From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH V33 27/30] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:19:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190621011941.186255-28-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.
The message now patterned something like:
Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 14edc475d75c..408f0048f8a2 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
{
if ((kernel_locked_down >= what) && lockdown_reasons[what])
- pr_notice("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
- lockdown_reasons[what]);
+ pr_notice("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
return (kernel_locked_down >= what);
}
--
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-21 1:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-21 1:19 [PATCH V33 00/30] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 01/30] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 3:21 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 5:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 19:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 02/30] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 3:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 03/30] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 3:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 19:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 21:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 22:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 3:46 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 06/30] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 08/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 09/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 10/30] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 11/30] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 12/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 13/30] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 14/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 18/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 19/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 20/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 21/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 12:46 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 22/30] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 23/30] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 5:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 20:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 20:22 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 0:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 18:06 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 23:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 18:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-29 23:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 25/30] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 26/30] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-06-21 4:09 ` [PATCH V33 27/30] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Kees Cook
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 28/30] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 29/30] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-26 13:07 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-26 19:39 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 30/30] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
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