From: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com>
To: keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
james.morris@microsoft.com, efremov@ispras.ru,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, dhowells@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, carmeli.tamir@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH] security/lsm_hooks: Updated set/remove xattr documentation
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2019 15:06:07 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190710190607.5026-1-carmeli.tamir@gmail.com> (raw)
The inode_setxattr and inode_removexattr hooks check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability when no LSMs exist. When LSMs exist, the hook expects
them to check for capabilities - which SMACK and SELinux indeed do.
This behavior is only mentioned in a comment in the
hooks' implementation. This patch makes it clearer for
LSM programmers that when implememting these hooks they are
responsible for the CAP check.
Signed-off-by: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 47f58cfb6a19..d16c88a31ea9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -377,7 +377,8 @@
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_setxattr:
* Check permission before setting the extended attributes
- * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * @value identified by @name for @dentry. Note that the hook
+ * is responsible to check for capabilities.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_post_setxattr:
* Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
@@ -392,7 +393,8 @@
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_removexattr:
* Check permission before removing the extended attribute
- * identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * identified by @name for @dentry. Note that the hook
+ * is responsible to check for capabilities.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_getsecurity:
* Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
--
2.21.0
reply other threads:[~2019-07-10 19:06 UTC|newest]
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