From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E60B1C43441 for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF45E22419 for ; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:06:40 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AF45E22419 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730114AbeKMCAa (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:30 -0500 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:39016 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729995AbeKMCA3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2018 21:00:29 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:34 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,495,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="273385348" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Nov 2018 08:06:29 -0800 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 9AD90863; Mon, 12 Nov 2018 18:06:28 +0200 (EET) From: Mika Westerberg To: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Joerg Roedel , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Ashok Raj , Bjorn Helgaas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Jacob jun Pan , Andreas Noever , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , Lukas Wunner , Christian Kellner , Mario.Limonciello@dell.com, Anthony Wong , Mika Westerberg , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/4] thunderbolt: Export IOMMU based DMA protection support to userspace Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:06:28 +0300 Message-Id: <20181112160628.86620-5-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> References: <20181112160628.86620-1-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or later may support a feature called Kernel DMA protection [1]. In practice this means that Thunderbolt connected devices are placed behind an IOMMU during the whole time it is connected (including during boot) making Thunderbolt security levels redundant. Some of these systems still have Thunderbolt security level set to "user" in order to support OS downgrade (the older version of the OS might not support IOMMU based DMA protection so connecting a device still relies on user approval then). Export this information to userspace by introducing a new sysfs attribute (iommu_dma_protection). Based on it userspace tools can make more accurate decision whether or not authorize the connected device. In addition update Thunderbolt documentation regarding IOMMU based DMA protection. [1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt | 9 ++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c | 17 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt index 151584a1f950..b21fba14689b 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt @@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ Description: Holds a comma separated list of device unique_ids that If a device is authorized automatically during boot its boot attribute is set to 1. +What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/iommu_dma_protection +Date: Mar 2019 +KernelVersion: 4.21 +Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org +Description: This attribute tells whether the system uses IOMMU + for DMA protection. Value of 1 means IOMMU is used 0 means + it is not (DMA protection is solely based on Thunderbolt + security levels). + What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security Date: Sep 2017 KernelVersion: 4.13 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst index 35fccba6a9a6..ccac2596a49f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst @@ -133,6 +133,29 @@ If the user still wants to connect the device they can either approve the device without a key or write a new key and write 1 to the ``authorized`` file to get the new key stored on the device NVM. +DMA protection utilizing IOMMU +------------------------------ +Recent systems shipping with Windows 10 version 1803 or later may support a +feature called `Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt 3`_. This means that +Thunderbolt security is handled by an IOMMU so connected devices cannot +access memory regions outside of what is allocated for them by drivers. +When Linux is running on such system it automatically enables IOMMU if not +enabled by the user already. These systems can be identified by reading +``1`` from ``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/domainX/iommu_dma_protection`` +attribute. + +The driver does not do anything special in this case but because DMA +protection is handled by the IOMMU, security levels (if set) are +redundant. For this reason some systems ship with security level set to +``none``. Other systems have security level set to ``user`` in order to +support downgrade to older Windows, so users who want to automatically +authorize devices when IOMMU DMA protection is enabled can use the +following ``udev`` rule:: + + ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="thunderbolt", ATTRS{iommu_dma_protection}=="1", ATTR{authorized}=="0", ATTR{authorized}="1" + +.. _Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt 3: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt + Upgrading NVM on Thunderbolt device or host ------------------------------------------- Since most of the functionality is handled in firmware running on a diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c index 93e562f18d40..7416bdbd8576 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ */ #include +#include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -236,6 +238,20 @@ static ssize_t boot_acl_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(boot_acl); +static ssize_t iommu_dma_protection_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + /* + * Kernel DMA protection is a feature where Thunderbolt security is + * handled natively using IOMMU. It is enabled when IOMMU is + * enabled and ACPI DMAR table has DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN set. + */ + return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", + iommu_present(&pci_bus_type) && dmar_platform_optin()); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(iommu_dma_protection); + static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { @@ -251,6 +267,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(security); static struct attribute *domain_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_boot_acl.attr, + &dev_attr_iommu_dma_protection.attr, &dev_attr_security.attr, NULL, }; -- 2.19.1