From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CCF8C32751 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:20:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AFC7206A2 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:20:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=shutemov-name.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@shutemov-name.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="a8D1IY8W" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729806AbfGaPUD (ORCPT ); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 11:20:03 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-f66.google.com ([209.85.208.66]:39586 "EHLO mail-ed1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729527AbfGaPUA (ORCPT ); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 11:20:00 -0400 Received: by mail-ed1-f66.google.com with SMTP id m10so66045556edv.6 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 08:19:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=shutemov-name.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=igF6rwOO/MpHXaPOW5M5V10Q4NOXV533wOmvObyjS78=; b=a8D1IY8WQS/+pFXxx/c79xwSarq0iBdwCWmWCulUgzml4ker2LJSZneHrbBGRc9GCv H11X9TMhet9vbmINgjsTxzpQhGw8LclboXWyHT3C8sP81/lKyUEJb80FNr1Z3YxssR1s IN4FXExlSdSk1vWQd4N5Kkg511vrNfyls4pDcgm+WDjrht72CCqQslx6rnLT6w1nFhR7 qav+PNWqOr+wWtQ7MgYg1Knk12t/pP9iRkjhwnvEbWBJH7+WHTJWnfHK0vZdejGeflRe +np9WYVRO4AAyNwU58oVH7WDmV4bh3Re5u+csPI0Y37Za/tH7uxoXCEETZ2CG6GG8fvP xGJg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=igF6rwOO/MpHXaPOW5M5V10Q4NOXV533wOmvObyjS78=; b=DzxKx1y7xowmkR5p5BALYYQ7BtP/Ns1ApQAgyzPKWsQAo0AOCxftAgTuo/IMWs/bV6 +mgQxxRhNl0IvrDTmAOOfVRF+77WytGFRWuv7NcoJD286j/oARU/KVplsbPfKGpHUWSc mqL9J/TRf/crxB4zs+pqtRktjwQ3qaF6qP1GwJtVg1pwavVQwkuQyLaKKLbJrgcFR0jM oyjE5D58cOZIHwy9nxmCJQxSiFmwaRfmty/ydk2c91HoRs4yoUkbw+YPdyAoDK7j+Js0 uR67j90c370AVBt5tRGzodIVnxRUnjU60G6sAuQMAK9wIePNBVL0LBkhQSAdg+2VZ/1L 4gqg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU4kKyzv1UlUg0WRwXjd4kcImjGrlvuE54qFwTZFWWkbyk1FXg0 ZMSOdj2OOXfAc/Gmrs82WCc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwV5kCyMozU4z2zmBu0uFZ9eCcpeUARTXuEcmuWXOI+wPOLh76dszK/1zlrOgtlJNxL8DEMmg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:784:: with SMTP id l4mr80515472ejc.19.1564586033595; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 08:13:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from box.localdomain ([86.57.175.117]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c16sm17311766edc.58.2019.07.31.08.13.50 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 08:13:51 -0700 (PDT) From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" X-Google-Original-From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Received: by box.localdomain (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 79BFF1048A7; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:08:17 +0300 (+03) To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCHv2 55/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:08:09 +0300 Message-Id: <20190731150813.26289-56-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Alison Schofield Describe the security benefits of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) over Total Memory Encryption (TME) alone. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst | 151 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 152 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst index 1614b52dd3e9..a3a29577b013 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst @@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) .. toctree:: mktme_overview + mktme_mitigations diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c593784851fb --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_mitigations.rst @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +MKTME-Provided Mitigations +========================== +:Author: Dave Hansen + +MKTME adds a few mitigations against attacks that are not +mitigated when using TME alone. The first set are mitigations +against software attacks that are familiar today: + + * Kernel Mapping Attacks: information disclosures that leverage + the kernel direct map are mitigated against disclosing user + data. + * Freed Data Leak Attacks: removing an encryption key from the + hardware mitigates future user information disclosure. + +The next set are attacks that depend on specialized hardware, +such as an “evil DIMM” or a DDR interposer: + + * Cross-Domain Replay Attack: data is captured from one domain +(guest) and replayed to another at a later time. + * Cross-Domain Capture and Delayed Compare Attack: data is + captured and later analyzed to discover secrets. + * Key Wear-out Attack: data is captured and analyzed in order + to Weaken the AES encryption itself. + +More details on these attacks are below. + +Kernel Mapping Attacks +---------------------- +Information disclosure vulnerabilities leverage the kernel direct +map because many vulnerabilities involve manipulation of kernel +data structures (examples: CVE-2017-7277, CVE-2017-9605). We +normally think of these bugs as leaking valuable *kernel* data, +but they can leak application data when application pages are +recycled for kernel use. + +With this MKTME implementation, there is a direct map created for +each MKTME KeyID which is used whenever the kernel needs to +access plaintext. But, all kernel data structures are accessed +via the direct map for KeyID-0. Thus, memory reads which are not +coordinated with the KeyID get garbage (for example, accessing +KeyID-4 data with the KeyID-0 mapping). + +This means that if sensitive data encrypted using MKTME is leaked +via the KeyID-0 direct map, ciphertext decrypted with the wrong +key will be disclosed. To disclose plaintext, an attacker must +“pivot” to the correct direct mapping, which is non-trivial +because there are no kernel data structures in the KeyID!=0 +direct mapping. + +Freed Data Leak Attack +---------------------- +The kernel has a history of bugs around uninitialized data. +Usually, we think of these bugs as leaking sensitive kernel data, +but they can also be used to leak application secrets. + +MKTME can help mitigate the case where application secrets are +leaked: + + * App (or VM) places a secret in a page * App exits or frees +memory to kernel allocator * Page added to allocator free list * +Attacker reallocates page to a purpose where it can read the page + +Now, imagine MKTME was in use on the memory being leaked. The +data can only be leaked as long as the key is programmed in the +hardware. If the key is de-programmed, like after all pages are +freed after a guest is shut down, any future reads will just see +ciphertext. + +Basically, the key is a convenient choke-point: you can be more +confident that data encrypted with it is inaccessible once the +key is removed. + +Cross-Domain Replay Attack +-------------------------- +MKTME mitigates cross-domain replay attacks where an attacker +replaces an encrypted block owned by one domain with a block +owned by another domain. MKTME does not prevent this replacement +from occurring, but it does mitigate plaintext from being +disclosed if the domains use different keys. + +With TME, the attack could be executed by: + * A victim places secret in memory, at a given physical address. + Note: AES-XTS is what restricts the attack to being performed + at a single physical address instead of across different + physical addresses + * Attacker captures victim secret’s ciphertext * Later on, after + victim frees the physical address, attacker gains ownership + * Attacker puts the ciphertext at the address and get the secret + plaintext + +But, due to the presumably different keys used by the attacker +and the victim, the attacker can not successfully decrypt old +ciphertext. + +Cross-Domain Capture and Delayed Compare Attack +----------------------------------------------- +This is also referred to as a kind of dictionary attack. + +Similarly, MKTME protects against cross-domain capture-and-compare +attacks. Consider the following scenario: + * A victim places a secret in memory, at a known physical address + * Attacker captures victim’s ciphertext + * Attacker gains control of the target physical address, perhaps + after the victim’s VM is shut down or its memory reclaimed. + * Attacker computes and writes many possible plaintexts until new + ciphertext matches content captured previously. + +Secrets which have low (plaintext) entropy are more vulnerable to +this attack because they reduce the number of possible plaintexts +an attacker has to compute and write. + +The attack will not work if attacker and victim uses different +keys. + +Key Wear-out Attack +------------------- +Repeated use of an encryption key might be used by an attacker to +infer information about the key or the plaintext, weakening the +encryption. The higher the bandwidth of the encryption engine, +the more vulnerable the key is to wear-out. The MKTME memory +encryption hardware works at the speed of the memory bus, which +has high bandwidth. + +Such a weakness has been demonstrated[1] on a theoretical cipher +with similar properties as AES-XTS. + +An attack would take the following steps: + * Victim system is using TME with AES-XTS-128 + * Attacker repeatedly captures ciphertext/plaintext pairs (can + be Performed with online hardware attack like an interposer). + * Attacker compels repeated use of the key under attack for a + sustained time period without a system reboot[2]. + * Attacker discovers a cipertext collision (two plaintexts + translating to the same ciphertext) + * Attacker can induce controlled modifications to the targeted + plaintext by modifying the colliding ciphertext + +MKTME mitigates key wear-out in two ways: + * Keys can be rotated periodically to mitigate wear-out. Since + TME keys are generated at boot, rotation of TME keys requires a + reboot. In contrast, MKTME allows rotation while the system is + booted. An application could implement a policy to rotate keys + at a frequency which is not feasible to attack. + * In the case that MKTME is used to encrypt two guests’ memory + with two different keys, an attack on one guest’s key would not + weaken the key used in the second guest. + +-- +1. http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf +2. This sustained time required for an attack could vary from days + to years depending on the attacker’s goals. -- 2.21.0