From: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, "open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] bpf: btf: Fix a missing-check bug Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 17:26:23 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20181024172514.l33dsaqdvs5yewvm@kafai-mbp> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1540386020-30680-1-git-send-email-wang6495@umn.edu> On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 08:00:19AM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote: > In btf_parse(), the header of the user-space btf data 'btf_data' is firstly > parsed and verified through btf_parse_hdr(). In btf_parse_hdr(), the header > is copied from user-space 'btf_data' to kernel-space 'btf->hdr' and then > verified. If no error happens during the verification process, the whole > data of 'btf_data', including the header, is then copied to 'data' in > btf_parse(). It is obvious that the header is copied twice here. More > importantly, no check is enforced after the second copy to make sure the > headers obtained in these two copies are same. Given that 'btf_data' > resides in the user space, a malicious user can race to modify the header > between these two copies. By doing so, the user can inject inconsistent > data, which can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and introduce > potential security risk. > > To avoid the above issue, this patch copies the parsed header from > 'btf->hdr' to 'data'. The remaining part in 'data' is still copied from the > user-space 'btf_data'. LGTM. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> > > Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> > --- > kernel/bpf/btf.c | 11 ++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c > index 378cef7..b52a834a 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c > @@ -2152,6 +2152,7 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size, > struct btf_verifier_env *env = NULL; > struct bpf_verifier_log *log; > struct btf *btf = NULL; > + u32 hdr_len; > u8 *data; > int err; > > @@ -2200,7 +2201,15 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size, > btf->data_size = btf_data_size; > btf->nohdr_data = btf->data + btf->hdr.hdr_len; > > - if (copy_from_user(data, btf_data, btf_data_size)) { > + /* > + * The header at btf_data could be modified by a malicious user > + * after it is parsed. So we copy the parsed header here. The > + * remaining part is still copied from btf_data. > + */ > + hdr_len = min_t(u32, btf->hdr.hdr_len, sizeof(btf->hdr)); > + memcpy(data, &btf->hdr, hdr_len); > + if (copy_from_user(data + hdr_len, (u8 __user *)btf_data + hdr_len, > + btf_data_size - hdr_len)) { > err = -EFAULT; > goto errout; > } > -- > 2.7.4 >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-24 17:26 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-10-24 13:00 Wenwen Wang 2018-10-24 17:26 ` Martin Lau [this message] 2018-10-24 18:22 ` Martin Lau 2018-10-24 20:42 ` Martin Lau 2018-10-24 21:50 ` Song Liu 2018-10-25 22:58 ` Daniel Borkmann
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