From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com,
stefan.wahren@i2e.com, Andre.Przywara@arm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:50:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190403165005.GA17500@fuggles.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190321230557.45107-10-jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Hi Jeremy,
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:56PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. If
> the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then
> return the expected machine state based on a new blacklist of known
> vulnerable cores.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index 6958dcdabf7d..172ffbabd597 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
>
> int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
> +static bool __ssb_safe = true;
>
> static const struct ssbd_options {
> const char *str;
> @@ -386,6 +387,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>
> WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>
> + if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
> + __ssb_safe = false;
> +
Does this mean that we assume that CPUs not present in our table are not
affected by speculative store bypass? I don't think that's a good
assumption, because we don't necessary have knowledge about partner or
future CPU implementations, so I think any CPU lists really have to be
whitelists like they are for the other vulnerabilities.
> if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
> required = false;
> goto out_printmsg;
> @@ -419,12 +423,14 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> return false;
>
> + /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
> case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
> pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
> return false;
>
> case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
> + __ssb_safe = false;
> required = true;
> break;
>
> @@ -474,6 +480,16 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> return required;
> }
>
> +/* known vulnerable cores */
> +static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
> + {},
> +};
> +
> static void __maybe_unused
> cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> {
> @@ -769,6 +785,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
> .capability = ARM64_SSBD,
> .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
> .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
> + .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
> },
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
> {
> @@ -807,3 +824,30 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>
> return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> }
> +
> +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Two assumptions: First, ssbd_state reflects the worse case
> + * for heterogeneous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
> + * supported by all cores.
> + */
> + switch (ssbd_state) {
> + case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> +
> + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
> + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
> + if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD))
> + return sprintf(buf,
> + "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
x86 has a message about the prctl(), which we also support.
Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-03 16:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-21 23:05 [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-03-25 10:32 ` Andre Przywara
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-03-25 10:59 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] arm64: Always enable spectrev2 vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-04-03 16:50 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2019-04-05 10:10 ` Andre Przywara
2019-04-05 14:43 ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 15:18 ` Andre Przywara
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-03-22 17:49 ` Stefan Wahren
2019-03-25 10:33 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Andre Przywara
2019-03-25 12:22 ` Catalin Marinas
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