From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: prsriva@linux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/9] KEYS: Updated IMA policy functions for handling key measurement
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 18:19:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191031011910.2574-5-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191031011910.2574-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Information regarding what keyrings need to be measured is missing.
A new field in the IMA policy, namely, keyrings is added to
convey what keyrings need to be measured.
This patch updates the IMA function to retrieve keyrings from the policy.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 12e9ec6847b5..3539a159a7ac 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -240,8 +240,10 @@ void ima_measure_queued_keys(void);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ char **keyrings);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f614e22bf39f..f488d1cead79 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
* | KEXEC_CMDLINE
+ * | KEYRING_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
@@ -190,7 +191,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
- template_desc);
+ template_desc, NULL);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 89b83194d1dc..5bed19be0f6a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0cc49f2d5233..b972a32ccb1b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define IMA_PCR 0x0100
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
+#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
+ char *keyrings; /* Keyrings to measure */
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
@@ -476,6 +478,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
+ * @keyrings: keyrings for this rule, if specified
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -486,7 +489,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+ struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+ char **keyrings)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -518,6 +522,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
*pcr = entry->pcr;
+ if ((keyrings) && (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS))
+ *keyrings = entry->keyrings;
+
if (template_desc && entry->template)
*template_desc = entry->template;
else if (template_desc)
@@ -761,7 +768,7 @@ enum {
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
- Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err
+ Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -796,6 +803,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
+ {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -959,6 +967,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEYRING_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = KEYRING_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
@@ -1011,6 +1021,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = 0;
entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
break;
+ case Opt_keyrings:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
+
+ if ((entry->keyrings) ||
+ (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
+ (entry->func != KEYRING_CHECK)) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->keyrings = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry->keyrings) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
+ break;
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
@@ -1371,6 +1398,15 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) {
+ if (entry->keyrings != NULL)
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->keyrings);
+ else
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", "All keyrings");
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_keyrings), tbuf);
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
+ }
+
if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-31 1:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-31 1:19 [PATCH v3 0/9] KEYS: Measure keys when they are created or updated Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] KEYS: Defined an IMA hook to measure keys on key create or update Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 9:10 ` Sasha Levin
2019-10-31 15:27 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 15:36 ` Sasha Levin
2019-10-31 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 15:08 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 15:27 ` Sasha Levin
2019-10-31 15:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 15:42 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] KEYS: Defined functions to queue and dequeue keys for measurement Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 15:09 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] KEYS: Added KEYRING_CHECK policy for key measurement Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 1:19 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message]
2019-10-31 12:10 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] KEYS: Updated IMA policy functions for handling " Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] KEYS: Updated ima_get_action() to return keyrings if specified in the policy Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] KEYS: Measure key if the IMA policy allows measurement for the given keyring Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] KEYS: Queue key for measurement if IMA is not yet initialized. Measure queued keys when IMA initialization is completed Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] KEYS: Added a boolean flag for IMA initialization status Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 1:19 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure key when a new key is created or an existing key is updated Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
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