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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s66sm4289099pfb.38.2019.11.21.10.15.28 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 21 Nov 2019 10:15:28 -0800 (PST) From: Kees Cook To: Andrew Morton Cc: Kees Cook , Andrey Ryabinin , Elena Petrova , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , Linus Torvalds , Dan Carpenter , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Arnd Bergmann , Ard Biesheuvel , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 10:15:18 -0800 Message-Id: <20191121181519.28637-3-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20191121181519.28637-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20191121181519.28637-1-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In order to do kernel builds with the bounds checker individually available, introduce CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, with the remaining options under CONFIG_UBSAN_MISC. For example, using this, we can start to expand the coverage syzkaller is providing. Right now, all of UBSan is disabled for syzbot builds because taken as a whole, it is too noisy. This will let us focus on one feature at a time. For the bounds checker specifically, this provides a mechanism to eliminate an entire class of array overflows with close to zero performance overhead (I cannot measure a difference). In my (mostly) defconfig, enabling bounds checking adds ~4200 checks to the kernel. Performance changes are in the noise, likely due to the branch predictors optimizing for the non-fail path. Some notes on the bounds checker: - it does not instrument {mem,str}*()-family functions, it only instruments direct indexed accesses (e.g. "foo[i]"). Dealing with the {mem,str}*()-family functions is a work-in-progress around CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE[1]. - it ignores flexible array members, including the very old single byte (e.g. "int foo[1];") declarations. (Note that GCC's implementation appears to ignore _all_ trailing arrays, but Clang only ignores empty, 0, and 1 byte arrays[2].) [1] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/6 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=92589 Suggested-by: Elena Petrova Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin --- lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ scripts/Makefile.ubsan | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan index 9deb655838b0..9b9f76d1a3f7 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan +++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan @@ -25,6 +25,26 @@ config UBSAN_TRAP the system. For some system builders this is an acceptable trade-off. +config UBSAN_BOUNDS + bool "Perform array index bounds checking" + depends on UBSAN + default UBSAN + help + This option enables detection of directly indexed out of bounds + array accesses, where the array size is known at compile time. + Note that this does not protect array overflows via bad calls + to the {str,mem}*cpy() family of functions (that is addressed + by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE). + +config UBSAN_MISC + bool "Enable all other Undefined Behavior sanity checks" + depends on UBSAN + default UBSAN + help + This option enables all sanity checks that don't have their + own Kconfig options. Disable this if you only want to have + individually selected checks. + config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL bool "Enable instrumentation for the entire kernel" depends on UBSAN diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan index 668a91510bfe..5b15bc425ec9 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan +++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan @@ -5,14 +5,19 @@ ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=alignment) endif +ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS + CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bounds) +endif + +ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_MISC CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=shift) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=unreachable) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow) - CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bounds) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=object-size) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bool) CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=enum) +endif ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error) -- 2.17.1