From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FSL_HELO_FAKE,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78B04ECDE43 for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 18:28:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 480E221476 for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 18:28:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="QYBl9sA5" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 480E221476 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728164AbeJTCfW (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 22:35:22 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:47872 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727509AbeJTCfV (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 22:35:21 -0400 Received: from gmail.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3C9FB2086E; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 18:28:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1539973687; bh=Lic+bmBwgTZYCKOk4vb2DxF8sAEEHd55Yyu/Acg0Dqc=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=QYBl9sA5TbLQ6NUL8laDFUU2UDZXdulDFHgXVkXaCizSdbWb84WEwJLnVmeFdcLJr /Ihsxu9kSN6z/CTU85alYwMK+TdUJKZ44tcY+YkkIuMLMnF/3Y5z4xqAobOO67wjHe JZKnxDqXhaVH2K9wal9izNTRH51Zj6vRBfGIM5YY= Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 11:28:05 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Greg Kaiser , Herbert Xu , Samuel Neves , Michael Halcrow , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Tomer Ashur , linux-arm-kernel , Paul Crowley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support Message-ID: <20181019182804.GA246441@gmail.com> References: <20181015175424.97147-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20181015175424.97147-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Ard, On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 10:34:41PM +0800, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h > > index ae79e9983c72f..3d261f5cd156d 100644 > > --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h > > +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h > > @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ > > * XChaCha extends ChaCha's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha's > > * security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and setkey > > * function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. > > + * > > + * The ChaCha paper specifies 20, 12, and 8-round variants. In general, it is > > + * recommended to use the 20-round variant ChaCha20. However, the other > > + * variants can be needed in some performance-sensitive scenarios. The generic > > + * ChaCha code currently allows only the 20 and 12-round variants. > > */ > > > > #ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H > > @@ -39,6 +44,8 @@ void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); > > > > int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, > > unsigned int keysize); > > +int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, > > + unsigned int keysize); > > > > int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); > > int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); > > diff --git a/lib/chacha.c b/lib/chacha.c > > index 0a2c2e5b7b84d..c4d69a83fcd2d 100644 > > --- a/lib/chacha.c > > +++ b/lib/chacha.c > > @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds) > > int i; > > > > /* whitelist the allowed round counts */ > > - BUG_ON(nrounds != 20); > > + BUG_ON(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12); > > > > I didn't spot this until this patch, but BUG_ON() may bring down the > kernel, and so it should really only be used as a last resort. (i.e., > if this is called from non-process context things may explode rather > painfully) > > I didn't look at the entire file [which is a bit cumbersome while > reviewing incremental changes like this] and so I don't really have > another suggestion right now, but please try to come up with something > better if you can. > I'll change it to WARN_ON_ONCE(), I guess. I do still want it to be very noisy if something fishy is going on with the round count. - Eric