* [PATCH 1/3] sched: Remove __rcu annotation from cred pointer
@ 2020-02-07 18:05 Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 2/3] cred: Do not use RCU primitives to access " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from " Amol Grover
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Amol Grover @ 2020-02-07 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
James Morris, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, Jann Horn,
David Howells, Shakeel Butt, Eric W . Biederman, Andrew Morton,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris
Cc: linux-kernel-mentees, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Joel Fernandes,
Madhuparna Bhowmik, Paul E . McKenney, Amol Grover
task_struct::cred (subjective credentials) is *always* used
task-synchronously, hence, does not require RCU semantics.
task_struct::real_cred (objective credentials) can be used in
RCU context and its __rcu annotation is retained.
However, task_struct::cred and task_struct::real_cred *may*
point to the same object, hence, the object pointed to by
task_struct::cred *may* have RCU delayed freeing.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 716ad1d8d95e..39924e6e0cf2 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -879,8 +879,11 @@ struct task_struct {
/* Objective and real subjective task credentials (COW): */
const struct cred __rcu *real_cred;
- /* Effective (overridable) subjective task credentials (COW): */
- const struct cred __rcu *cred;
+ /*
+ * Effective (overridable) subjective task credentials (COW)
+ * which is used task-synchronously
+ */
+ const struct cred *cred;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* Cached requested key. */
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/3] cred: Do not use RCU primitives to access cred pointer
2020-02-07 18:05 [PATCH 1/3] sched: Remove __rcu annotation from cred pointer Amol Grover
@ 2020-02-07 18:05 ` Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from " Amol Grover
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Amol Grover @ 2020-02-07 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
James Morris, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, Jann Horn,
David Howells, Shakeel Butt, Eric W . Biederman, Andrew Morton,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris
Cc: linux-kernel-mentees, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Joel Fernandes,
Madhuparna Bhowmik, Paul E . McKenney, Amol Grover
Since task_struct::cred can only be used task-synchronously,
and is not visible to other threads under RCU context,
we do not require RCU primitives to read/write to it and incur
heavy barriers.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 5 ++---
kernel/cred.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263..5973791e5fe4 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -291,11 +291,10 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
/**
* current_cred - Access the current task's subjective credentials
*
- * Access the subjective credentials of the current task. RCU-safe,
- * since nobody else can modify it.
+ * Access the subjective credentials of the current task.
*/
#define current_cred() \
- rcu_dereference_protected(current->cred, 1)
+ (current->cred)
/**
* current_real_cred - Access the current task's objective credentials
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985b1793..3956c31d068d 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
- rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
+ task->cred = new;
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
*/
get_new_cred((struct cred *)new);
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
- rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
+ current->cred = new;
alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
validate_creds(old);
validate_creds(override);
alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
- rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+ current->cred = old;
alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
put_cred(override);
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
2020-02-07 18:05 [PATCH 1/3] sched: Remove __rcu annotation from cred pointer Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 2/3] cred: Do not use RCU primitives to access " Amol Grover
@ 2020-02-07 18:05 ` Amol Grover
2020-02-11 15:19 ` Paul Moore
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Amol Grover @ 2020-02-07 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
James Morris, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra, Jann Horn,
David Howells, Shakeel Butt, Eric W . Biederman, Andrew Morton,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris
Cc: linux-kernel-mentees, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Joel Fernandes,
Madhuparna Bhowmik, Paul E . McKenney, Amol Grover
task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
not required to read from it.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise.
- *
- * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
- * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
- * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
*/
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
struct audit_names *name,
- enum audit_state *state,
- bool task_creation)
+ enum audit_state *state)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
unsigned int sessionid;
- cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
+ cred = tsk->cred;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
- &state, true)) {
+ &state)) {
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
- &state, false)) {
+ &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
ctx->current_state = state;
return state;
@@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
- audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from " Amol Grover
@ 2020-02-11 15:19 ` Paul Moore
2020-02-13 8:11 ` Amol Grover
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2020-02-11 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Amol Grover
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
James Morris, Thomas Gleixner, Jann Horn, David Howells,
Shakeel Butt, Eric W . Biederman, Andrew Morton, Eric Paris,
linux-kernel-mentees, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Joel Fernandes,
Madhuparna Bhowmik, Paul E . McKenney
On Fri, Feb 7, 2020 at 1:08 PM Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
> not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
> not required to read from it.
>
> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
> Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
> ---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Considering the other changes in this patchset this change seems
reasonable to me. I'm assuming you were intending this patchset to go
in via some tree other than audit?
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
> /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
> * otherwise.
> - *
> - * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
> - * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
> - * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
> */
> static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> struct audit_krule *rule,
> struct audit_context *ctx,
> struct audit_names *name,
> - enum audit_state *state,
> - bool task_creation)
> + enum audit_state *state)
> {
> const struct cred *cred;
> int i, need_sid = 1;
> u32 sid;
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> - cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> + cred = tsk->cred;
>
> for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
> @@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
> rcu_read_lock();
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
> if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
> - &state, true)) {
> + &state)) {
> if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
> *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> @@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
> if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
> audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
> - &state, false)) {
> + &state)) {
> rcu_read_unlock();
> ctx->current_state = state;
> return state;
> @@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
>
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
> if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
> - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
> + audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
> ctx->current_state = state;
> return 1;
> }
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
2020-02-11 15:19 ` Paul Moore
@ 2020-02-13 8:11 ` Amol Grover
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Amol Grover @ 2020-02-13 8:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
James Morris, Thomas Gleixner, Jann Horn, David Howells,
Shakeel Butt, Eric W . Biederman, Andrew Morton, Eric Paris,
linux-kernel-mentees, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Joel Fernandes,
Madhuparna Bhowmik, Paul E . McKenney
On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 10:19:04AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 7, 2020 at 1:08 PM Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
> > not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
> > not required to read from it.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> Considering the other changes in this patchset this change seems
> reasonable to me. I'm assuming you were intending this patchset to go
> in via some tree other than audit?
>
Yes, that's correct. Thank you for the ack!
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
> > /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
> > * otherwise.
> > - *
> > - * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
> > - * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
> > - * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
> > */
> > static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > struct audit_krule *rule,
> > struct audit_context *ctx,
> > struct audit_names *name,
> > - enum audit_state *state,
> > - bool task_creation)
> > + enum audit_state *state)
> > {
> > const struct cred *cred;
> > int i, need_sid = 1;
> > u32 sid;
> > unsigned int sessionid;
> >
> > - cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> > + cred = tsk->cred;
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
> > struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
> > @@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
> > rcu_read_lock();
> > list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
> > if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
> > - &state, true)) {
> > + &state)) {
> > if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
> > *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
> > rcu_read_unlock();
> > @@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
> > if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
> > audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
> > - &state, false)) {
> > + &state)) {
> > rcu_read_unlock();
> > ctx->current_state = state;
> > return state;
> > @@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >
> > list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
> > if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
> > - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
> > + audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
> > ctx->current_state = state;
> > return 1;
> > }
> > --
> > 2.24.1
> >
>
>
> --
> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2020-02-07 18:05 [PATCH 1/3] sched: Remove __rcu annotation from cred pointer Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 2/3] cred: Do not use RCU primitives to access " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from " Amol Grover
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