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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>,
	Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/13] taint: Introduce a new taint flag (insecure)
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:48:37 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190116224849.8617-2-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190116224849.8617-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

For testing (or root-only) purposes, the new flag will serve to tag the
kernel taint accurately.

When adding a new feature support, patches need to be incrementally
applied and tested with temporal parameters. Currently, there is no flag
for this usage.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 1 +
 include/linux/kernel.h          | 3 ++-
 kernel/panic.c                  | 1 +
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index c0527d8a468a..c4f37871d86e 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -1052,6 +1052,7 @@ ORed together. The letters are seen in "Tainted" line of Oops reports.
  32768 (K): The kernel has been live patched.
  65536 (X): Auxiliary taint, defined and used by for distros.
 131072 (T): The kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin.
+262144 (Z): The kernel is running in a known insecure configuration.
 
 ==============================================================
 
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 8f0e68e250a7..dc149ff8cc52 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -599,7 +599,8 @@ extern enum system_states {
 #define TAINT_LIVEPATCH			15
 #define TAINT_AUX			16
 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT		17
-#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		18
+#define TAINT_INSECURE			18
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		19
 
 struct taint_flag {
 	char c_true;	/* character printed when tainted */
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index f121e6ba7e11..cb6b90538375 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
 	[ TAINT_LIVEPATCH ]		= { 'K', ' ', true },
 	[ TAINT_AUX ]			= { 'X', ' ', true },
 	[ TAINT_RANDSTRUCT ]		= { 'T', ' ', true },
+	[ TAINT_INSECURE ]		= { 'Z', ' ', false },
 };
 
 /**
-- 
2.19.1


  reply	other threads:[~2019-01-16 22:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-16 22:48 [PATCH v4 00/13] x86: Enable FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] kbuild: Raise the minimum required binutils version to 2.21 Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics/macros for FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-01-17  5:09   ` Andi Kleen
2019-01-17 18:04     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in the helper functions Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Preserve FS/GS state in __switch_to() if FSGSBASE is on Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: When copying a thread, use the FSGSBASE instructions if available Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use the per-CPU base as GSBASE at the paranoid_entry Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test WRGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE by default and add a chicken bit Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Chang S. Bae
2019-01-16 22:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add documentation for FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae

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