From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
<david.safford@ge.com>, <monty.wiseman@ge.com>,
<matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<keyrings@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 5/6] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 11:06:40 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190201100641.26936-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190201100641.26936-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().
This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
security/keys/trusted.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 4d98f4f87236..5b852263eae1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+static struct tpm_chip *chip;
struct sdesc {
struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
int rc;
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
- rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
+ rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
if (rc > 0)
/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
@@ -384,10 +385,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
- return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/*
@@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
@@ -496,7 +497,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -751,7 +752,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
int i;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -920,7 +921,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -970,7 +971,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
size_t key_len;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -1011,7 +1012,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_load:
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
else
ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1021,13 +1022,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
break;
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
- ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
else
ret = key_seal(payload, options);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1225,17 +1226,26 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int ret;
+ chip = tpm_default_chip();
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENOENT;
ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto err_put;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
if (ret < 0)
- trusted_shash_release();
+ goto err_release;
+ return 0;
+err_release:
+ trusted_shash_release();
+err_put:
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
return ret;
}
static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
{
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
trusted_shash_release();
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-01 10:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-01 10:06 [PATCH v9 0/6] tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms from TPM Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 10:06 ` [PATCH v9 1/6] tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 13:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 10:06 ` [PATCH v9 2/6] tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 13:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 10:06 ` [PATCH v9 3/6] tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 10:06 ` [PATCH v9 4/6] tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 13:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-04 8:58 ` kbuild test robot
2019-02-01 10:06 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2019-02-01 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 5/6] KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip() Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 10:06 ` [PATCH v9 6/6] tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend() Roberto Sassu
2019-02-01 13:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 13:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 14:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-01 17:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 17:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-01 19:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-04 9:14 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-02-04 12:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-04 12:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-04 13:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-02-04 23:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-04 23:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-05 10:02 ` Roberto Sassu
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