From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
yhs@fb.com, lkp@01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 11:36:35 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190305113635.18f80ea3b1f4fca54b9d21e4@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiQM84VsAiw92UWyQZTQxr+F032Gm5BiFBXk7tC+LQohQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 4 Mar 2019 10:59:22 -0800
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 1:06 AM Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, 3 Mar 2019 18:37:59 -0800
> > Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > > We've had this before. We've gotten rid of the actual "use system
> > > calls", but we still have some of the init sequence in particular just
> > > calling the wrappers instead.
> >
> > Are those safe if we are in init sequence?
>
> Yes, they are, it runs with set_fs(KERNEL_DS).
>
> But the patches made that now complain about copying from non-user
> space, even though it's fine.
>
> Basically, "strncpy_from_user()" shouldn't use "user_access_ok()",
> since it actually can take a kernel address (with set_fs()).
OK, so strncpy_from_user() or any other copy_from_user() should be
available for copying kernel memory if set_fs(KERNEL_DS).
> Your "unsafe" version for tracing that actually sets "set_fs(USER_DS)"
> is thje only thing that should use that helper.
I see, it ensures it is accessing user-memory.
>
> > > And yes, ksys_mount() takes __user pointers.
> > >
> > > It would be a lot better to use "do_mount()", which is the interface
> > > that takes actual "char *" pointers.
> >
> > Unfortunately, it still takes a __user pointer.
>
> Ahh, yes, the name remains in user space.
>
> Besides, I'm sure you'd just hit other cases instead where people use
> set_fs() and copy strings.
Yeah, under init/ I saw such cases.
>
> > So what we need is
> >
> > long do_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *dir_path,
> > const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
> >
> > or introduce kern_do_mount()?
>
> It's actually fairly painful. Particularly because of that "void *data_page".
Yeah, that is what I've hit while testing :-(
>
> Your second email with "Would this work?" helper function _wopuldn't_
> work correctly, exactly because you passed in a regular string to the
> data page.
>
> Also, I don't want to see code that replaces the unconditional "copy
> path from user space" with a conditional "do we have path in kernel
> space".
Yes, that's just a hack :)
>
> So together with the whole "uyou'll hit other peoblems anyway", I
> don't think this is a good approach.
>
> I think you simply need to have a separate "unsafe_strncpy()"
> function, and not change the existing "strncpy_from_user()".
Would you mean implementing yet another "strncpy_from_user without
pagefault"?
What we changed here is just use user_access_ok() instead access_ok()
in user_access_begin() because access_ok() may cause false-positive
warning if we use it in IRQ.
I think the better way to do this is allowing strncpy_from_user()
if some conditions are match, like
- strncpy_from_user() will be able to copy user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
- strncpy_from_user() can copy kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
- strncpy_from_user() can access unsafe memory in IRQ context if
pagefault is disabled.
This is almost done, except for CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y on x86.
So, what about adding a condition to WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() like below
instead of introducing user_access_ok() ?
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 780f2b42c8ef..ec0f0b74c9ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un
})
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
-# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task())
+# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() WARN_ON_ONCE(pagefault_disabled() && !in_task())
#else
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
#endif
Of course we have to move pagefault_disabled() macro in somewhere better place.
Thank you,
--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-05 2:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-28 16:02 [PATCH v5 0/6] tracing/probes: uaccess: Add support user-space access Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:02 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] uaccess: Add user_access_ok() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] uaccess: Use user_access_ok() in user_access_begin() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-03 17:39 ` [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x kernel test robot
2019-03-03 19:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04 1:14 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 2:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04 9:06 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:16 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:58 ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 18:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-05 2:36 ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2019-03-05 8:22 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 9:01 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 9:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 13:58 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 14:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 15:18 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 3:20 ` [LKP] " Rong Chen
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 22:49 ` Yonghong Song
2019-03-01 2:29 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-01 6:30 ` Yonghong Song
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] tracing/probe: Add ustring type for user-space string Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] tracing/probe: Support user-space dereference Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests/ftrace: Add user-memory access syntax testcase Masami Hiramatsu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190305113635.18f80ea3b1f4fca54b9d21e4@kernel.org \
--to=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
--cc=changbin.du@gmail.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lkp@01.org \
--cc=lkp@intel.com \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=namit@vmware.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=yhs@fb.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).