From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE91BC43441 for ; Mon, 19 Nov 2018 21:54:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8079121582 for ; Mon, 19 Nov 2018 21:54:33 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8079121582 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731594AbeKTIUL (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Nov 2018 03:20:11 -0500 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:32094 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731529AbeKTIUJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Nov 2018 03:20:09 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Nov 2018 13:54:29 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,254,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="93319899" Received: from yyu32-desk1.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.147]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 19 Nov 2018 13:54:28 -0800 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:48:02 -0800 Message-Id: <20181119214809.6086-20-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag set and read-only protection. It has a fixed size of RLIMIT_STACK. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu --- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 34 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 15 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 + .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- 9 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c952a2ec65fe --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include + +struct task_struct; +/* + * Per-thread CET status + */ +struct cet_status { + unsigned long shstk_base; + unsigned long shstk_size; + unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET +int cet_setup_shstk(void); +void cet_disable_shstk(void); +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p); +#else +static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; } +static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {} +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {} +#endif + +#define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \ + (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || \ + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -75,7 +81,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 80f4a4f38c79..298721ff00f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -778,4 +778,19 @@ #define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115 #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0 /* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2 /* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4 /* kernel shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7 /* user shstk pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8 /* exception shstk table */ + +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */ +#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN 0x0000000000000001ULL +#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN 0x0000000000000002ULL +#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x0000000000000004ULL +#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x0000000000000008ULL +#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x0000000000000010ULL +#define MSR_IA32_CET_BITMAP_MASK 0xfffffffffffff000ULL + #endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 071b2a6fff85..1222dc204c40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86; #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -500,6 +501,10 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET + struct cet_status cet; +#endif + /* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 8824d01c0c35..fbb2d91fb756 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e6726e78e6cd --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * cet.c - Control-flow Enforcement (CET) + * + * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. + * Yu-cheng Yu + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr) +{ + u64 r; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return -1; + + if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4))) + return -1; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN); + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long get_shstk_addr(void) +{ + unsigned long ptr; + + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + return 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr); + return ptr; +} + +int cet_setup_shstk(void) +{ + unsigned long addr, size; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK); + addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK); + + /* + * Return actual error from do_mmap(). + */ + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) + return addr; + + set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(u64)); + current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr; + current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size; + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1; + return 0; +} + +void cet_disable_shstk(void) +{ + u64 r; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0); + current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; +} + +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || + !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + return; + + if (tsk == current) + cet_disable_shstk(); + + /* + * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm + * with current but has its own shstk. + */ + if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) && + (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) { + vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base, + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size); + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; + } + + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index ffb181f959d2..795e195bf2fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC #include @@ -411,6 +412,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg) __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + if (cpu_x86_cet_enabled()) + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s) +{ + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */ + if (s[0] != '\0') + return 0; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return 1; + + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK); + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_shstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n"); + return 1; +} +__setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk); +#endif + /* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization @@ -1379,6 +1403,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) x86_init_rdrand(c); x86_init_cache_qos(c); setup_pku(c); + setup_cet(c); /* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index c93fcfdf1673..4a776da4c28c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux, @@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ void flush_thread(void) flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk); memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array)); + cet_disable_shstk(); fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu); } diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -75,7 +81,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP) +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) -- 2.17.1