From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B98CC35640 for ; Fri, 21 Feb 2020 08:12:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FBCD24673 for ; Fri, 21 Feb 2020 08:12:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1582272768; bh=qJfzYyV9Y0WYbfKEDYmFsAxQ6hgFWI3pRXz7mg64m7s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=gA1yRHCois39VQEekdXtjj0BxvOJX4pDCdzbdD/R/5qwpCmoI3ybAPH5JhowzFVar 70YpBaJJ3kxUD0xNSulu6uI2MuBAAjZGqS+NTOouDSnDndZgM4ViwpDrFmMMuLm/H/ oYz1pY+qUrij3wJ/hfBari9cQJA/8264ILuwHt1Q= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727872AbgBUIMr (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Feb 2020 03:12:47 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:48628 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732454AbgBUIMp (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Feb 2020 03:12:45 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2F0B024673; Fri, 21 Feb 2020 08:12:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1582272764; bh=qJfzYyV9Y0WYbfKEDYmFsAxQ6hgFWI3pRXz7mg64m7s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=2sy834ocKFPTXyNaZYveig5Mf8UbrM92L/UNo4w8I71tZgZpBgzBOiMwD8Wjm4g+b iZeF1WnnaUk8AP/6O6ypLJ1NRNlAKwFUUX0smq5vyOFmHkIyZHajTnciA2dhMHrIls 9Obf8WBUQNMT7G3u+HLl0r0LVBN8x/N5MQ6JpzCw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Ingo Molnar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.4 259/344] x86/mm: Fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 08:40:58 +0100 Message-Id: <20200221072413.126463845@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200221072349.335551332@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200221072349.335551332@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Ard Biesheuvel [ Upstream commit 75fbef0a8b6b4bb19b9a91b5214f846c2dc5139e ] The following commit: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 0d09cc5aad614..a19a71b4d1850 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ int __init kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, .pgd = pgd, .numpages = numpages, .mask_set = __pgprot(0), - .mask_clr = __pgprot(0), + .mask_clr = __pgprot(~page_flags & (_PAGE_NX|_PAGE_RW)), .flags = 0, }; @@ -2224,12 +2224,6 @@ int __init kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)) goto out; - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_NX)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_NX); - - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW); - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC)) cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr); -- 2.20.1