From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.9 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7642CC04EB8 for ; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:11:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D7EE2084C for ; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:11:33 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3D7EE2084C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=davemloft.net Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729805AbeLJULc (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Dec 2018 15:11:32 -0500 Received: from shards.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.9]:43902 "EHLO shards.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726607AbeLJULb (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Dec 2018 15:11:31 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [IPv6:2601:601:9f80:35cd::bf5]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) (Authenticated sender: davem-davemloft) by shards.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 25D921473814A; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:11:31 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:11:30 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <20181210.121130.912436244375054028.davem@davemloft.net> To: gustavo@embeddedor.com Cc: kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru, yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability From: David Miller In-Reply-To: <20181210184124.GA24497@embeddedor> References: <20181210184124.GA24497@embeddedor> X-Mailer: Mew version 6.8 on Emacs 26.1 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.12 (shards.monkeyblade.net [149.20.54.216]); Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:11:31 -0800 (PST) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 12:41:24 -0600 > vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) > net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Applied and queued up for -stable. Please do not CC: stable for networking bug fixes, thank you.