From: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 16:36:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181003143610.GC22724@asgard.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-21-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 08:03:44AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When setting up a signal, the kernel creates a shadow stack
> restore token at the current SHSTK address and then stores the
> token's address in the signal frame, right after the FPU state.
> Before restoring a signal, the kernel verifies and then uses the
> restore token to set the SHSTK pointer.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> index ec256ae27a31..5cc4be6e0982 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> @@ -46,6 +47,69 @@ static unsigned long get_shstk_addr(void)
> return ptr;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Verify the restore token at the address of 'ssp' is
> + * valid and then set shadow stack pointer according to the
> + * token.
> + */
> +static int verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp)
> +{
> + unsigned long token;
> +
> + *new_ssp = 0;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)ssp))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + /* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */
> + if (ia32 && (token & 3) != 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + else if ((token & 3) != 1)
> + return -EINVAL;
It is probably worth adding constant names for these flags, example,
there's Section 2.4 in the currently available description[1], and
it took some time before I decided to look into other patches
and find the patch with the documentation (or finally notice section 2.7).
[1] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
> + token &= ~(1UL);
> +
> + if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if ((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != ssp)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *new_ssp = token;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.
> + * A token is always 8-byte and aligned to 8.
> + */
> +static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr;
> +
> + *new_ssp = 0;
> +
> + if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
> + return -EINVAL;
Maybe refactor this check into a separate function/macro?
> +
> + addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
> +
> + /* Is the token for 64-bit? */
> + if (!ia32)
> + ssp |= 1;
Again, usage of a named constant might document it better.
> +
> + if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, ssp))
This function is defined in "[RFC PATCH v4 19/27] x86/cet/shstk:
Introduce WRUSS instruction"
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + *new_ssp = addr;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> {
> unsigned long addr, size;
> @@ -107,3 +171,54 @@ void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
>
> tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> }
> +
> +int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp)
> +{
> + unsigned long new_ssp;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> + return 0;
> +
> + err = verify_rstor_token(in_ia32_syscall(), ssp, &new_ssp);
> +
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + return set_shstk_ptr(new_ssp);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Setup the shadow stack for the signal handler: first,
> + * create a restore token to keep track of the current ssp,
> + * and then the return address of the signal handler.
> + */
> +int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor_addr,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp)
> +{
> + unsigned long ssp;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> + return 0;
> +
> + ssp = get_shstk_addr();
> + err = create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, new_ssp);
> +
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + if (ia32) {
> + ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u32);
> + err = write_user_shstk_32(ssp, (unsigned int)rstor_addr);
> + } else {
> + ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u64);
> + err = write_user_shstk_64(ssp, rstor_addr);
> + }
> +
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + set_shstk_ptr(ssp);
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> index 92a3b312a53c..e9a85689143f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
>
> #include <asm/sigframe.h>
> #include <asm/signal.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #define COPY(x) do { \
> get_user_ex(regs->x, &sc->x); \
> @@ -152,6 +153,10 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
>
> err |= fpu__restore_sig(buf, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32));
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + err |= restore_sigcontext_ext(buf);
> +#endif
> +
> force_iret();
>
> return err;
> @@ -266,6 +271,11 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
> }
>
> if (fpu->initialized) {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + /* sigcontext extension */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + sp -= sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8;
> +#endif
> sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32),
> &buf_fx, &math_size);
That might be refactored in a separate function.
Also, it looks like that possible padding for 8-byte alignment
(copy_ext_{to,from}_user) is not accounted here.
> *fpstate = (void __user *)sp;
> @@ -493,6 +503,9 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
> err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set->sig[0]);
> err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
>
> + if (!err)
> + err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fp);
> +
Why is this not in setup_sigcontext, for example?
> if (err)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -576,6 +589,9 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig,
> regs, set->sig[0]);
> err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
>
> + if (!err)
> + err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate);
> +
> if (err)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -707,6 +723,86 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +static int copy_ext_from_user(struct sc_ext *ext, void __user *fpu)
> +{
> + void __user *p;
> +
> + if (!fpu)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
> + p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
> +
> + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, p, sizeof(*ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (__copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int copy_ext_to_user(void __user *fpu, struct sc_ext *ext)
> +{
> + void __user *p;
> +
> + if (!fpu)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
> + p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
> +
> + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, sizeof(*ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (__copy_to_user(p, ext, sizeof(*ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int restore_sigcontext_ext(void __user *fp)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
> + struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
> +
> + err = copy_ext_from_user(&ext, fp);
> +
> + if (!err)
> + err = cet_restore_signal(ext.ssp);
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +int setup_sigcontext_ext(struct ksignal *ksig, void __user *fp)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
> + struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
> + unsigned long rstor;
> +
> + rstor = (unsigned long)ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
> + err = cet_setup_signal(is_ia32_frame(ksig), rstor, &ext.ssp);
> + if (!err) {
> + ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
> + err = copy_ext_to_user(fp, &ext);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static void
> handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> --
> 2.17.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-03 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-21 15:03 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-28 16:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-28 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-02 15:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:30 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:39 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 17:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 17:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-04 15:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 10:39 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:38 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-03 14:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-03 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:19 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 15:08 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 15:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 4:15 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 14:36 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov [this message]
2018-10-03 16:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 23:27 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-09 21:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 23:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-16 17:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] mm/map: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 16:55 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-21 17:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 4:56 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 5:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:32 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:52 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 21:21 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 17:57 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 22:53 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-09-24 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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