From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE670C43381 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:47:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B673A2085A for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 14:47:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729204AbfCYOrl (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:47:41 -0400 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:5949 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726128AbfCYOrk (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 10:47:40 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Mar 2019 07:47:40 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,269,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="154987358" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.237.50.97]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 25 Mar 2019 07:47:37 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Dan Williams , stable@vger.kernel.org, James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:47:35 +0200 Message-Id: <20190325144735.30443-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit adds checks to the key type callbacks and exported functions to fail when a TPM is not available. Cc: Dan Williams Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ecec672d3a77..13fb1068e371 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, int ret; va_list argp; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, va_list argp; int ret; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); ordinal = command; @@ -363,6 +369,9 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) { int rc; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen); dump_tpm_buf(cmd); @@ -429,6 +438,9 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + INIT_BUF(tb); store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); @@ -967,6 +979,9 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, size_t key_len; int tpm2; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; @@ -1050,6 +1065,9 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) { struct trusted_key_payload *p; + if (!chip) + return; + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); kzfree(p); } @@ -1066,6 +1084,9 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; @@ -1144,6 +1165,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, char *bufp; int i; + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; @@ -1170,6 +1194,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { + if (!chip) + return; + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); } @@ -1245,9 +1272,13 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) { int ret; + /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if + * TPM is not used. + */ chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!chip) - return -ENOENT; + return 0; + ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0) goto err_put; @@ -1263,16 +1294,19 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) err_free: kfree(digests); err_put: - put_device(&chip->dev); + if (chip) + put_device(&chip->dev); return ret; } static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) { - put_device(&chip->dev); - kfree(digests); - trusted_shash_release(); - unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (chip) { + put_device(&chip->dev); + kfree(digests); + trusted_shash_release(); + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + } } late_initcall(init_trusted); -- 2.19.1