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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv2 30/59] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:07:44 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190731150813.26289-31-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>

Finally, the keys are programmed into the hardware via each
lead CPU. Every package has to be programmed successfully.
There is no partial success allowed here.

Here a retry scheme is included for two errors that may succeed
on retry: MKTME_DEVICE_BUSY and MKTME_ENTROPY_ERROR.
However, it's not clear if even those errors should be retried
at this level. Perhaps they too, should be returned to user space
for handling.

Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 security/keys/mktme_keys.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
index 272bff8591b7..3c641f3ee794 100644
--- a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
@@ -83,6 +83,96 @@ static const match_table_t mktme_token = {
 	{OPT_ERROR, NULL}
 };
 
+struct mktme_hw_program_info {
+	struct mktme_key_program *key_program;
+	int *status;
+};
+
+struct mktme_err_table {
+	const char *msg;
+	bool retry;
+};
+
+static const struct mktme_err_table mktme_error[] = {
+/* MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS     */ {"KeyID was successfully programmed",   false},
+/* MKTME_INVALID_PROG_CMD */ {"Invalid KeyID programming command",   false},
+/* MKTME_ENTROPY_ERROR    */ {"Insufficient entropy",		      true},
+/* MKTME_INVALID_KEYID    */ {"KeyID not valid",		     false},
+/* MKTME_INVALID_ENC_ALG  */ {"Invalid encryption algorithm chosen", false},
+/* MKTME_DEVICE_BUSY      */ {"Failure to access key table",	      true},
+};
+
+static int mktme_parse_program_status(int status[])
+{
+	int cpu, sum = 0;
+
+	/* Success: all CPU(s) programmed all key table(s) */
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, mktme_leadcpus)
+		sum += status[cpu];
+	if (!sum)
+		return MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS;
+
+	/* Invalid Parameters: log the error and return the error. */
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, mktme_leadcpus) {
+		switch (status[cpu]) {
+		case MKTME_INVALID_KEYID:
+		case MKTME_INVALID_PROG_CMD:
+		case MKTME_INVALID_ENC_ALG:
+			pr_err("mktme: %s\n", mktme_error[status[cpu]].msg);
+			return status[cpu];
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Device Busy or Insufficient Entropy: do not log the
+	 * error. These will be retried and if retries (time or
+	 * count runs out) caller will log the error.
+	 */
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, mktme_leadcpus) {
+		if (status[cpu] == MKTME_DEVICE_BUSY)
+			return status[cpu];
+	}
+	return MKTME_ENTROPY_ERROR;
+}
+
+/* Program a single key using one CPU. */
+static void mktme_do_program(void *hw_program_info)
+{
+	struct mktme_hw_program_info *info = hw_program_info;
+	int cpu;
+
+	cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	info->status[cpu] = mktme_key_program(info->key_program);
+}
+
+static int mktme_program_all_keytables(struct mktme_key_program *key_program)
+{
+	struct mktme_hw_program_info info;
+	int err, retries = 10; /* Maybe users should handle retries */
+
+	info.key_program = key_program;
+	info.status = kcalloc(num_possible_cpus(), sizeof(info.status[0]),
+			      GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	while (retries--) {
+		get_online_cpus();
+		on_each_cpu_mask(mktme_leadcpus, mktme_do_program,
+				 &info, 1);
+		put_online_cpus();
+
+		err = mktme_parse_program_status(info.status);
+		if (!err)			   /* Success */
+			return err;
+		else if (!mktme_error[err].retry)  /* Error no retry */
+			return -ENOKEY;
+	}
+	/* Ran out of retries */
+	pr_err("mktme: %s\n", mktme_error[err].msg);
+	return err;
+}
+
 /* Copy the payload to the HW programming structure and program this KeyID */
 static int mktme_program_keyid(int keyid, u32 payload)
 {
@@ -97,7 +187,7 @@ static int mktme_program_keyid(int keyid, u32 payload)
 	kprog->keyid = keyid;
 	kprog->keyid_ctrl = payload;
 
-	ret = MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS;	/* Future programming call */
+	ret = mktme_program_all_keytables(kprog);
 	kmem_cache_free(mktme_prog_cache, kprog);
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-31 15:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-31 15:07 [PATCHv2 00/59] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 01/59] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 02/59] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 03/59] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 04/59] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 05/59] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 06/59] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 07/59] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 08/59] x86/mm: Introduce helpers to read number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 09/59] x86/mm: Store bitmask of the encryption algorithms supported by MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 10/59] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 11/59] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 12/59] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 13/59] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 14/59] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 15/59] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 16/59] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 17/59] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 18/59] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 19/59] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 20/59] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 21/59] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 22/59] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 23/59] x86/pconfig: Set an activated algorithm in all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 24/59] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 25/59] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-05 11:58   ` Ben Boeckel
2019-08-05 20:31     ` Alison Schofield
2019-08-13 13:06       ` Ben Boeckel
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 26/59] keys/mktme: Instantiate MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 27/59] keys/mktme: Destroy " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 28/59] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 29/59] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 31/59] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 32/59] keys/mktme: Clear the key programming from the MKTME hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 33/59] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 34/59] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 35/59] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 36/59] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 37/59] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 38/59] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 39/59] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 40/59] keys/mktme: Block memory hotplug additions when MKTME is enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 41/59] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 42/59] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 43/59] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 44/59] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 45/59] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on hardware key usage " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 46/59] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 47/59] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-06 20:26   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-08-07 14:28     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 48/59] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 49/59] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 50/59] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 51/59] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 52/59] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 53/59] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 54/59] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 55/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 56/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 57/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-05 11:58   ` Ben Boeckel
2019-08-05 20:44     ` Alison Schofield
2019-08-13 13:07       ` Ben Boeckel
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 58/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 59/59] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov

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