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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 16/24] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 08:57:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181122075709.GH41788@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181121201723.856044561@linutronix.de>


* Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:

> From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> 
> To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
> control of STIBP.
> 
> Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
> SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
> code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
> guest/host switch works properly.
> 
> This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
> which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
> code.
> 
> [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
>   	depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
>   	update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
>   	IBPB ]
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |    5 +++--
>  arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   |   12 ++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    5 ++++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |    4 ++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -41,9 +41,10 @@
>  
>  #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
>  #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT		1	   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
>  #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
>  
>  #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
>  #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
> @@ -53,12 +53,24 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(
>  	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
>  }
>  
> +static inline u64 stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
> +{
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
> +	return (tifn & _TIF_SPEC_IB) >> (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
> +}
> +
>  static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
>  {
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
>  	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
>  }
>  
> +static inline unsigned long stibp_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
> +{
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
> +	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) << (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
> +}
> +
>  static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
>  {
>  	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
>  #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
>  #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
> +#define TIF_SPEC_IB		9	/* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
>  #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	11	/* notify kernel of userspace return */
>  #define TIF_UPROBE		12	/* breakpointed or singlestepping */
>  #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING	13	/* pending live patching update */
> @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
>  #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
>  #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
> +#define _TIF_SPEC_IB		(1 << TIF_SPEC_IB)
>  #define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	(1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
>  #define _TIF_UPROBE		(1 << TIF_UPROBE)
>  #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING	(1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
> @@ -146,7 +148,8 @@ struct thread_info {
>  
>  /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
>  #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
> -	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
> +	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|		\
> +	 _TIF_SSBD|_TIF_SPEC_IB)
>  
>  #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
>  #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -148,6 +148,10 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
>  		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
>  			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
>  
> +		/* Check whether dynamic indirect branch control is on */
> +		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
> +			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
> +
>  		if (hostval != guestval) {
>  			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
>  			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/task.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/topology.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>  #include <linux/export.h>
>  #include <linux/pm.h>
> @@ -406,6 +407,11 @@ static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_up
>  	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
>  		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
>  
> +	/* Only evaluate STIBP if dynamic control is enabled */
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
> +	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
> +		msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);

> +	/*
> +	 * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if dynamic control is
> +	 * enabled, otherwise avoid the MSR write
> +	 */
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
> +	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
> +		updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB);

Small nit:

we use several terms here in an interchangeable fashion:

 - 'dynamic control'
 - 'conditional STIBP'

The in-code variable naming follows the second nomenclature, while we 
often mention 'dynamic control' - and the relationship is not always 
obvious immediately.

It might make sense to pick one of these - for example if we pick 
'conditional STIBP' then the second comment would become:

	/*
	 * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is
	 * enabled, otherwise avoid the MSR write
	 */

etc.

Thanks,

	ngo

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-22  7:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 95+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-21 20:14 [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:28   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 20:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 22:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:53         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-11-21 22:56             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:07               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:04         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-21 23:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 17:30             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-22 17:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 21:17                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 02/24] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 03/24] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 04/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 05/24] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 20:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 06/24] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 07/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 08/24] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 09/24] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 10/24] sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:41   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 11/24] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 12/24] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 13/24] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 14/24] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:59   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 15/24] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22  8:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:07       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22 10:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 10:48           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 16/24] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:57   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 17/24] x86/speculation: Move IBPB control out of switch_mm() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  0:01   ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-22  7:42     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:40   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:52   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 22:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 18/24] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:23   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:44     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 19/24] ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:13   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22 23:00     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-26 18:35         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-26 21:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:05             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27  7:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:30                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 12:52                   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 13:18                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 21:57                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27 22:07                       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:20                         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:36                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  1:50                           ` Tim Chen
2018-11-28 10:43                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  6:05                           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-28 14:33                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content tip-bot for Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:43   ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 21/24] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:34   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:17     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 23:28       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 22/24] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:10   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22  9:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22  9:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 12:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 12:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 23/24] x86/speculation: Enable PRCTL mode for spectre_v2_app2app Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 24/24] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:24   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:45     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:48 ` [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Tim Chen
2018-11-22  9:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra

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