2 ++
 mm/shmem.c                                  |  2 ++
 net/core/neighbour.c                        | 13 ++++++++-----
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c                          |  1 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c                      |  1 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                       |  6 ++----
 net/nfc/hci/core.c                          | 10 ++++++++++
 sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c         | 24 +++++++++++++----------
 sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c                   |  2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c                   |  4 ++--
 31 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.4 01/28] NFC: Fix possible memory corruption when handling SHDLC I-Frame commands

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>

commit 674d9de02aa7d521ebdf66c3958758bdd9c64e11 upstream.

When handling SHDLC I-Frame commands "pipe" field used for indexing
into an array should be checked before usage. If left unchecked it
might access memory outside of the array of size NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES(127).

Malformed NFC HCI frames could be injected by a malicious NFC device
communicating with the device being attacked (remote attack vector),
or even by an attacker with physical access to the I2C bus such that
they could influence the data transfers on that bus (local attack vector).
skb->data is controlled by the attacker and has only been sanitized in
the most trivial ways (CRC check), therefore we can consider the
create_info struct and all of its members to tainted. 'create_info->pipe'
with max value of 255 (uint8) is used to take an offset of the
hdev->pipes array of 127 elements which can lead to OOB write.

Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Kevin Deus <kdeus@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/nfc/hci/core.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/net/nfc/hci/core.c
+++ b/net/nfc/hci/core.c
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ void nfc_hci_cmd_received(struct nfc_hci
 		}
 		create_info = (struct hci_create_pipe_resp *)skb->data;
 
+		if (create_info->pipe >= NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES) {
+			status = NFC_HCI_ANY_E_NOK;
+			goto exit;
+		}
+
 		/* Save the new created pipe and bind with local gate,
 		 * the description for skb->data[3] is destination gate id
 		 * but since we received this cmd from host controller, we
@@ -232,6 +237,11 @@ void nfc_hci_cmd_received(struct nfc_hci
 		}
 		delete_info = (struct hci_delete_pipe_noti *)skb->data;
 
+		if (delete_info->pipe >= NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES) {
+			status = NFC_HCI_ANY_E_NOK;
+			goto exit;
+		}
+
 		hdev->pipes[delete_info->pipe].gate = NFC_HCI_INVALID_GATE;
 		hdev->pipes[delete_info->pipe].dest_host = NFC_HCI_INVALID_HOST;
 		break;

[PATCH 4.4 02/28] NFC: Fix the number of pipes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>

commit e285d5bfb7e9785d289663baef252dd315e171f8 upstream.

According to ETSI TS 102 622 specification chapter 4.4 pipe identifier
is 7 bits long which allows for 128 unique pipe IDs. Because
NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES is used as the number of pipes supported and not
as the max pipe ID, its value should be 128 instead of 127.

nfc_hci_recv_from_llc extracts pipe ID from packet header using
NFC_HCI_FRAGMENT(0x7F) mask which allows for pipe ID value of 127.
Same happens when NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_PIPE() is being used. With
pipes array having only 127 elements and pipe ID of 127 the OOB memory
access will result.

Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/net/nfc/hci.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/net/nfc/hci.h
+++ b/include/net/nfc/hci.h
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct nfc_hci_pipe {
  * According to specification 102 622 chapter 4.4 Pipes,
  * the pipe identifier is 7 bits long.
  */
-#define NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES		127
+#define NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES		128
 struct nfc_hci_init_data {
 	u8 gate_count;
 	struct nfc_hci_gate gates[NFC_HCI_MAX_CUSTOM_GATES];

[PATCH 4.4 03/28] ASoC: cs4265: fix MMTLR Data switch control

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>

commit 90a3b7f8aba3011badacd6d8121e03aa24ac79d1 upstream.

The MMTLR bit is in the CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2 register at address 0x12 bit 0
and not at address 0x0 bit 1. Fix this.

Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs4265.c
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs4
 	SOC_SINGLE("Validity Bit Control Switch", CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2,
 				3, 1, 0),
 	SOC_ENUM("SPDIF Mono/Stereo", spdif_mono_stereo_enum),
-	SOC_SINGLE("MMTLR Data Switch", 0,
-				1, 1, 0),
+	SOC_SINGLE("MMTLR Data Switch", CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2,
+				0, 1, 0),
 	SOC_ENUM("Mono Channel Select", spdif_mono_select_enum),
 	SND_SOC_BYTES("C Data Buffer", CS4265_C_DATA_BUFF, 24),
 };

[PATCH 4.4 04/28] ALSA: bebob: use address returned by kmalloc() instead of kernel stack for streaming DMA mapping

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>

commit 493626f2d87a74e6dbea1686499ed6e7e600484e upstream.

When executing 'fw_run_transaction()' with 'TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST',
an address of 'payload' argument is used for streaming DMA mapping by
'firewire_ohci' module if 'size' argument is larger than 8 byte.
Although in this case the address should not be on kernel stack, current
implementation of ALSA bebob driver uses data in kernel stack for a cue
to boot M-Audio devices. This often brings unexpected result, especially
for a case of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.

This commit fixes the bug.

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201021
Reference: https://forum.manjaro.org/t/firewire-m-audio-410-driver-wont-load-firmware/51165
Fixes: a2b2a7798fb6('ALSA: bebob: Send a cue to load firmware for M-Audio Firewire series')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c |   24 ++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c
+++ b/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob_maudio.c
@@ -96,17 +96,13 @@ int snd_bebob_maudio_load_firmware(struc
 	struct fw_device *device = fw_parent_device(unit);
 	int err, rcode;
 	u64 date;
-	__le32 cues[3] = {
-		cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE1),
-		cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE2),
-		cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE3)
-	};
+	__le32 *cues;
 
 	/* check date of software used to build */
 	err = snd_bebob_read_block(unit, INFO_OFFSET_SW_DATE,
 				   &date, sizeof(u64));
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto end;
+		return err;
 	/*
 	 * firmware version 5058 or later has date later than "20070401", but
 	 * 'date' is not null-terminated.
@@ -114,20 +110,28 @@ int snd_bebob_maudio_load_firmware(struc
 	if (date < 0x3230303730343031LL) {
 		dev_err(&unit->device,
 			"Use firmware version 5058 or later\n");
-		err = -ENOSYS;
-		goto end;
+		return -ENXIO;
 	}
 
+	cues = kmalloc_array(3, sizeof(*cues), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cues)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cues[0] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE1);
+	cues[1] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE2);
+	cues[2] = cpu_to_le32(MAUDIO_BOOTLOADER_CUE3);
+
 	rcode = fw_run_transaction(device->card, TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST,
 				   device->node_id, device->generation,
 				   device->max_speed, BEBOB_ADDR_REG_REQ,
-				   cues, sizeof(cues));
+				   cues, 3 * sizeof(*cues));
+	kfree(cues);
 	if (rcode != RCODE_COMPLETE) {
 		dev_err(&unit->device,
 			"Failed to send a cue to load firmware\n");
 		err = -EIO;
 	}
-end:
+
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.4 05/28] ALSA: emu10k1: fix possible info leak to userspace on SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

commit 49434c6c575d2008c0abbc93e615019f39e01252 upstream.

snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO) allocates
memory using kmalloc() and partially fills it by calling
snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info() before returning the resulting
structure to userspace, leaving uninitialized holes. Let's
just use kzalloc() here.

BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c
+++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c
@@ -2520,7 +2520,7 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(stru
 		emu->support_tlv = 1;
 		return put_user(SNDRV_EMU10K1_VERSION, (int __user *)argp);
 	case SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO:
-		info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
+		info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!info)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info(emu, info);

[PATCH 4.4 06/28] platform/x86: alienware-wmi: Correct a memory leak

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>

commit ff0e9f26288d2daee4950f42b37a3d3d30d36ec1 upstream.

An ACPI buffer that was allocated was not being freed after use.

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/platform/x86/alienware-wmi.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/platform/x86/alienware-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/alienware-wmi.c
@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ static acpi_status alienware_hdmi_comman
 		if (obj && obj->type == ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER)
 			*out_data = (u32) obj->integer.value;
 	}
+	kfree(output.pointer);
 	return status;
 
 }

[PATCH 4.4 07/28] xen/netfront: dont bug in case of too many frags

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

commit ad4f15dc2c70b1de5e0a64d27335962fbc9cf71c upstream.

Commit 57f230ab04d291 ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in
xennet_get_responses()") raised the max number of allowed slots by one.
This seems to be problematic in some configurations with netback using
a larger MAX_SKB_FRAGS value (e.g. old Linux kernel with MAX_SKB_FRAGS
defined as 18 instead of nowadays 17).

Instead of BUG_ON() in this case just fall back to retransmission.

Fixes: 57f230ab04d291 ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -892,7 +892,11 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct
 			BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb));
 			__pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb));
 		}
-		BUG_ON(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+		if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
+			queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++cons;
+			kfree_skb(nskb);
+			return ~0U;
+		}
 
 		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
 				skb_frag_page(nfrag),
@@ -1029,6 +1033,8 @@ err:
 		skb->len += rx->status;
 
 		i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq);
+		if (unlikely(i == ~0U))
+			goto err;
 
 		if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank)
 			skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;

[PATCH 4.4 08/28] xen/x86/vpmu: Zero struct pt_regs before calling into sample handling code

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

commit 70513d58751d7c6c1a0133557b13089b9f2e3e66 upstream.

Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user
registers.

Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/xen/pmu.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/pmu.c
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static void xen_convert_regs(const struc
 irqreturn_t xen_pmu_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
 {
 	int err, ret = IRQ_NONE;
-	struct pt_regs regs;
+	struct pt_regs regs = {0};
 	const struct xen_pmu_data *xenpmu_data = get_xenpmu_data();
 	uint8_t xenpmu_flags = get_xenpmu_flags();
 

[PATCH 4.4 09/28] ring-buffer: Allow for rescheduling when removing pages

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>

commit 83f365554e47997ec68dc4eca3f5dce525cd15c3 upstream.

When reducing ring buffer size, pages are removed by scheduling a work
item on each CPU for the corresponding CPU ring buffer. After the pages
are removed from ring buffer linked list, the pages are free()d in a
tight loop. The loop does not give up CPU until all pages are removed.
In a worst case behavior, when lot of pages are to be freed, it can
cause system stall.

After the pages are removed from the list, the free() can happen while
the work is rescheduled. Call cond_resched() in the loop to prevent the
system hangup.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907223129.71994-1-vnagarnaik@google.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Reported-by: Jason Behmer <jbehmer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1513,6 +1513,8 @@ rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_c
 	tmp_iter_page = first_page;
 
 	do {
+		cond_resched();
+
 		to_remove_page = tmp_iter_page;
 		rb_inc_page(cpu_buffer, &tmp_iter_page);
 

[PATCH 4.4 10/28] mm: shmem.c: Correctly annotate new inodes for lockdep

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>

commit b45d71fb89ab8adfe727b9d0ee188ed58582a647 upstream.

Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep
class.  For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives
in lockdep.  Annotate correctly after new inode creation.  If its a
directory inode, it will be put into a different class.

This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot:

> ======================================================
> WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
> 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted
> ------------------------------------------------------
> syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock:
> 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock
> include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline]
> 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at:
> shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602
>
> but task is already holding lock:
> 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630
> drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448
>
> which lock already depends on the new lock.
>
> -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}:
>        __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
>        __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073
>        mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088
>        ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361
>        call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline]
>        mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762
>        do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535
>        do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline]
>        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357
>        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585
>        __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline]
>        __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
>        __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568
>        _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25
>        copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline]
>        filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196
>        dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline]
>        dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline]
>        dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193
>        iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51
>        __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline]
>        __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}:
>        lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924
>        down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70
>        inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline]
>        shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602
>        ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455
>        ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797
>        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
>        file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline]
>        do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685
>        ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702
>        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline]
>        __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>
> Chain exists of:
>   &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex
>
>  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>
>        CPU0                    CPU1
>        ----                    ----
>   lock(ashmem_mutex);
>                                lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
>                                lock(ashmem_mutex);
>   lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9);
>
>  *** DEADLOCK ***
>
> 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483:
>  #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at:
> ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Suggested-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/shmem.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -1464,6 +1464,8 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(str
 			mpol_shared_policy_init(&info->policy, NULL);
 			break;
 		}
+
+		lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
 	} else
 		shmem_free_inode(sb);
 	return inode;

[PATCH 4.4 11/28] gso_segment: Reset skb->mac_len after modifying network header

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8, Size: 1982 bytes --]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@toke.dk>

[ Upstream commit c56cae23c6b167acc68043c683c4573b80cbcc2c ]

When splitting a GSO segment that consists of encapsulated packets, the
skb->mac_len of the segments can end up being set wrong, causing packet
drops in particular when using act_mirred and ifb interfaces in
combination with a qdisc that splits GSO packets.

This happens because at the time skb_segment() is called, network_header
will point to the inner header, throwing off the calculation in
skb_reset_mac_len(). The network_header is subsequently adjust by the
outer IP gso_segment handlers, but they don't set the mac_len.

Fix this by adding skb_reset_mac_len() calls to both the IPv4 and IPv6
gso_segment handlers, after they modify the network_header.

Many thanks to Eric Dumazet for his help in identifying the cause of
the bug.

Acked-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c     |    1 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -1280,6 +1280,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(
 		if (encap)
 			skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
 		skb->network_header = (u8 *)iph - skb->head;
+		skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
 	} while ((skb = skb->next));
 
 out:
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(
 		ipv6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)(skb_mac_header(skb) + nhoff);
 		ipv6h->payload_len = htons(skb->len - nhoff - sizeof(*ipv6h));
 		skb->network_header = (u8 *)ipv6h - skb->head;
+		skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
 
 		if (udpfrag) {
 			int err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);

[PATCH 4.4 12/28] ipv6: fix possible use-after-free in ip6_xmit()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit bbd6528d28c1b8e80832b3b018ec402b6f5c3215 ]

In the unlikely case ip6_xmit() has to call skb_realloc_headroom(),
we need to call skb_set_owner_w() before consuming original skb,
otherwise we risk a use-after-free.

Bring IPv6 in line with what we do in IPv4 to fix this.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -193,12 +193,10 @@ int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, stru
 				kfree_skb(skb);
 				return -ENOBUFS;
 			}
+			if (skb->sk)
+				skb_set_owner_w(skb2, skb->sk);
 			consume_skb(skb);
 			skb = skb2;
-			/* skb_set_owner_w() changes sk->sk_wmem_alloc atomically,
-			 * it is safe to call in our context (socket lock not held)
-			 */
-			skb_set_owner_w(skb, (struct sock *)sk);
 		}
 		if (opt->opt_flen)
 			ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, &proto);

[PATCH 4.4 13/28] net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

[ Upstream commit 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d ]

Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().

BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c
@@ -284,8 +284,12 @@ static int ipddp_ioctl(struct net_device
                 case SIOCFINDIPDDPRT:
 			spin_lock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock);
 			rp = __ipddp_find_route(&rcp);
-			if (rp)
-				memcpy(&rcp2, rp, sizeof(rcp2));
+			if (rp) {
+				memset(&rcp2, 0, sizeof(rcp2));
+				rcp2.ip    = rp->ip;
+				rcp2.at    = rp->at;
+				rcp2.flags = rp->flags;
+			}
 			spin_unlock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock);
 
 			if (rp) {

[PATCH 4.4 14/28] net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit a7f38002fb69b44f8fc622ecb838665d0b8666af ]

The operation ~(p100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP) returns a value
that is always non-zero and hence the wait for the link to drop always
terminates prematurely.  Fix this by using a logical not operator instead
of a bitwise complement.  This issue has been in the driver since
pre-2.6.12-rc2.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#114157 ("Logical vs. bitwise operator")

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hp/hp100.c
@@ -2636,7 +2636,7 @@ static int hp100_login_to_vg_hub(struct
 		/* Wait for link to drop */
 		time = jiffies + (HZ / 10);
 		do {
-			if (~(hp100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP_ST))
+			if (!(hp100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP_ST))
 				break;
 			if (!in_interrupt())
 				schedule_timeout_interruptible(1);

[PATCH 4.4 15/28] neighbour: confirm neigh entries when ARP packet is received

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasily Khoruzhick <vasilykh@arista.com>

[ Upstream commit f0e0d04413fcce9bc76388839099aee93cd0d33b ]

Update 'confirmed' timestamp when ARP packet is received. It shouldn't
affect locktime logic and anyway entry can be confirmed by any higher-layer
protocol. Thus it makes sense to confirm it when ARP packet is received.

Fixes: 77d7123342dc ("neighbour: update neigh timestamps iff update is effective")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Khoruzhick <vasilykh@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/neighbour.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,12 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh
 		lladdr = neigh->ha;
 	}
 
+	/* Update confirmed timestamp for neighbour entry after we
+	 * received ARP packet even if it doesn't change IP to MAC binding.
+	 */
+	if (new & NUD_CONNECTED)
+		neigh->confirmed = jiffies;
+
 	/* If entry was valid and address is not changed,
 	   do not change entry state, if new one is STALE.
 	 */
@@ -1163,15 +1169,12 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* Update timestamps only once we know we will make a change to the
+	/* Update timestamp only once we know we will make a change to the
 	 * neighbour entry. Otherwise we risk to move the locktime window with
 	 * noop updates and ignore relevant ARP updates.
 	 */
-	if (new != old || lladdr != neigh->ha) {
-		if (new & NUD_CONNECTED)
-			neigh->confirmed = jiffies;
+	if (new != old || lladdr != neigh->ha)
 		neigh->updated = jiffies;
-	}
 
 	if (new != old) {
 		neigh_del_timer(neigh);

[PATCH 4.4 16/28] scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>

commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream.

This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:

1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow

2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));

The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
it solves both issues.

This addresses CVE-2018-14633.

Beyond this:

- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.

- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021

CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
 ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
 ? 0xffffffffc1660000
 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
 ? memset+0x1f/0x40
 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
 process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
>ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
                                              ^
 ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c |   30 ++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -26,18 +26,6 @@
 #include "iscsi_target_nego.h"
 #include "iscsi_target_auth.h"
 
-static int chap_string_to_hex(unsigned char *dst, unsigned char *src, int len)
-{
-	int j = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 2), rc;
-
-	rc = hex2bin(dst, src, j);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		pr_debug("CHAP string contains non hex digit symbols\n");
-
-	dst[j] = '\0';
-	return j;
-}
-
 static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -241,9 +229,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
 		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (strlen(chap_r) != MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2) {
+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (hex2bin(client_digest, chap_r, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) < 0) {
+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r);
-	chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));
 
 	tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
@@ -348,9 +343,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
 		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
-	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
-	challenge_len = chap_string_to_hex(challenge_binhex, challenge,
-				strlen(challenge));
+	challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2);
 	if (!challenge_len) {
 		pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
 		goto out;
@@ -359,6 +352,11 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
 		pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) {
+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
 	/*
 	 * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
 	 * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by

[PATCH 4.4 17/28] ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>

commit 234b69e3e089d850a98e7b3145bd00e9b52b1111 upstream.

While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying
storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head.
Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into
journal, that will trigger the following panic.

[203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342!
[203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015
[203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000
[203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e9f09>]  [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818  EFLAGS: 00010206
[203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000
[203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe
[203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0
[203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000
[203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000
[203748.705871] FS:  00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[203748.706370] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670
[203748.707124] Stack:
[203748.707371]  ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001
[203748.707885]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00
[203748.708399]  00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[203748.708915] Call Trace:
[203748.709175]  [<ffffffffa0609f52>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2]
[203748.709680]  [<ffffffffa05eca00>] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2]
[203748.710185]  [<ffffffffa05ec0cb>] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2]
[203748.710691]  [<ffffffffa05f0fbf>] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2]
[203748.711204]  [<ffffffffa065660f>] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2]
[203748.711716]  [<ffffffffa05f4f3a>] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2]
[203748.712227]  [<ffffffffa05f442e>] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2]
[203748.712737]  [<ffffffffa061b2f2>] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2]
[203748.713003]  [<ffffffffa061c385>] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2]
[203748.713263]  [<ffffffff8121714b>] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150
[203748.713518]  [<ffffffff8121b225>] do_last+0x815/0x1210
[203748.713772]  [<ffffffff812192e9>] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450
[203748.714123]  [<ffffffff8121bca0>] path_openat+0x80/0x600
[203748.714378]  [<ffffffff811bcd45>] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620
[203748.714634]  [<ffffffff8121d7ba>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0
[203748.714888]  [<ffffffff8122a767>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[203748.715143]  [<ffffffff81209ffc>] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220
[203748.715403]  [<ffffffff81026ddb>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180
[203748.715668]  [<ffffffff816f0c9f>] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190
[203748.715928]  [<ffffffff8120a10e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[203748.716184]  [<ffffffff816f0d5e>] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7
[203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10
[203748.717505] RIP  [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.717775]  RSP <ffff88006ff4b818>

Joesph ever reported a similar panic.
Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ int ocfs2_read_blocks(struct ocfs2_cachi
 				 * for this bh as it's not marked locally
 				 * uptodate. */
 				status = -EIO;
+				clear_buffer_needs_validate(bh);
 				put_bh(bh);
 				bhs[i] = NULL;
 				continue;

[PATCH 4.4 18/28] drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Use pm_runtime_get_noresume() in connector_detect()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>

commit 6833fb1ec120bf078e1a527c573a09d4de286224 upstream.

It's true we can't resume the device from poll workers in
nouveau_connector_detect(). We can however, prevent the autosuspend
timer from elapsing immediately if it hasn't already without risking any
sort of deadlock with the runtime suspend/resume operations. So do that
instead of entirely avoiding grabbing a power reference.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c |   20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c
@@ -253,12 +253,16 @@ nouveau_connector_detect(struct drm_conn
 		nv_connector->edid = NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* Outputs are only polled while runtime active, so acquiring a
-	 * runtime PM ref here is unnecessary (and would deadlock upon
-	 * runtime suspend because it waits for polling to finish).
+	/* Outputs are only polled while runtime active, so resuming the
+	 * device here is unnecessary (and would deadlock upon runtime suspend
+	 * because it waits for polling to finish). We do however, want to
+	 * prevent the autosuspend timer from elapsing during this operation
+	 * if possible.
 	 */
-	if (!drm_kms_helper_is_poll_worker()) {
-		ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(connector->dev->dev);
+	if (drm_kms_helper_is_poll_worker()) {
+		pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev->dev);
+	} else {
+		ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev->dev);
 		if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES)
 			return conn_status;
 	}
@@ -329,10 +333,8 @@ detect_analog:
 
  out:
 
-	if (!drm_kms_helper_is_poll_worker()) {
-		pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(connector->dev->dev);
-		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(connector->dev->dev);
-	}
+	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(dev->dev);
+	pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev->dev);
 
 	return conn_status;
 }

[PATCH 4.4 19/28] tty: vt_ioctl: fix potential Spectre v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

commit e97267cb4d1ee01ca0929638ec0fcbb0904f903d upstream.

vsa.console is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:711 vt_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'vc_cons' [r]

Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include <linux/kbd_kern.h>
 #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
 #include <linux/kbd_diacr.h>
@@ -703,6 +705,8 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty,
 		if (vsa.console == 0 || vsa.console > MAX_NR_CONSOLES)
 			ret = -ENXIO;
 		else {
+			vsa.console = array_index_nospec(vsa.console,
+							 MAX_NR_CONSOLES + 1);
 			vsa.console--;
 			console_lock();
 			ret = vc_allocate(vsa.console);

[PATCH 4.4 20/28] ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 4d982e25d0bdc83d8c64e66fdeca0b89240b3b85 upstream.

A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into
reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run
into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero
fault.  Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of
dir->i_size.

Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the
message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division
by zero trap if the size passed in is zero.  (I'm not sure why we
coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is
actually more confusing and less useful.)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/dir.c    |   20 +++++++++-----------
 fs/ext4/inline.c |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *f
 	else if (unlikely(rlen < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len)))
 		error_msg = "rec_len is too small for name_len";
 	else if (unlikely(((char *) de - buf) + rlen > size))
-		error_msg = "directory entry across range";
+		error_msg = "directory entry overrun";
 	else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) >
 			le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
 		error_msg = "inode out of bounds";
@@ -83,18 +83,16 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *f
 
 	if (filp)
 		ext4_error_file(filp, function, line, bh->b_blocknr,
-				"bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u(%u), "
-				"inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d",
-				error_msg, (unsigned) (offset % size),
-				offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode),
-				rlen, de->name_len);
+				"bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, "
+				"inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d",
+				error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode),
+				rlen, de->name_len, size);
 	else
 		ext4_error_inode(dir, function, line, bh->b_blocknr,
-				"bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u(%u), "
-				"inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d",
-				error_msg, (unsigned) (offset % size),
-				offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode),
-				rlen, de->name_len);
+				"bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, "
+				"inode=%u, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d, size=%d",
+				 error_msg, offset, le32_to_cpu(de->inode),
+				 rlen, de->name_len, size);
 
 	return 1;
 }
--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
@@ -1756,6 +1756,7 @@ int empty_inline_dir(struct inode *dir,
 {
 	int err, inline_size;
 	struct ext4_iloc iloc;
+	size_t inline_len;
 	void *inline_pos;
 	unsigned int offset;
 	struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
@@ -1783,8 +1784,9 @@ int empty_inline_dir(struct inode *dir,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	inline_len = ext4_get_inline_size(dir);
 	offset = EXT4_INLINE_DOTDOT_SIZE;
-	while (offset < dir->i_size) {
+	while (offset < inline_len) {
 		de = ext4_get_inline_entry(dir, &iloc, offset,
 					   &inline_pos, &inline_size);
 		if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de,

[PATCH 4.4 21/28] ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 4274f516d4bc50648a4d97e4f67ecbd7b65cde4a upstream.

When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free
blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock.  It's not
strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to
keep them roughly aligned to reality.

Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't
call ext4_commit_super().  The problem is that it's in
ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum.  So
if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call
ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is
consistent.

Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling
ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time
the file system is unmounted.  However, it doesn't work in this
sequence:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M
mount /dev/vdc /vdc
cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc
godown /vdc
umount /vdc
mount /dev/vdc
tune2fs -l /dev/vdc

With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails.

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/super.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -4024,11 +4024,13 @@ no_journal:
 	block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb);
 	ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es, 
 				   EXT4_C2B(sbi, block));
+	ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb);
 	err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block,
 				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!err) {
 		unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb);
 		sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei);
+		ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb);
 		err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei,
 					  GFP_KERNEL);
 	}

[PATCH 4.4 22/28] ext4: fix online resizes handling of a too-small final block group

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit f0a459dec5495a3580f8d784555e6f8f3bf7f263 upstream.

Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block
group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in
the block group.

This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer:

umount /mnt
mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \
	-E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M
mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt
truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img
resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400
umount /mnt
e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img

Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/resize.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -1954,6 +1954,26 @@ retry:
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the last group has enough space so that it's
+	 * guaranteed to have enough space for all metadata blocks
+	 * that it might need to hold.  (We might not need to store
+	 * the inode table blocks in the last block group, but there
+	 * will be cases where this might be needed.)
+	 */
+	if ((ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, n_group) +
+	     ext4_group_overhead_blocks(sb, n_group) + 2 +
+	     sbi->s_itb_per_group + sbi->s_cluster_ratio) >= n_blocks_count) {
+		n_blocks_count = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, n_group);
+		n_group--;
+		n_blocks_count_retry = 0;
+		if (resize_inode) {
+			iput(resize_inode);
+			resize_inode = NULL;
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
 	/* extend the last group */
 	if (n_group == o_group)
 		add = n_blocks_count - o_blocks_count;

[PATCH 4.4 23/28] ext4: fix online resizing for bigalloc file systems with a 1k block size

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 5f8c10936fab2b69a487400f2872902e597dd320 upstream.

An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled
and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not
understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even
when the block size is 1k.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/resize.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb)
 {
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block
          * because the user tools have no way of handling this.  Probably a
          * bad time to do it anyways.
          */
-	if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh->b_blocknr !=
+	if (EXT4_B2C(sbi, sbi->s_sbh->b_blocknr) !=
 	    le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_first_data_block)) {
 		ext4_warning(sb, "won't resize using backup superblock at %llu",
 			(unsigned long long)EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh->b_blocknr);

[PATCH 4.4 24/28] ext4: dont mark mmp buffer head dirty

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com>

commit fe18d649891d813964d3aaeebad873f281627fbc upstream.

Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback
pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the
duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of
reading and writing the mmp block.
Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on
the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because
kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting
new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested
by writeback.

Signed-off-by: Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/mmp.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/mmp.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mmp.c
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ static int write_mmp_block(struct super_
 	 */
 	sb_start_write(sb);
 	ext4_mmp_csum_set(sb, mmp);
-	mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
 	lock_buffer(bh);
 	bh->b_end_io = end_buffer_write_sync;
 	get_bh(bh);

[PATCH 4.4 25/28] arm64: Add trace_hardirqs_off annotation in ret_to_user

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

commit db3899a6477a4dccd26cbfb7f408b6be2cc068e0 upstream.

When a kernel is built with CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS the following warning
is produced when entering userspace for the first time:

  WARNING: at /work/Linux/linux-2.6-aarch64/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3519
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.4.0-rc3+ #639
  Hardware name: Juno (DT)
  task: ffffffc9768a0000 ti: ffffffc9768a8000 task.ti: ffffffc9768a8000
  PC is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8
  LR is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8
  pc : [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] lr : [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] pstate: 600001c5
  sp : ffffffc9768abe10
  x29: ffffffc9768abe10 x28: ffffffc9768a8000
  x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001
  x25: 00000000000000a6 x24: ffffffc00064be6c
  x23: ffffffc0009f249e x22: ffffffc9768a0000
  x21: ffffffc97fea5480 x20: 00000000000001c0
  x19: ffffffc00169a000 x18: 0000005558cc7b58
  x17: 0000007fb78e3180 x16: 0000005558d2e238
  x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0ffffffffffffffd
  x13: 0000000000000008 x12: 0101010101010101
  x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: fefefefefefeff63
  x9 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x8 : 6e655f7371726964
  x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffffffc0001079c4
  x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001
  x3 : ffffffc001698438 x2 : 0000000000000000
  x1 : ffffffc9768a0000 x0 : 000000000000002e
  Call trace:
  [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8
  [<ffffffc0000fc440>] lock_is_held+0x80/0x98
  [<ffffffc00064bafc>] __schedule+0x404/0x730
  [<ffffffc00064be6c>] schedule+0x44/0xb8
  [<ffffffc000085bb0>] ret_to_user+0x0/0x24
  possible reason: unannotated irqs-off.
  irq event stamp: 502169
  hardirqs last  enabled at (502169): [<ffffffc000085a98>] el0_irq_naked+0x1c/0x24
  hardirqs last disabled at (502167): [<ffffffc0000bb3bc>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x298
  softirqs last  enabled at (502168): [<ffffffc0000bb43c>] __do_softirq+0x1fc/0x298
  softirqs last disabled at (502143): [<ffffffc0000bb830>] irq_exit+0xa0/0xf0

This happens because we disable interrupts in ret_to_user before calling
schedule() in work_resched. This patch adds the necessary
trace_hardirqs_off annotation.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -649,6 +649,9 @@ work_pending:
 	bl	do_notify_resume
 	b	ret_to_user
 work_resched:
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+	bl	trace_hardirqs_off		// the IRQs are off here, inform the tracing code
+#endif
 	bl	schedule
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.4 26/28] HID: sony: Update device ids

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>

commit cf1015d65d7c8a5504a4c03afb60fb86bff0f032 upstream.

Support additional DS4 model.

Signed-off-by: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c |    2 ++
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h  |    1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-sony.c |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
@@ -2011,6 +2011,8 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_ha
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) },
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) },
+	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_STEELSERIES, USB_DEVICE_ID_STEELSERIES_SRWS1) },
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -879,6 +879,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_BDREMOTE		0x0306
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER	0x0268
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER	0x05c4
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2	0x09cc
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_MOTION_CONTROLLER	0x03d5
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER	0x042f
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_BUZZ_CONTROLLER		0x0002
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
@@ -2460,6 +2460,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id sony_d
 		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB },
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER),
 		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2),
+		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB },
+	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2),
+		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT },
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, sony_devices);

[PATCH 4.4 27/28] HID: sony: Support DS4 dongle

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>

commit de66a1a04c25f2560a8dca7a95e2a150b0d5e17e upstream.

Add support for USB based DS4 dongle device, which allows connecting
a DS4 through Bluetooth, but hides Bluetooth from the host system.

Signed-off-by: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c |    1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h  |    1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-sony.c |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
@@ -2013,6 +2013,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_ha
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) },
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2) },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGX_MOUSE) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_VAIO_VGP_MOUSE) },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_STEELSERIES, USB_DEVICE_ID_STEELSERIES_SRWS1) },
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -880,6 +880,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS3_CONTROLLER	0x0268
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER	0x05c4
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2	0x09cc
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE	0x0ba0
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_MOTION_CONTROLLER	0x03d5
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER	0x042f
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_BUZZ_CONTROLLER		0x0002
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
@@ -2464,6 +2464,8 @@ static const struct hid_device_id sony_d
 		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB },
 	{ HID_BLUETOOTH_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_2),
 		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_BT },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SONY, USB_DEVICE_ID_SONY_PS4_CONTROLLER_DONGLE),
+		.driver_data = DUALSHOCK4_CONTROLLER_USB },
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, sony_devices);

[PATCH 4.4 28/28] iw_cxgb4: only allow 1 flush on user qps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit 308aa2b8f7b7db3332a7d41099fd37851fb793b2 upstream.

Once the qp has been flushed, it cannot be flushed again.  The user qp
flush logic wasn't enforcing it however.  The bug can cause
touch-after-free crashes like:

Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x000001ec
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000016069100
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [c008000016069100] flush_qp+0x80/0x480 [iw_cxgb4]
LR [c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4]
Call Trace:
[c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4]
[c00800001606e868] c4iw_ib_modify_qp+0x118/0x200 [iw_cxgb4]
[c0080000119eae80] ib_security_modify_qp+0xd0/0x3d0 [ib_core]
[c0080000119c4e24] ib_modify_qp+0xc4/0x2c0 [ib_core]
[c008000011df0284] iwcm_modify_qp_err+0x44/0x70 [iw_cm]
[c008000011df0fec] destroy_cm_id+0xcc/0x370 [iw_cm]
[c008000011ed4358] rdma_destroy_id+0x3c8/0x520 [rdma_cm]
[c0080000134b0540] ucma_close+0x90/0x1b0 [rdma_ucm]
[c000000000444da4] __fput+0xe4/0x2f0

So fix flush_qp() to only flush the wq once.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -1183,6 +1183,12 @@ static void flush_qp(struct c4iw_qp *qhp
 
 	t4_set_wq_in_error(&qhp->wq);
 	if (qhp->ibqp.uobject) {
+
+		/* for user qps, qhp->wq.flushed is protected by qhp->mutex */
+		if (qhp->wq.flushed)
+			return;
+
+		qhp->wq.flushed = 1;
 		t4_set_cq_in_error(&rchp->cq);
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 		(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq, rchp->ibcq.cq_context);

Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[Nathan Chancellor]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:06:24AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.159 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sat Sep 29 09:06:27 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.159-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Merged, compiled with -Werror, and installed onto my Pixel 2 XL.

No initial issues noticed in dmesg or general usage.

Thanks!
Nathan

Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[Rafael David Tinoco]

On 9/27/18 6:06 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.159 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sat Sep 29 09:06:27 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.159-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.4.159-rc1
git repo: 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: 00c1733d7f0d0d2d6e7f3a2198d63a99ca8be540
git describe: v4.4.158-29-g00c1733d7f0d
Test details: 
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.158-29-g00c1733d7f0d


No regressions (compared to build v4.4.157-69-g9fbcdd1319b4)


Ran 16876 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.4.159-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git branch: 4.4.159-rc1-hikey-20180927-294
git commit: 7bb00ecae52c8ec133eaf805b246cbe44a5fb46d
git describe: 4.4.159-rc1-hikey-20180927-294
Test details: 
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.159-rc1-hikey-20180927-294


No regressions (compared to build 4.4.159-rc1-hikey-20180926-293)


Ran 2725 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- qemu_arm64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests

-- 
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 09/27/2018 03:06 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.159 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sat Sep 29 09:06:27 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.159-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.159-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:06:24AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.159 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sat Sep 29 09:06:27 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 151 pass: 151 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 284 pass: 283 fail: 1
Failed tests: 
	powerpc:g3beige:ppc_book3s_defconfig:nosmp:ide:rootfs

Details are available at https://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter