From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.9 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D0ECC43387 for ; Mon, 31 Dec 2018 10:41:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 071CB218AF for ; Mon, 31 Dec 2018 10:41:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1546252861; bh=xc5/gIvNxDnpj64JC6uK7YnQwnhqe1oLUCct72yCcCE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:List-ID:From; b=NSS6QFcpZ5Q0SH2SAPr20hrUfwj6FPidMNzvW8otudIEgStKSRIq0DXrPGtZu0ikI PRU7dgUjYGhDJhXyMn0BzceQqeHFygAb78yQxZFd2eMfEfEncskJ/QzrfVlBSkOjnP iIOS2W+9Jgc0Al/HKyOGLxl1QeXXmcI4oYgPbpvo= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727260AbeLaKlA (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Dec 2018 05:41:00 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:43408 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727040AbeLaKk7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Dec 2018 05:40:59 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A727F21019; Mon, 31 Dec 2018 10:40:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1546252858; bh=xc5/gIvNxDnpj64JC6uK7YnQwnhqe1oLUCct72yCcCE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=0oPQlDWAp3ETW9bL5hWEzELj1Ma2axb1y0WGq53Eqii6K5bcMTEsycMAt4PFgridz kIQr/8paMRdnJ9GoS+g2RGyP0tf1t1Afc5/hTAiEmoRp6SVyYyr9TcVtUIJ2MWmYzO RuvL7ZQOE1VZv7owM6wps+g6oAqesXKzhfb7IsGo= Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2018 11:40:55 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: joeyli Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Pavel Machek , Len Brown , "Martin K . Petersen" , Randy Dunlap , Joe Perches , Bart Van Assche , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, Chen Yu , Giovanni Gherdovich , Jann Horn , Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] PM / Sleep: Check the file capability when writing wake lock interface Message-ID: <20181231104055.GB27420@kroah.com> References: <20181230132856.24095-1-jlee@suse.com> <20181230132856.24095-3-jlee@suse.com> <20181230144835.GB18985@kroah.com> <20181231093851.GN3506@linux-l9pv.suse> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181231093851.GN3506@linux-l9pv.suse> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.1 (2018-12-01) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 05:38:51PM +0800, joeyli wrote: > Hi Greg, > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 03:48:35PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 09:28:56PM +0800, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote: > > > The wake lock/unlock sysfs interfaces check that the writer must has > > > CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND capability. But the checking logic can be bypassed > > > by opening sysfs file within an unprivileged process and then writing > > > the file within a privileged process. The tricking way has been exposed > > > by Andy Lutomirski in CVE-2013-1959. > > > > Don't you mean "open by privileged and then written by unprivileged?" > > Or if not, exactly how is this a problem? You check the capabilities > > when you do the write and if that is not allowed then, well > > > > Sorry for I didn't provide clear explanation. > > The privileged means CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND but not file permission. The file permission > has already relaxed for non-root user. Then the expected behavior is that non-root > process must has CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND capability for writing wake_lock sysfs. > > But, the CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND restrict can be bypassed: > > int main(int argc, char* argv[]) > { > int fd, ret = 0; > > fd = open("/sys/power/wake_lock", O_RDWR); > if (fd < 0) > err(1, "open wake_lock"); > > if (dup2(fd, 1) != 1) // overwrite the stdout with wake_lock > err(1, "dup2"); > sleep(1); > execl("./string", "string"); //string has capability > > return ret; > } > > This program is an unpriviledged process (has no CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND), it opened > wake_lock sysfs and overwrited stdout. Then it executes the "string" program > that has CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND. That's the problem right there, do not give CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND rights to "string". If any user can run that program, there's nothing the kernel can do about this, right? Just don't allow that program on the system :) > The string program writes to stdout, which means that it writes to > wake_lock. So an unpriviledged opener can trick an priviledged writer > for writing sysfs. That sounds like a userspace program that was somehow given incorrect rights by the admin, and a user is taking advantage of it. That's not the kernel's fault. > > And you are checking the namespace of the person trying to do the write > > when the write happens, which is correct here, right? > > > > If you really want to mess with wake locks in a namespaced environment, > > then put it in a real namespaced environment, which is {HUGE HINT} not > > sysfs. > > > > I don't want to mess with wake locks in namespace. Neither do I :) so all should be fine, don't allow crazy executables with odd permissions to be run by any user and you should be fine. That's always been the case, right? thanks, greg k-h