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[173.76.246.42]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c2sm4825237qtc.41.2019.03.07.19.43.13 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Thu, 07 Mar 2019 19:43:14 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 22:43:12 -0500 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Jerome Glisse Cc: Jason Wang , kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterx@redhat.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, aarcange@redhat.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V2 5/5] vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address Message-ID: <20190307224143-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <1551856692-3384-1-git-send-email-jasowang@redhat.com> <1551856692-3384-6-git-send-email-jasowang@redhat.com> <20190307103503-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20190307124700-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20190307191720.GF3835@redhat.com> <20190307211506-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20190308025539.GA5562@redhat.com> <20190307221549-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20190308034053.GB5562@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20190308034053.GB5562@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:40:53PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote: > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:16:00PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:55:39PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:21:03PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 02:17:20PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote: > > > > > > It's because of all these issues that I preferred just accessing > > > > > > userspace memory and handling faults. Unfortunately there does not > > > > > > appear to exist an API that whitelists a specific driver along the lines > > > > > > of "I checked this code for speculative info leaks, don't add barriers > > > > > > on data path please". > > > > > > > > > > Maybe it would be better to explore adding such helper then remapping > > > > > page into kernel address space ? > > > > > > > > I explored it a bit (see e.g. thread around: "__get_user slower than > > > > get_user") and I can tell you it's not trivial given the issue is around > > > > security. So in practice it does not seem fair to keep a significant > > > > optimization out of kernel because *maybe* we can do it differently even > > > > better :) > > > > > > Maybe a slightly different approach between this patchset and other > > > copy user API would work here. What you want really is something like > > > a temporary mlock on a range of memory so that it is safe for the > > > kernel to access range of userspace virtual address ie page are > > > present and with proper permission hence there can be no page fault > > > while you are accessing thing from kernel context. > > > > > > So you can have like a range structure and mmu notifier. When you > > > lock the range you block mmu notifier to allow your code to work on > > > the userspace VA safely. Once you are done you unlock and let the > > > mmu notifier go on. It is pretty much exactly this patchset except > > > that you remove all the kernel vmap code. A nice thing about that > > > is that you do not need to worry about calling set page dirty it > > > will already be handle by the userspace VA pte. It also use less > > > memory than when you have kernel vmap. > > > > > > This idea might be defeated by security feature where the kernel is > > > running in its own address space without the userspace address > > > space present. > > > > Like smap? > > Yes like smap but also other newer changes, with similar effect, since > the spectre drama. > > Cheers, > Jérôme Sorry do you mean meltdown and kpti? -- MST