From: Eric Biggers <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: Ard Biesheuvel <email@example.com> Cc: Paul Crowley <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" <email@example.com>, firstname.lastname@example.org, linux-arm-kernel <email@example.com>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Herbert Xu <email@example.com>, Greg Kaiser <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Michael Halcrow <email@example.com>, Samuel Neves <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Tomer Ashur <email@example.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] crypto: Adiantum support Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 22:22:16 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181020052215.GA876@sol.localdomain> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu9be0LDSzkinzwJ50LN+g7Omdjh5Z7xUmpoQc+oCzxZ_Q@mail.gmail.com> Hi Ard, On Sat, Oct 20, 2018 at 11:24:05AM +0800, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On 20 October 2018 at 02:19, Paul Crowley <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > > On Fri, 19 Oct 2018 at 08:58, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote: > >> Before merging this into the kernel, do you want to wait until you've > >> received some public review from academia? > > > > I would prefer not to wait. Unlike a new primitive whose strength can > > only be known through attempts at cryptanalysis, Adiantum is a > > construction based on > > well-understood and trusted primitives; it is secure if the proof > > accompanying it is correct. Given that (outside competitions or > > standardization efforts) no-one ever issues public statements that > > they think algorithms or proofs are good, what I'm expecting from > > academia is silence :) The most we could hope for would be getting the > > paper accepted at a conference, and we're pursuing that but there's a > > good chance that won't happen simply because it's not very novel. It > > basically takes existing ideas and applies them using a stream cipher > > instead of a block cipher, and a faster hashing mode; it's also a > > small update from HPolyC. I've had some private feedback that the > > proof seems correct, and that's all I'm expecting to get. > > Hi Paul, Eric, > > The Adiantum paper claims > > "On an ARM Cortex-A7 processor, Adiantum decrypts 4096-byte messages > at 11 cycles per byte, five times faster than AES-256-XTS, with a > constant-time implementation." > > which is surprising to me. The bit slicing NEON AES core runs at ~14 > cycle per byte on a Cortex-A15 (when encrypting), so 55 cycles per > byte on A7 sounds rather high. Is it really that bad? Yes, it's really that slow, maybe because the NEON unit on Cortex-A7 isn't very good. Our figures are shown in the performance table in section 4. Note that the abstract is talking about AES-256-XTS. AES-128-XTS is ~27% faster. You can also reproduce our performance results using our userspace benchmark program from https://github.com/google/adiantum/tree/master/benchmark. It uses a copy of aes-neonbs-core.S from the kernel source tree. > > Also, the paper mentions that the second hash pass and the stream > cipher en/decryption pass could be executed in parallel, while your > implementation performs three distinct passes. Do you have any > estimates on the potential performance gain of implementing that? In > my experience (which is mostly A53 rather than A7 based, mind you), > removing memory accesses can help tremendously to speed up the > execution on low end cores. As a quick hack, on Cortex-A7 I timed "NH" without loading the message words. It became about 10% faster. My NEON-accelerated NH is already only about 1.3 cpb, so that means in theory not having to reload the message words would save ~0.13 cpb... But Adiantum as a whole is ~11 cpb, so that suggests the improvement would be only a bit over 1%. Maybe it could actually be better (for example, not having to map the pages again could save a lot), but in practice considering the increased complexity as well as that probably there wouldn't actually be enough registers to do everything efficiently, it seemed it would cause far too much trouble to bother yet (at least for the Linux kernel implementation; a two-pass implementation could still be useful elsewhere, of course). - Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-20 5:22 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-10-15 17:54 Eric Biggers 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/12] crypto: chacha20-generic - add HChaCha20 library function Eric Biggers 2018-10-19 14:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/12] crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support Eric Biggers 2018-10-19 14:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/12] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Eric Biggers 2018-10-19 14:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support Eric Biggers 2018-10-19 14:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-19 18:28 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/12] crypto: arm/chacha20 - add XChaCha20 support Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 2:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/12] crypto: arm/chacha20 - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 3:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-20 5:26 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] crypto: arm/chacha - add XChaCha12 support Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 3:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/12] crypto: poly1305 - add Poly1305 core API Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 3:45 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/12] crypto: nhpoly1305 - add NHPoly1305 support Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 4:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-20 5:38 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 15:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-22 18:42 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-22 22:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-22 22:40 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-22 22:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/12] crypto: arm/nhpoly1305 - add NEON-accelerated NHPoly1305 Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 4:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-20 5:51 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 15:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 4:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-20 7:12 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-23 10:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-24 22:06 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-30 8:17 ` Herbert Xu 2018-10-15 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/12] fscrypt: " Eric Biggers 2018-10-19 15:58 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] crypto: " Jason A. Donenfeld 2018-10-19 18:19 ` Paul Crowley 2018-10-20 3:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-10-20 5:22 ` Eric Biggers [this message] [not found] ` <email@example.com> 2018-10-22 11:20 ` Tomer Ashur 2018-10-19 19:04 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-20 10:26 ` Milan Broz 2018-10-20 13:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2018-11-16 21:52 ` Eric Biggers 2018-11-17 10:29 ` Milan Broz 2018-11-19 19:28 ` Eric Biggers 2018-11-19 20:05 ` Milan Broz 2018-11-19 20:30 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2018-10-21 22:23 ` Eric Biggers 2018-10-21 22:51 ` Jason A. Donenfeld 2018-10-22 17:17 ` Paul Crowley
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