From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4301C43381 for ; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 02:05:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FB6220663 for ; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 02:05:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728861AbfCFCFp (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Mar 2019 21:05:45 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:55280 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726256AbfCFCFo (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Mar 2019 21:05:44 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F30F5308222E; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 02:05:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from sky.random (ovpn-121-1.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.121.1]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 14774600D7; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 02:05:40 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 21:05:40 -0500 From: Andrea Arcangeli To: zhong jiang Cc: Dmitry Vyukov , syzbot , Michal Hocko , cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Johannes Weiner , LKML , Linux-MM , syzkaller-bugs , Vladimir Davydov , David Rientjes , Hugh Dickins , Matthew Wilcox , Mel Gorman , Vlastimil Babka , Mike Rapoport , Peter Xu Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm Message-ID: <20190306020540.GA23850@redhat.com> References: <00000000000006457e057c341ff8@google.com> <5C7BFE94.6070500@huawei.com> <5C7D2F82.40907@huawei.com> <5C7D4500.3070607@huawei.com> <5C7E1A38.2060906@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5C7E1A38.2060906@huawei.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.3 (2019-02-01) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.47]); Wed, 06 Mar 2019 02:05:44 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hello everyone, [ CC'ed Mike and Peter ] On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 02:42:00PM +0800, zhong jiang wrote: > On 2019/3/5 14:26, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 4:32 PM zhong jiang wrote: > >> On 2019/3/4 22:11, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > >>> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 3:00 PM zhong jiang wrote: > >>>> On 2019/3/4 15:40, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > >>>>> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 5:19 PM zhong jiang wrote: > >>>>>> Hi, guys > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I also hit the following issue. but it fails to reproduce the issue by the log. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> it seems to the case that we access the mm->owner and deference it will result in the UAF. > >>>>>> But it should not be possible that we specify the incomplete process to be the mm->owner. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Any thoughts? > >>>>> FWIW syzbot was able to reproduce this with this reproducer. > >>>>> This looks like a very subtle race (threaded reproducer that runs > >>>>> repeatedly in multiple processes), so most likely we are looking for > >>>>> something like few instructions inconsistency window. > >>>>> > >>>> I has a little doubtful about the instrustions inconsistency window. > >>>> > >>>> I guess that you mean some smb barriers should be taken into account.:-) > >>>> > >>>> Because IMO, It should not be the lock case to result in the issue. > >>> Since the crash was triggered on x86 _most likley_ this is not a > >>> missed barrier. What I meant is that one thread needs to executed some > >>> code, while another thread is stopped within few instructions. > >>> > >>> > >> It is weird and I can not find any relationship you had said with the issue.:-( > >> > >> Because It is the cause that mm->owner has been freed, whereas we still deference it. > >> > >> From the lastest freed task call trace, It fails to create process. > >> > >> Am I miss something or I misunderstand your meaning. Please correct me. > > Your analysis looks correct. I am just saying that the root cause of > > this use-after-free seems to be a race condition. > > > > > > > Yep, Indeed, I can not figure out how the race works. I will dig up further. Yes it's a race condition. We were aware about the non-cooperative fork userfaultfd feature creating userfaultfd file descriptor that gets reported to the parent uffd, despite they belong to mm created by failed forks. https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg136357.html The fork failure in my testcase happened because of signal pending that interrupted fork after the failed-fork uffd context, was already pushed to the userfaultfd reader/monitor. CRIU then takes care of filtering the failed fork cases so we didn't want to make the fork code more complicated just for userfaultfd. In reality if MEMCG is enabled at build time, mm->owner maintainance code now creates a race condition in the above case, with any fork failure. I pinged Mike yesterday to ask if my theory could be true for this bug and one solution he suggested is to do the userfaultfd_dup at a point where fork cannot fail anymore. That's precisely what we were wondering to do back then to avoid the failed fork reports to the non cooperative uffd monitor. That will solve the false positive deliveries that CRIU manager currently filters out too. From a theoretical standpoint it's also quite strange to even allow any uffd ioctl to run on a otherwise long gone mm created for a process that in the end wasn't even created (the mm got temporarily fully created, but no child task really ever used such mm). However that mm is on its way to exit_mmap as soon as the ioclt returns and this only ever happens during race conditions, so the way CRIU monitor works there wasn't anything fundamentally concerning about this detail, despite it's remarkably "strange". Our priority was to keep the fork code as simple as possible and keep userfaultfd as non intrusive as possible. One alternative solution I'm wondering about for this memcg issue is to free the task struct with RCU also when fork has failed and to add the mm_update_next_owner before mmput. That will still report failed forks to the uffd monitor, so it's not the ideal fix, but since it's probably simpler I'm posting it below. Also I couldn't reproduce the problem with the testcase here yet. >From 6cbf9d377b705476e5226704422357176f79e32c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 19:21:37 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails if MEMCG MEMCG depends on the task structure not to be freed under rcu_read_lock() in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() after it dereferences mm->owner. A better fix would be to avoid registering forked vmas in userfaultfd contexts reported to the monitor, if case fork ends up failing. Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli --- kernel/fork.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index eb9953c82104..3bcbb361ffbc 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -953,6 +953,15 @@ static void mm_init_aio(struct mm_struct *mm) #endif } +static __always_inline void mm_clear_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, + struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG + if (mm->owner == p) + mm->owner = NULL; +#endif +} + static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p) { #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG @@ -1345,6 +1354,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk) free_pt: /* don't put binfmt in mmput, we haven't got module yet */ mm->binfmt = NULL; + mm_init_owner(mm, NULL); mmput(mm); fail_nomem: @@ -1676,6 +1686,24 @@ static inline void rcu_copy_process(struct task_struct *p) #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU */ } +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG +static void __delayed_free_task(struct rcu_head *rhp) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu); + + free_task(tsk); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCG */ + +static __always_inline void delayed_free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG + call_rcu(&tsk->rcu, __delayed_free_task); +#else /* CONFIG_MEMCG */ + free_task(tsk); +#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCG */ +} + /* * This creates a new process as a copy of the old one, * but does not actually start it yet. @@ -2137,8 +2165,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces: exit_task_namespaces(p); bad_fork_cleanup_mm: - if (p->mm) + if (p->mm) { + mm_clear_owner(p->mm, p); mmput(p->mm); + } bad_fork_cleanup_signal: if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) free_signal_struct(p->signal); @@ -2169,7 +2199,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( bad_fork_free: p->state = TASK_DEAD; put_task_stack(p); - free_task(p); + delayed_free_task(p); fork_out: spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); hlist_del_init(&delayed.node);