From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D34B6C43441 for ; Sun, 11 Nov 2018 23:20:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B08B20817 for ; Sun, 11 Nov 2018 23:20:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="doJfQFf+" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 9B08B20817 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389596AbeKLJLE (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 04:11:04 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:47942 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389462AbeKLIVR (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 03:21:17 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [206.108.79.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3DDAB223C6; Sun, 11 Nov 2018 22:31:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541975480; bh=RRajRalsw06Zqv+BPA4Hrpg+dioudxZAkboujObzrE0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=doJfQFf+1XwMzIZpWARSEZemyXC+v6sACBCmA0MTwRE7ZrMznDmCUCwiggJYmhOvk vNnONR4A1QRknzpjVQejQWOfRI2+71RiXpMpAE6zUzhDsmEBcNJ3m0H3sNAOF+U/Ej UhRhExd95CATl6dABRYkYNuxbV+Hdz5dyY+sh5QQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang , Mike Snitzer Subject: [PATCH 4.18 267/350] dm ioctl: harden copy_params()s copy_from_user() from malicious users Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2018 14:22:11 -0800 Message-Id: <20181111221719.186621974@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181111221707.043394111@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181111221707.043394111@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Wenwen Wang commit 800a7340ab7dd667edf95e74d8e4f23a17e87076 upstream. In copy_params(), the struct 'dm_ioctl' is first copied from the user space buffer 'user' to 'param_kernel' and the field 'data_size' is checked against 'minimum_data_size' (size of 'struct dm_ioctl' payload up to its 'data' member). If the check fails, an error code EINVAL will be returned. Otherwise, param_kernel->data_size is used to do a second copy, which copies from the same user-space buffer to 'dmi'. After the second copy, only 'dmi->data_size' is checked against 'param_kernel->data_size'. Given that the buffer 'user' resides in the user space, a malicious user-space process can race to change the content in the buffer between the two copies. This way, the attacker can inject inconsistent data into 'dmi' (versus previously validated 'param_kernel'). Fix redundant copying of 'minimum_data_size' from user-space buffer by using the first copy stored in 'param_kernel'. Also remove the 'data_size' check after the second copy because it is now unnecessary. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | 18 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c @@ -1720,8 +1720,7 @@ static void free_params(struct dm_ioctl } static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl __user *user, struct dm_ioctl *param_kernel, - int ioctl_flags, - struct dm_ioctl **param, int *param_flags) + int ioctl_flags, struct dm_ioctl **param, int *param_flags) { struct dm_ioctl *dmi; int secure_data; @@ -1762,18 +1761,13 @@ static int copy_params(struct dm_ioctl _ *param_flags |= DM_PARAMS_MALLOC; - if (copy_from_user(dmi, user, param_kernel->data_size)) - goto bad; + /* Copy from param_kernel (which was already copied from user) */ + memcpy(dmi, param_kernel, minimum_data_size); -data_copied: - /* - * Abort if something changed the ioctl data while it was being copied. - */ - if (dmi->data_size != param_kernel->data_size) { - DMERR("rejecting ioctl: data size modified while processing parameters"); + if (copy_from_user(&dmi->data, (char __user *)user + minimum_data_size, + param_kernel->data_size - minimum_data_size)) goto bad; - } - +data_copied: /* Wipe the user buffer so we do not return it to userspace */ if (secure_data && clear_user(user, param_kernel->data_size)) goto bad;