* [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
@ 2018-10-16 10:16 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-10-16 10:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Felipe Balbi, Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-usb, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva
num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
fsg_opts->common->luns
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
index cb402e7a..043f97a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@
#include <linux/usb/gadget.h>
#include <linux/usb/composite.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include "configfs.h"
@@ -3152,6 +3154,7 @@ static struct config_group *fsg_lun_make(struct config_group *group,
fsg_opts = to_fsg_opts(&group->cg_item);
if (num >= FSG_MAX_LUNS)
return ERR_PTR(-ERANGE);
+ num = array_index_nospec(num, FSG_MAX_LUNS);
mutex_lock(&fsg_opts->lock);
if (fsg_opts->refcnt || fsg_opts->common->luns[num]) {
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
2018-10-16 10:16 [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi
2018-10-16 11:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Felipe Balbi @ 2018-10-16 11:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-usb, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva
Hi Greg,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> writes:
> num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
> potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
> fsg_opts->common->luns
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Can you still take this as an urgent fix?
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com>
--
balbi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi
@ 2018-10-16 11:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-10-16 11:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Felipe Balbi; +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva, linux-usb, linux-kernel
On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 02:28:19PM +0300, Felipe Balbi wrote:
>
> Hi Greg,
>
> "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> writes:
>
> > num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> >
> > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> >
> > drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
> > potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
> >
> > Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
> > fsg_opts->common->luns
> >
> > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> > completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> >
> > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> >
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>
> Can you still take this as an urgent fix?
>
> Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com>
Yes, will do so, thanks.
greg k-h
>
> --
> balbi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2018-10-16 10:16 [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi
2018-10-16 11:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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