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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linuxfs <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	rcu@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] selinux: Don't call avc_compute_av() from RCU path walk
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 19:13:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191120191340.GA4799@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191120190743.GT2889@paulmck-ThinkPad-P72>

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 11:07:43AM -0800, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 10:28:31AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 11/20/19 8:12 AM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > Hi Stephen,
> > > 
> > > Thanks for the quick reply.
> > > 
> > > On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 01:59:40PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > > On 11/19/19 1:40 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > > 'avc_compute_av()' can block, so we carefully exit the RCU read-side
> > > > > critical section before calling it in 'avc_has_perm_noaudit()'.
> > > > > Unfortunately, if we're calling from the VFS layer on the RCU path walk
> > > > > via 'selinux_inode_permission()' then we're still actually in an RCU
> > > > > read-side critical section and must not block.
> > > > 
> > > > avc_compute_av() should never block AFAIK. The blocking concern was with
> > > > slow_avc_audit(), and even that appears dubious to me. That seems to be more
> > > > about misuse of d_find_alias in dump_common_audit_data() than anything.
> > > 
> > > Apologies, I lost track of GFP_ATOMIC when I reading the code and didn't
> > > think it was propagated down to all of the potential allocations and
> > > string functions. Having looked at it again, I can't see where it blocks.
> > > 
> > > Might be worth a comment in avc_compute_av(), because the temporary
> > > dropping of rcu_read_lock() looks really dodgy when we could be running
> > > on the RCU path walk path anyway.
> > 
> > I don't think that's a problem but I'll defer to the fsdevel and rcu folks.
> > The use of RCU within the SELinux AVC long predates the introduction of RCU
> > path walk, and the rcu_read_lock()/unlock() pairs inside the AVC are not
> > related in any way to RCU path walk.  Hopefully they don't break it.  The
> > SELinux security server (i.e. security_compute_av() and the rest of
> > security/selinux/ss/*) internally has its own locking for its data
> > structures, primarily the policy rwlock.  There was also a patch long ago to
> > convert use of that policy rwlock to RCU but it didn't seem justified at the
> > time.  We are interested in revisiting that however.  That would introduce
> > its own set of rcu_read_lock/unlock pairs inside of security_compute_av() as
> > well.
> 
> RCU readers nest, so it should be fine.  (Famous last words...)

Agreed. It was blocking that worried me, and it turns out that doesn't
happen for this code.

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-20 19:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-19 18:40 [RFC PATCH 0/2] Avoid blocking in selinux inode callbacks on RCU walk Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:40 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] selinux: Don't call avc_compute_av() from RCU path walk Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:59   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 13:12     ` Will Deacon
2019-11-20 15:28       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 19:07         ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-20 19:13           ` Will Deacon [this message]
2019-11-19 18:40 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] selinux: Propagate RCU walk status from 'security_inode_follow_link()' Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:46   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 13:13     ` Will Deacon
2019-11-20 13:31       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-29  7:36   ` [selinux] 5149a783b9: WARNING:at_security/selinux/avc.c:#avc_has_perm_flags kernel test robot

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