From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 02:24:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191007012437.GK26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whAQWEMADgxb_qAw=nEY4OnuDn6HU4UCSDMNT5ULKvg3g@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Oct 06, 2019 at 06:17:02PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 6, 2019 at 5:04 PM Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> wrote:
> >
> > All my alpha, sparc64, and xtensa tests pass with the attached patch
> > applied on top of v5.4-rc2. I didn't test any others.
>
> Okay... I really wish my guess had been wrong.
>
> Because fixing filldir64 isn't the problem. I can come up with
> multiple ways to avoid the unaligned issues if that was the problem.
>
> But it does look to me like the fundamental problem is that unaligned
> __put_user() calls might just be broken on alpha (and likely sparc
> too). Because that looks to be the only difference between the
> __copy_to_user() approach and using unsafe_put_user() in a loop.
>
> Now, I should have handled unaligned things differently in the first
> place, and in that sense I think commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert
> filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()") really is
> non-optimal on architectures with alignment issues.
>
> And I'll fix it.
Ugh... I wonder if it would be better to lift STAC/CLAC out of
raw_copy_to_user(), rather than trying to reinvent its guts
in readdir.c...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-07 1:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-06 22:20 [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Guenter Roeck
2019-10-06 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-06 23:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 0:04 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 1:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 1:24 ` Al Viro [this message]
2019-10-07 2:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 2:50 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 3:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 15:40 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08 9:58 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 17:34 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:22 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:36 ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 19:49 ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 20:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08 3:29 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 4:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08 4:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08 5:02 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 4:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-10 19:55 ` Al Viro
2019-10-10 22:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-11 0:11 ` Al Viro
2019-10-11 0:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 18:13 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:10 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 19:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:59 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 20:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 3:46 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 18:08 ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 19:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 19:40 ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 20:18 ` Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:12 ` [RFC] change of calling conventions for arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-16 20:25 ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:36 ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] sg_ioctl(): fix copyout handling Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] sg_new_write(): replace access_ok() + __copy_from_user() with copy_from_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] sg_write(): __get_user() can fail Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] sg_read(): simplify reading ->pack_id of userland sg_io_hdr_t Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] sg_new_write(): don't bother with access_ok Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] sg_read(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_..._user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] sg_write(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_from_user()/__get_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39 ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] SG_IO: get rid of access_ok() Al Viro
2019-10-17 21:44 ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Douglas Gilbert
2019-11-05 4:54 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-11-05 5:25 ` Al Viro
2019-11-06 4:29 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-10-18 0:27 ` [RFC] csum_and_copy_from_user() semantics Al Viro
2019-10-25 14:01 ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-08 4:57 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 13:14 ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 15:29 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 15:38 ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 17:06 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 19:58 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:16 ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:34 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 2:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 3:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 0:23 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 4:04 ` Max Filippov
2019-10-07 12:16 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 20:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 23:27 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-08 6:28 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20191007012437.GK26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
--to=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux@roeck-us.net \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).