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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 15:11:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190228231203.212359-11-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190228231203.212359-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      | 9 ++++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 9ecfe13157c0..40c14574fcf8 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1167,6 +1170,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
 	struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1242,6 +1248,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 6fa1627ce08d..1549cdd0710e 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -237,7 +243,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
+	    kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index d96626c614f5..b8a08d3166a1 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);
-- 
2.21.0.352.gf09ad66450-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-28 23:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-28 21:28 [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 22:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 23:13   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01  0:05     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-01  1:01       ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01  1:44         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-01  3:33           ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01  4:16             ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 22:44 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 22:44   ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:10 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:10   ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 08/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-01  2:05     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 09/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-19 22:15     ` Pavel Machek
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 10/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 12/27] x86: Lock down IO port access " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 13/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 18/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 20/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 21/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11   ` [PATCH 23/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12   ` [PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12   ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12   ` [PATCH 26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:12   ` [PATCH 27/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:24 ` [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Randy Dunlap
2019-03-04 22:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 11/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett

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