From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05602CA9EA9 for ; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 01:39:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFA4C222CD for ; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 01:39:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726511AbfJSBjc (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Oct 2019 21:39:32 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:55076 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726195AbfJSBjc (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Oct 2019 21:39:32 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B7FE18CB8E6; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 01:39:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from madcap2.tricolour.ca (ovpn-112-19.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.112.19]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EFB0A19C7F; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 01:39:06 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 21:39:04 -0400 From: Richard Guy Briggs To: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Moore , sgrubb@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com, dwalsh@redhat.com, mpatel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V7 20/21] audit: add capcontid to set contid outside init_user_ns Message-ID: <20191019013904.uevmrzbmztsbhpnh@madcap2.tricolour.ca> References: <214163d11a75126f610bcedfad67a4d89575dc77.1568834525.git.rgb@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <214163d11a75126f610bcedfad67a4d89575dc77.1568834525.git.rgb@redhat.com> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.2 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.63]); Sat, 19 Oct 2019 01:39:31 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2019-09-18 21:22, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Provide a mechanism similar to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to explicitly give a > process in a non-init user namespace the capability to set audit > container identifiers. > > Use audit netlink message types AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID 1027 and > AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID 1028. The message format includes the data > structure: > struct audit_capcontid_status { > pid_t pid; > u32 enable; > }; Paul, can I get a review of the general idea here to see if you're ok with this way of effectively extending CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL for the sake of setting contid from beyond the init user namespace where capable() can't reach and ns_capable() is meaningless for these purposes? Last weekend was Canadian Thanksgiving where I took an extra day for an annual bike trip and I'm buried to my neck in a complete kitchen gut (down to 1920 structural double brick and knob/tube wiring), but I've got fixes or responses to almost everything else you've raised which I'll post shortly. Thanks! > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 14 +++++++ > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 + > kernel/audit.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > kernel/audit.h | 5 +++ > 4 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index 1ce27af686ea..dcc53e62e266 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ struct audit_task_info { > kuid_t loginuid; > unsigned int sessionid; > struct audit_cont *cont; > + u32 capcontid; > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > struct audit_context *ctx; > #endif > @@ -224,6 +225,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) > return tsk->audit->sessionid; > } > > +static inline u32 audit_get_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (!tsk->audit) > + return 0; > + return tsk->audit->capcontid; > +} > + > +extern int audit_set_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 enable); > extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid); > > static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > @@ -309,6 +318,11 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) > return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; > } > > +static inline u32 audit_get_capcontid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index eef42c8eea77..011b0a8ee9b2 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ > #define AUDIT_GET_LOGINUID 1024 /* Get loginuid of a task */ > #define AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID 1025 /* Set loginuid of a task */ > #define AUDIT_GET_SESSIONID 1026 /* Set sessionid of a task */ > +#define AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID 1027 /* Get cap_contid of a task */ > +#define AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID 1028 /* Set cap_contid of a task */ > > #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ > #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */ > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index a70c9184e5d9..7160da464849 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -1192,6 +1192,14 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) > case AUDIT_GET_SESSIONID: > return 0; > break; > + case AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID: > + case AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID: > + case AUDIT_GET_CONTID: > + case AUDIT_SET_CONTID: > + if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) && !audit_get_capcontid(current)) > + return -EPERM; > + return 0; > + break; > default: /* do more checks below */ > break; > } > @@ -1227,8 +1235,6 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) > case AUDIT_TTY_SET: > case AUDIT_TRIM: > case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: > - case AUDIT_GET_CONTID: > - case AUDIT_SET_CONTID: > case AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID: > /* Only support auditd and auditctl in initial pid namespace > * for now. */ > @@ -1304,6 +1310,23 @@ static int audit_get_contid_status(struct sk_buff *skb) > return 0; > } > > +static int audit_get_capcontid_status(struct sk_buff *skb) > +{ > + struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); > + u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; > + void *data = nlmsg_data(nlh); > + struct audit_capcontid_status cs; > + > + cs.pid = ((struct audit_capcontid_status *)data)->pid; > + if (!cs.pid) > + cs.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); > + rcu_read_lock(); > + cs.enable = audit_get_capcontid(find_task_by_vpid(cs.pid)); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID, 0, 0, &cs, sizeof(cs)); > + return 0; > +} > + > struct audit_loginuid_status { uid_t loginuid; }; > > static int audit_get_loginuid_status(struct sk_buff *skb) > @@ -1779,6 +1802,27 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > if (err) > return err; > break; > + case AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID: { > + struct audit_capcontid_status *s = data; > + struct task_struct *tsk; > + > + /* check if new data is valid */ > + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*s)) > + return -EINVAL; > + tsk = find_get_task_by_vpid(s->pid); > + if (!tsk) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + err = audit_set_capcontid(tsk, s->enable); > + put_task_struct(tsk); > + return err; > + break; > + } > + case AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID: > + err = audit_get_capcontid_status(skb); > + if (err) > + return err; > + break; > case AUDIT_SET_LOGINUID: { > uid_t *loginuid = data; > kuid_t kloginuid; > @@ -2711,6 +2755,56 @@ static struct task_struct *audit_cont_owner(struct task_struct *tsk) > return NULL; > } > > +int audit_set_capcontid(struct task_struct *task, u32 enable) > +{ > + u32 oldcapcontid; > + int rc = 0; > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > + uid_t uid; > + struct tty_struct *tty; > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > + > + if (!task->audit) > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > + oldcapcontid = audit_get_capcontid(task); > + /* if task is not descendant, block */ > + if (task == current) > + rc = -EBADSLT; > + else if (!task_is_descendant(current, task)) > + rc = -EXDEV; > + else if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) { > + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) && !audit_get_capcontid(current)) > + rc = -EPERM; > + } > + if (!rc) > + task->audit->capcontid = enable; > + > + if (!audit_enabled) > + return rc; > + > + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID); > + if (!ab) > + return rc; > + > + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); > + tty = audit_get_tty(); > + audit_log_format(ab, > + "opid=%d capcontid=%u old-capcontid=%u pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", > + task_tgid_nr(task), enable, oldcapcontid, > + task_tgid_nr(current), uid, > + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), > + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", > + audit_get_sessionid(current)); > + audit_put_tty(tty); > + audit_log_task_context(ab); > + audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); > + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); > + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + return rc; > +} > + > /* > * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid > * @task: target task > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index cb25341c1a0f..ac4694e88485 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -231,6 +231,11 @@ struct audit_contid_status { > u64 id; > }; > > +struct audit_capcontid_status { > + pid_t pid; > + u32 enable; > +}; > + > #define AUDIT_CONTID_DEPTH 5 > > /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ > -- > 1.8.3.1 > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635