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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 15:29:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190826132920.GD28610@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190710201244.25195-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 08:13:03PM +0000, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
> The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with
> KVM_SEV_SEND_START command.
> 
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst     |  8 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index 060ac2316d69..9864f9215c43 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -289,6 +289,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>                  __u32 trans_len;
>          };
>  
> +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH
> +------------------------
> +
> +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be
> +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context.
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
>  References
>  ==========
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 8e815a53c420..be73a87a8c4f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -7168,6 +7168,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +	struct sev_data_send_finish *data;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +		return -ENOTTY;

Almost all sev_ command functions do that check, except
sev_guest_init(). You could pull up that check, into svm_mem_enc_op()
and save yourself the repeated pattern:

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 273ad624b23d..950282c8c4f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -7225,6 +7225,11 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (sev_cmd.id != KVM_SEV_INIT) {
+		if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+			return -ENOTTY;
+	}
+
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
 	switch (sev_cmd.id) {
---

> +
> +	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);

Btw, since

  1ec696470c86 ("kvm: svm: Add memcg accounting to KVM allocations")

gfp flags should be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT now.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 247165, AG München

  reply	other threads:[~2019-08-26 13:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20190710201244.25195-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 10:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-22 13:23     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-12 18:35   ` Peter Gonda
2019-11-12 22:27     ` Brijesh Singh
2019-11-14 19:27       ` Peter Gonda
2019-11-19 14:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 12:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-22 13:27     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-22 13:34       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-12 22:23   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-26 13:29   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-27 12:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 21:02   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-27 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-21 20:57   ` David Rientjes
2019-07-22 17:12     ` Cfir Cohen
2019-07-23 15:31       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-23 15:16     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-25 19:07   ` Peter Gonda
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 16:41     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Singh, Brijesh
2019-08-29 16:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 18:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-29 18:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-29 18:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-10 20:13 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-11-15  1:22   ` Steve Rutherford
2019-11-15  1:39     ` Steve Rutherford

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