linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH STABLE 4.9] x86, mm, gup: prevent get_page() race with munmap in paravirt guest
Date: Fri,  2 Aug 2019 18:06:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190802160614.8089-1-vbabka@suse.cz> (raw)

The x86 version of get_user_pages_fast() relies on disabled interrupts to
synchronize gup_pte_range() between gup_get_pte(ptep); and get_page() against
a parallel munmap. The munmap side nulls the pte, then flushes TLBs, then
releases the page. As TLB flush is done synchronously via IPI disabling
interrupts blocks the page release, and get_page(), which assumes existing
reference on page, is thus safe.
However when TLB flush is done by a hypercall, e.g. in a Xen PV guest, there is
no blocking thanks to disabled interrupts, and get_page() can succeed on a page
that was already freed or even reused.

We have recently seen this happen with our 4.4 and 4.12 based kernels, with
userspace (java) that exits a thread, where mm_release() performs a futex_wake()
on tsk->clear_child_tid, and another thread in parallel unmaps the page where
tsk->clear_child_tid points to. The spurious get_page() succeeds, but futex code
immediately releases the page again, while it's already on a freelist. Symptoms
include a bad page state warning, general protection faults acessing a poisoned
list prev/next pointer in the freelist, or free page pcplists of two cpus joined
together in a single list. Oscar has also reproduced this scenario, with a
patch inserting delays before the get_page() to make the race window larger.

Fix this by removing the dependency on TLB flush interrupts the same way as the
generic get_user_pages_fast() code by using page_cache_add_speculative() and
revalidating the PTE contents after pinning the page. Mainline is safe since
4.13 where the x86 gup code was removed in favor of the common code. Accessing
the page table itself safely also relies on disabled interrupts and TLB flush
IPIs that don't happen with hypercalls, which was acknowledged in commit
9e52fc2b50de ("x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing
(CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)"). That commit with follups should also be
backported for full safety, although our reproducer didn't hit a problem
without that backport.

Reproduced-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---

Hi, I'm sending this stable-only patch for consideration because it's probably
unrealistic to backport the 4.13 switch to generic GUP. I can look at 4.4 and
3.16 if accepted. The RCU page table freeing could be also considered.
Note the patch also includes page refcount protection. I found out that
8fde12ca79af ("mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount")
backport to 4.9 missed the arch-specific gup implementations:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6650323f-dbc9-f069-000b-f6b0f941a065@suse.cz/

 arch/x86/mm/gup.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/gup.c b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c
index 1680768d392c..d7db45bdfb3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/gup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c
@@ -97,6 +97,20 @@ static inline int pte_allows_gup(unsigned long pteval, int write)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Return the compund head page with ref appropriately incremented,
+ * or NULL if that failed.
+ */
+static inline struct page *try_get_compound_head(struct page *page, int refs)
+{
+	struct page *head = compound_head(page);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_ref_count(head) < 0))
+		return NULL;
+	if (unlikely(!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)))
+		return NULL;
+	return head;
+}
+
 /*
  * The performance critical leaf functions are made noinline otherwise gcc
  * inlines everything into a single function which results in too much
@@ -112,7 +126,7 @@ static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
 	ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
 	do {
 		pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep);
-		struct page *page;
+		struct page *head, *page;
 
 		/* Similar to the PMD case, NUMA hinting must take slow path */
 		if (pte_protnone(pte)) {
@@ -138,7 +152,21 @@ static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
 		}
 		VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
 		page = pte_page(pte);
-		get_page(page);
+
+		head = try_get_compound_head(page, 1);
+		if (!head) {
+			put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
+			pte_unmap(ptep);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
+			put_page(head);
+			put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
+			pte_unmap(ptep);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
 		put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
 		SetPageReferenced(page);
 		pages[*nr] = page;
-- 
2.22.0


             reply	other threads:[~2019-08-02 16:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-02 16:06 Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2019-08-05 11:58 ` [PATCH STABLE 4.9] x86, mm, gup: prevent get_page() race with munmap in paravirt guest Greg KH
2019-09-19 18:26 ` Ben Hutchings
2019-09-23  8:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2019-11-06 17:18   ` Vlastimil Babka

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190802160614.8089-1-vbabka@suse.cz \
    --to=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=osalvador@suse.de \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).